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the .means by which the ·"moral embarg~'' of "1936 i~as applied to Spain. 
The· study concent:rates··on.the United States-Congress·, Franklin Delano 
Ropseve.1t~ and t~e Department ·of s·tate. · ~.-
Realization, on the writer's part, 'of the .extreme diffic-ulty · 
. ' . '. ,'' . 
. ,..". ,, i~ . 
. ' . . 
facing one who is 3:ttempting to/understand--and evaluate thi-s_: one-·as.pect 
. ' 
of ,fcir<figti=p:olicy had much to do with the genesis of this thesis . 
. 'I. . 
. 
. . . -------------- --····-----·-- - ---····-· --------·- ---------- -- ------------ ------ ----~ - --~-
·-···-··-··----.,,--caCongress hacl ~et tli-e-riioocr·-of Amer:fc-an iieutrality by its act of 
• ,/ • '1 
j' l 
193.5. Its reactions to the·---sparifsn--crlsis of 193-6 are· examined ·in re--.~ 
-- -latiqnshi.p. to former legislation with emphasis on the many debates on. 
- neutral rights and· duties. 
. ' -~-----~------· ·---·~·---
(:.l 
_,..: ___ ;~~--- •• -·---~·----. ___ . · .• ----~ ----:-·----::-:------- -----·---- ~----- =:'."::_· ~ ----------·--~- - :. - -- -- . .. • ' - -- - ------ -------------- . . . -- . ·--- ·:-- - -· 
· ----=--=-=-:: ---~::-=--------Roosevelt is-:.examine-d---~both from his speeches and his private 
·==-------------, - --~------. . --. ' ' 
·-~;·--.- ---=--~--------·-·••.,• :_ ··-·--·---~---··--··-·•·.--."' --··-·-~--1.-.. ••---- ·-··•-~·••~-;·-,-.-··-~-.-------------.· •------·--•---.,-. ....._··--·• ·•-rr·--- ·""""~-----,••-• --•-·-~~-----·-----~···-·----•·-·--·---• -----··- ••-H·•··-• ·.,-.- ,, __ ,_,.,.._,..,,0...---·~·7;•,·•~ ··-~ ~ ~ --..---,~"'=·--•0 ···=~,,-, -~·-" ··---~,., · ~-·- "~.-···-- ••• -·~ .•. .,._, .. ____ ._,~ -._,.,. ··••, 
sympathies as they ·'tvere in cont.ra¢fiction with each other on· the embargo 
F.D.Ro's thinking on trade are incorporated'into the paper. Since F.DoRo 
was sc>' much concerned with his New Deal program, attention is also given 
.1 
to the Presidential election 1of 1936. 
-1-
1 1 t 'O I ' I ' ' \ ',' ~ 
' ., ,.) 
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The State Department policies and especially. the motivatio1:1s of c'l, ." 
,, -----·---·-·-- -----· -· ---·· _,· - -
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'public.' pressure -and foreign influence' are empha"sized in the thesis' as 
l!'ia,,~· 
·. tqell- ·as a·preseiitat:ion on t:h~ relationship b_etween- the American embargo 
Other -problems that are ·considered are the legal questions· at 
issue respecttng our rights and duties under international law, the con-







The 1936 policies show the weakness of .trying to coop·erate aria 
-----~----~·--- ··-
~ 
yet stay aloof at one and the same time" I have emphasized t~at if· we had 
. 
· wanted to stop the carn,age in Spa~n and prevent its spread to other nations 
- -
-------· ---·-···-- -------- --- - --- - ----
···----- - ··-·-·-·----··- ---- -------· ------·-- - --
- -- ---
- ------··- ----- ·------------·- - - . - -=-- - -
. . ---
- - --"tqe· · should h~ye-put our ___ fui·1:~tJeight behind Non~_~ntervention and prevented 
' ' / 
' ' ' 
' 
____ ..... -.... ,_ .. ____ ------· .. --·-----· 
' ,, ,,. · __ - ··- -----· 
__ · --..L--------
--------- .-~---·----·--·-··-:-·---------.. -------.. ,- ---·------.. -·--·"'"···-·-·· -··----·----··-- ... - -, 
- ···-·· -·-- -- --· 
this p_olicy,· from serving as a cloak· for appeasement o • Congress was dead 
set in its ways of isolation irt 1936, Roosevelt was fearful of e~ection, 






 · ---=--:_-------_· -_-----~---_-----·_---·_·--·. 
and Hull and his Department were willing to allow Europe to ·tfike. the lea·d ' 6 ' 
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§J1 ·lo INTRODUCTION 
/"'• 
,t In late July o? ·· 1936, Civil War erupted· in Spain. , It· came · as 
the climax to two decades of chaos and discontent. Since the end of 
World ·war I,. S.panish governments had engaged in a fruitless· search fol:· 
. 
political and economic stabilityo In the mid-twenties, the Spanish 
monarch allowed a military·dic_tator, General .Primo de Rivera,' to.take· 
control of the cou.ntr-y after the.King.'s econ?mic and social policies·-had 
I> ' " 
proved inept. But the depression destroyed any gains de.Rivera might 
have made and·in 1930 there was a revolution·with the more radical. 
_socialistic forces triumphing. A Republic was set up, but it brought 
no solution to the -~()_ttrit:ry ~ ~ _____ p_:t.Q_blem. _____ The __ new __ gov.C:?rnment-,.~becau~e of 
. 1 .. ----·--·----its liberal and an-ti..;.Catholic pqlicies, antagonized tI?.e strong con-f ---
- ~-- ---- __: ____ ---:-·----~------------···-- ------·-····-···· 
I I 
1 
, I servative elements in Spain as well as the church\ Strikes, p-0litical 








coali~ion was formed, · in,, an attempt to unite the divided· elements of the 
------ -------~-· • --·-····"' ... c 
~-- ---------
' , 
, left and bring about economic reforms.· It won the election of February, 
··----~----------.,! 
. I! 
I 1936; but~the conse;vative elements, partially motivated by a fear of I , .. 
. . ~ 
< • • 
' 
- ·-- ·--------------·---·---------~---- . . .-,-.,-~•-.. ••~ ... :., .... u.- ,,., • .,,. .. ,.,..-,,,.._., .. ·-,,c .. S,-•·•~~"~'--.---·1.· .,.,.-..,-,.1••·.,,.,, .. ,·••·•--,• --·~J,,--.•£ano,.-.. J..<.,.,..,,.,,,, • ., ,.,•~•~••••·--~•~,_, . .,,,-.~,~""'"'' ..... .,.~ ........ ,~ ,,·• -•,•• }.,~ .. P~'•"n•••"'":"""""''"""''""-u•»•,.••••·,-•••.•••-•••••••••••••rt•-·comm11nism···~~~=t.e"f.us~ed~fo::~~accep"""t-=:·~tl1~=-=new~~:·g••ever•n;e~~lt=~·:·;~d••·-•st-irre·d-•·up=·=new••""•"' •••••"• ,,.,••••-'-"-··-•""··-•"•"-'" __ ..... ,-••--•·•" ·f-·-------- ---,~~---·-········-------------·.·-·---·---.---··----······- - ! ., 
' 








. - . ·- ·- 11_ /\ . . . - . 
-- - . - -
·- ' - - . ' ' ' I I 
. Francisco ·Fran~o, and the revolution soon sp~ead. The Re,publiC!~n f..grc~s, 
... --·-····---- · .. -·. _ ··"-· · _ _-_ · -
· .. , ..•. .,..,_,, _ _,, ... , •... ,u.,.,,..,a1~.,, •• ...._g__.-.- .. ·-- -
(Loyal'ists) mobilized for war, even after a larger part of the army had 
1 already defected to Franco. 
I/ 
''M"-. ,.........r!~·-··:.A•-• __ .. :··. ·-,:-~~~ .... · -~------·--··, ·- .. -, . :. • ,j. ·;-" • •••••,-,1 __ ' __ .. J,•. ;J,, __ J .,.,. ·'--x~---.--,- ••-.. ,i-' , •-• '•-. \~,-__,_.. __ .,,. -~-'_,,._. '·-~-~·' - ,-- ,',.L' ,_,' ___ J, 
--·.·· .,._._,-; --,----
··· ... - ~---- ,--.,,..,, 




·-· · ••••• ~r ..... ,., •• - ----·- -·'--. ··-· - -----··--· ., • 
' '· 
. j),' . " ' " ' ... 4· 





« . ~ ...... , 
=i,,'tff<,t In any event by the end of July, it wa:s obvious that the Spanish 
- - --·-· --··-···- ----·-
. The·=id~~oi•'Og-i~;-1· ... d.il:1: e-~en.~e~~---.• i~_yo_l:v,i.4 .. '· '--. · 
. . . . ' : . . : . . '" ,::;·. . - . . . ,, . . . "' 
a.dded to its intensity. Franco had made no' effort to hide th{iact· that 
:... 
.... 
he was a Fascist and rece_~'7-~~-?P~~--a:id fr_~~- ~_taly and Ge:rmanr. _ _ Demo-
• ' I . 
. 
cratic· France on the other hand wanted to help her · sister Republic o Even . . - i., 
,;_--~ 
. ' 
,.;;_ ·::. -- . - ...• -·· ---·-
- ... . - ....... -···· --·-· 
... --- ~---,.-.. -.-~" .. ,, - --· -
Russia threatened to enter the picture .. by qssisting ·the Popular Front 
coalition against the dreaded enemy Fascism~ Thus ,the implications of 
this· conflict were far reaching and excep~io~ally dangerous. 
'Xo England and France, the Spanish war was a' horrifying. ,develop-
. ment that threatened to upset all their previous ef-forts to bring a 
. s.table peace to Europe. Only n·ine. mo~ths earlier, this .peace had been 
,, jeopar~ized by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. However, though the 
Ethiopian invasion was a breach of the peace it.held much· less of a 
·, 
had at least taken place in Africa, and not on the European continent. 
-. The revolt in Spain was right on the French frontier, and the dange~s. of ; ~ .. 
the war's close proximity to the heart .of th~ continent were enormous. 
If any power tried to assist either of the Spanish combatants,·· the war 








·····-·---·-···-,- ....:.:..::__ _________ ·- ----~----------
The S·panish Government showed that ~ spreacl of the_ conflict was 







. .. - ---- - -- ·- .. Germany we:~e~'backing the Insur.gents. After a little hesitation and con-
sultation with England, the French Premier, decided on August 4, 1936 
. 2 
not to permit the purchase. Instead France would attempt to get pledges 
from every European power that each would abstain' from selling arms to 








-- '-, -•••- - '·--~~-~ • ._ - 'I 




,, I . 
I [ /. 
;:( 
,. 
'II,, 1 \ 
- . 
either of the Span.ish participants. · A Non-Intervention Conunittee (NIC) 
I 
- - - - - --- -·--·---------·------· -- . ·-- ----------·--- . -----·---·--···----·------~,---------~ 
_, ____ . --- . , ··-··-··----·---~·--·----·-··---· ----·------------~~·~-,, ..... --··,._,,,_.,.,,...-,-- -.-_-,-------:-~:~-~~·~-~:-~----- .":- .-_. ___ . -------
'f.'li . ' ,, 





~ } ' , .. 
. ·~ 
. . . . . 
. . 
·had agreed t~· join, includi:ng Italy, Germany and Russia.· Thoug~ the 
·. ,, ... ----fr.ench ~e_re q~t~l'l.§i_bJy __ J::lle_-·organize_rs.of·this_ pact, there is tittle------------ --- -- ····--- -------_--- - -s• ----·-- --···· _. .......... - -=+.-.. 
. ~~ '-':t, '..'/' ,,-'·•,·~· . . ' ' •, 
·, 
·doubt that the British played a very ~mportant role.··-- Both countrie·s 
- . ·4 
. . 
h~cto,ggcided that "the war rqust either -be halted or at least kept ·cont:ained 
. c···~, 
. . ' 
with.ire- the· S1;,anish borders .. 
' . 
. In· any case it-·should- not _be· allowed to_ 
., 
reach the proportio1!-s that ~ou·ld envelop·=·:'all of Europe _ in a, general war o 
Even when Italy_ and Ger~any were openly flouting the Non-Intervention 
_ -Agreement- and,---C~mmftteei, --'the ·two democr.acies still citing to. their . ·dreams 




democracies -of Europ~ wex:.e· more concerned with peace than the down£ all-
of a sister democracy. - The appeasement policy first instituted in the 
-- It-al-ian :war was -now· being applied to Spain~ 
- ---- --··-· - - - -
Non-intervention, howeve:r;, could not be .-/n\"effective. policy./" __ c,,--
unless America adopted as,imilar attitude. If a power as large.as the 
United States dec.ided to allow the Spc1:nish government or the Insurgents 
to purchase arms, then all th~ efforts of Engl~nd and France wotild be for 
n~ught. -·- A conference that was held in the Secretary of State's off ice 
on August.5, 1936 indicated that the United States policymakers wantea 







French policy, the United"States did adopt a policy similar in: principle 
·-----·-------- -.~-------------·-1:0-"that of the--flon::·rnt-ervention agreetnent, though_ fc;rr_ different reasons C, 
American foreign policy in regard to Europe during the mid-1930's 
was essentially isolati9~ist. Most Americans wanted one thing from their 
























.. I . 
. ,1 
to do with. European tr·-oubles and wars. World War I had bee,n.,. sufficient 
. . . .. ···\ 
proof of the useless-ne·ss of United Sta~es j.nvolvement in a cont~nent 
•.•. ' •~- • ., .•... ';• 
'l • . 3,000 miles awayG Ever since that World War··the United State~_·had with-
."· 
drawn .into· its· Western::Hemisphe-ric __ sh~ll, indifferent .to events abroad · . 
that did not immediately concern Amer.ica .. · · It had firmly rejected 
... 
membership in the League .of Nations and -the World Court. . In the rare 
. -cas~s th-at-th-~~~--~·co_t1:c1.-try-·--g·i~ ye11t1=1re-out into.the world, .it was over some.· 
t:rea.ty that. required n_othing "more from America than a signature. The 
... -
. . 
Kellogg.-Br.iand Pact with j.ts grandiose :J?D-rases calling for the abolition 
'!. ~ 
. · of. ivar, .. and its failure to --indicate- -the me-ans 0£- enforcement, was such 
,.. an example . 
I.f America up until 1934-'-h-ad--not--be-en--convinced--··that-·-th-is-
country should stay out o'f European affairs, the Nye i~Commit"tee hearing 
did c~nvince it.4 . The United States, the committee found, had not been 
r, 




defend· its rights against the Ge~n submal:ine. 5 Rather· the-se ~onsider-
• I ' 
ations had, simply -been a fac:ade· behind which the- munitions makers' 
··--·· 
. -t-- - ..... - - - --· ........ 0 :~_·_-_ __ ::__. _____ ,, _____ ,. .... -------·-·· 
.profiteers and- bankers hid in order to ·.get America to protect their 
American public's attention was focused square·ly- on foreign policy. 
·- · ·Bookstands. were.~ f·lo~o_ded~-wtth--antf-;;;war-pub·licat·ions··and~·-gro.ups._we1;e ... f.ormed---- .. · 
a9ross the country' under such titles as "The National Council for the 
' 6 
Preventio11 of War. n America became determined that the mistake of 
letting the United States get dragged into the European war of 1914 would 
not happen againo 
''\ 
.. 
.: .... ,.,i, ......... . 
C I ,- - -
.,,,,,, 








-7 . 0 
\> 
-As 11European af.fairs woriiened the desire· for isolation increased 
co~_respondingly,,, .The· -Italo-Ethiopian Wa~, the ri;e_ .of. :Hitler .and the 
· Rhine'land Putsch indicated that the_ continental -·pot was once again 
.beginning to·-boil:.-:----Americans seemed- -to--view the troubles -a-s a ·repe-
- • ·: ...... 1·-· 
. -- • ,,.r·---' tition of -the days before World War I and decided it would be best (to 
.. leave.that chaotic continent to its own.folly" As one author put it, 
,,_t'I--
. :1 
- . ·_ , ---, 
' 
"Ther_e was a ~la.tional stampede for the _storm cellar to sit out the 
I I ' 
,· 
tempe_.sts ·ahead .. " 7 . ·Isolation became firmly ·entrenched and became· a 
, ,. J -
major factor in determining .f.uture American foreign policy o Those 
people 'tvho wanted America to- take a· m6re cooperative ~pproach towards 
' 
world' affairs. were fighti,ng what appeared to be a useless battle. The 
;; 
· isotationist segment ,of the country believed that ,the best way to pre .... 
vent America from being dragged __ into another war was to build a pro-
tective shield around the countryo The internationalists' belief that 
. -·., they started was effectively coun-tered. Biif in ariy event neither:of 
these groups wanted the United States involved in a war. Even the 







· • helping to gain world peace . ______ :Wc1:r ___ wc1,_~ 1:>eyond their limits. The new '_ ·---------- -·--- ---- ----------- ------- -·~--. ------------- -·-·--- - ---- -- --------- --------··--· --------·----- . . - . 





Repubtic magazine stated simp1.y that "No development in any one country, 
- # - -- ---- --- -
-- --- - - • ·- •• - :: _---;-·------- ·- - --~-- --·--·-----··--·-----·---·-- --_ 
- ·-·-·· ·-·- ---·--------. ····-· -- - -- ·----. ··#---·--·-·:··· ---·.-:---------
_In _1935, isolation~_be.came. more than a neg_a;tve P9.!.~~-y ,-~_f __ what 
the. Unitecl Sta.te:s:·should not do.- In that year .the first of- the se1:reral 
- .--
Neutrality Act.s lvas implemented as a result of the Italo-EtI1iopian War. 
This Congressional measure called for the prohibition _of all American 
arms exports to countries involyed in war. The President was directed 
, 










to de·termine if· a state. of war existed between• two or more countries and 
then·declare that an embar,g~ would be invoked against all bellige!ent~, 
<;:). 
~ ' •.• l 
) aggress.ors and victims· alike. . Since many isolationists held that . 
_../ ' . 
- - .. -- -·· .Ame.rican-invo.lvement in World _War. I h·ad been caused by.the arms pr_9f- .... 
iteers, a. .. mandatory trade· ·embargo on ·weapons. would give· the United States 










strtct neutrality policy, Americans seemed to believe that they could 
~ . . . . 
erect a shield,. around .. this country which e~en the President could not 
set aside. Whatever would occur in ·Europe., th-is -country would remain 
·, 
safe., ·As one author noted, America wrapped itself· up in a mantle of 
. ' 9 
neutrality and laid down to -sleep like a "somnolent giant." 
' 
However; the 1935 neutrality act and the later amended bill of,. 
1936 only applied to nations at war. Congress in its ·attempt to be as 
speci~·ic as pos~ible had preyented the application of these acts to 
' '• 
·any other type of war:..specifically a. civil one. It was this loophole · 
that was glaringly displayed by the outbreak of civil strife in Spain. 
And it was this gap in the legislation that. created an explosive problem 
. for the Administration of Franklin D. ,Roosevelt.· 
-
Since Congress was not in session when the Spanish cri·sis 
. ' 
occurred, it was up to the President and the State· Department to formulate 
a policy towards the conflict. 
~<- ' ' ' 
Under tn~ leadership of President, 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the government decided 
to adopt a policy of "strict neutrality." It was first announced 
~rather quietly on August 7, 1936, in a directive by Acting Secretary 
of State William Phillips to all foreign embassies. In the message, he 
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. 6 . -
- g ,,; ' 
., '' .. ,., ' . 
country _wouid not intervene in any way with the Spanish war. lO The 
... ,, 
Nation's representatives were to remain aloof from showing partiality 
to either the Loyalists, as the Republican. forces were known~- or "the , 
I • ~ 
• 
",' 
-Insurgents,.. Two days later; the Depa.rtmen·t irtfotm.ed the ttationR s---~-
f 
munitions manufacturers that they too would be expected, to·remain 
- 11. 
aloof of the waro ,Though t~e formal !3mbargo set up under the 1935 
Neutrality Act did not apply, the State n·epartment nevrrthele·ss 
\ 
' ' 
requested. that the:- spirit of that Act be maintained. ·· It would not 
I, 
- ' ' look favorably up_on any attempt by a munitions manufacturer to obtain . 
a license to export arms to Spain. In effect the government had 
instituted a "moral embargo." 
' 
.. -· . I, 
.For four months this moral embargo remained in effect, under 
' ' 
the sole responsibli.ty of the State· Depa~tment. ·.However, on·· December· 
2s·,. Robert Cuse, a second-hand junk dealer in Jersey City, requested . 
clearance to ship arms and aircraft engines to the ·Loyalists on the 
I 




He refused to listen to the ·pleas of 
the Departmei-1t and the President to refrain from such an· act. As a , 
- ' ' ' 0 , 
\ 
· ds~lt;~·-aengr·{ss was requested to pass an Emergency Embargo Resolution 
; .. 1 
• '·111 
















·---~~- __ _____ : ___ ___ The __ '.President. presented-the_c_.problem 1to the---newly convened--75-t-h-=con-g-re~ss-·------.-. --------------
.. 1'- ·, 
on January 3, 1937 and by January 8th th~-Legislature'.had.p'assed the.-·-~--=--·----· 
Resolution by 
406-1 and the 
an overwhelming majority; the ·House_ .favored the embargo 
12 •' . · · 
Senate 80-0. Thus a formal ban repl~ced the moral one. 
And it was this embargo policy that ,vas to remain in effect until 
-., 
General Franco had fin~lly gained full control of Spain. Essentially 
',• 
' ~- ' the government did not vary its pol~cy from August 1936 until March· 1939, 













such.constancy of purpose.,·By the-time the formal embargo was-insti- _ 
- Y' 
, • tuted in-·January )937 many_ s·egme~ts- of the American public had become 
---
., .. __ ,..,I partial· to either the Loyalis,ts or Insurgents., 
,,)r?°'',,1!,tr."'•'!.'-" 1,-.-{, ;,,.f"4 • 
And those ,;vho favored 





a' the sympathizers· of Franco worked equally as hard to make .sure the ban 
-was retained o- A debate--'·ensue·d ~hrdughout the. war with one element 
(I 
'1 
trying to ~E~V~ __ the unneutralft;y of the embargo and the oth'er just. _the --·•-, ----------- ~-
opposite. 
• • -~ •-•M ... • > 
·_ Inasmuch as the ~mqargo controversy in the United States 
raise~_ several important alternatives with, regard to American~neu.trality 
policy, a few observations should be made on the subject. 
Professors Jessup and ·Padelford have shown that th.ere were a .... -
/ 
number of different interpretations of neutraiity··. The various schools 
,-
of thought were .the traditional, isolationist and executive discretion. 
----·----~-· --Tlie- United- States was free to choose from a number of ·neutrality \ .. 
policies o 
·>, The traditional policy wou-ld allow us to assert "freedom of 
the seas," and the right to trade .. Inherent in the fundamental 
6 
. J 
international .law and relations, is the right of each state to decide 
-· with v1hom it is going to trade, providing it will take the risks 








"On the./other. hand, we could abandon the .defense of traditio.na.l ~ 
,- , 
. . ... 
./ . 
rights' ~t sea and isolat~ ,purs~lves from all contacts with .the opposing 
Jf 
.14 ·,· · . · , 
·powers .. · Hence, we ·could restrict our trade and· go beyond the require-
· 111ents of interna·tiorial law. sb. as ~ot to -risk .irivolv~merit: :in a crisis .• 
a 
The right of a·. goy~_rnme.nt to make c,,ommerce in any commodity unlawful . 
. 
and· prohibited cannot be legally questioned. 'It is unfortunate if the····· 




. . ' ·., 15 
·established go~e'rnment. , 
. To insure· peace for the'. country, Congress was riot prepared ,,~Q ... 
. r.j 
· . s~:~t~. 
r, .. 
• ,,> 
sever all co~ercial ties. . It compromised the tragitional and iso-
11_)' 
... 
lationist policies to allow the President freedom to decide the kinds of 
' circumstances v1hich, if arms. were exported, would threaten peace; when· 
.-· 
the peace ~.~· endangered .and wh~n it is not; and what kinds of materials 
to restrain and for how long.· Hence, the chief executive_ might judge 
• 4. •• 
and act properly in the interest· of the United St~.t.es in the varying 
( 
,, .... '·' ..... .. · . 1·6~-"-·•··l· 
circumstances under __ which civi-1 :strife may ·appear and develop. 
< 
None of the restrictions in .the Neutrality Acts were needed 
to establish the neutrality of the United· S~ates- in international law .. 
,• 
' ' Their real purpose was to minimize .provocative incidents like tho.se of 
past wars. -The underlying principle was clearly isolation~-but only 
., >\''"~··-•·----- ,,., ,_.,,-,.,., -~-l' , •.. •:,,~ .. - .• , ~·,·• ,._ ..•• ,.,,...·-., • .- • ._.,,\, ... ;_'.,.. •. " . .o---•-"'l·-·'lo\h,•,..,.-, _,,._, •. , ...... ,, .•• :,.,;-,1~-~·,r•,h<-_,.c.·-··«',.,·•;,.,- .... ,·.,,.,--. -·<"'I>~ .... ;,.,-- ~, ..... - ... , •'··· .-.-.. ~. -·-·- -"--'·-·· 
as much isolation as would be compatible.with the economic interests 
" 
of the country . 
~ .. ·.··· __ J 
. _ . _ ., ---- -•····•--•·---·• __ :,._ .• __,_, .. __ ,-•-~----·-·--····•'""·-- •'"--"·-··-~-----• .. •-~---•·•-•--·•-,o--,,,.u"" __ .. ,,.~ .. t.P•~••" ""'•-'"'"·•4,._, ... ,_._._ ·•-·"-"·-~••·•• -·-··---·'~ -•••--"•••-···-· •···-• ,.,. .• ,,, ,,,,. -~, -··-~·--·« .~,, .. ~,-,._, • .~·· ·_,_.,. -~--•~•"---,•-··•-·-••••~u,' ,,u,,p.---• ·•·-·••• •••••~• 'l••-·u,,•-• •••··•• '• ••• • ····"""" ·-• ,,, -•-•• • ~~·•--• ••••--·-·••••,.<• ,~,,,--.~, ·>-••,•~ -•·-,•~· 
From the outset of· the ·war, Americans had shown an interest in 
,, . 
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'1 
reports~on the war. The New Republic, Catholic Worl<;l, and the Nation 
were among the magazine,s that showed' a deep interest in the events in 
' . 
... ' ,\ 
Spain .. And this interest intensified as America made its own position 
clear. Reporters went to the scene of the war and slanted· their stories 
to favor one side or the other. The Times even had two correspondents, 
\' 
one who wrote the war from the Reb~~"-·_pq,i.nt of view and anothEir· who 
-12. 
gave the Republican accounts. Most· other publications, however, were not 
nearly so fair. 
:i_: 
Tq ... .rrtost of America. the Spanis4 War· had become an· ideological. 
struggle of tremendous ·(magnitude. The Republica·n government because __ of 
\. its Popular Front coalition had-, become known as "communistic" and to 
·., 
many Catholics and conservatives,. Franco was saving Spain from the "Reds-". 
·, 
On th~ o.ther hand the more liberal elements believed that the Spani.sh 
", 
17 War wa~ another crucial duel between Fascism- and democracy. Italy 
and Germany were trying to undermine democracy throughout Europe_ and had: Qc • 
') 
now picked Spain as the battlefield. Fasc.ism was the oµe enemy of 
democracy and,.accordingly, had to be stopped. Thus the embargo should 
,J 
. be l_ifted~ so that the Republic could purchase anns ~nd _defeat'-·Franco. 
' ~ , I 
• 
-· The- pro-Loyalist elements·_ aiso· got th:e support of those Americans who 
believed our embargo was :i.llega-1 in terms of international law a By 
bannin~_arms to_ a formally re·cognized .government we were--in--fact- being 




. --·· - .. i 
. untteutral .. · 





happenings in Spain, as the Spanish conflict be·came more than a question I ! 
of ideology o Hotveve1;, when the government was establishing_ its embargo 
. '\ ... 







Loyalist cause. The fear of war was._s~ more prevel~nt than a desire. 
to sa\Te democracy ... As the ,New Republic said: "Many Americans of 
.. 
. l.iberfJ-1 sympathies are, it is obvious, troubled as to the attitude they 




· been brought up· td oppose all milit;ary activity it). wl1atever cause"· 
... 
. They 'have also schooled themselves to believe thqt the United States and 
·)its citizens should k~ep aloof,· to the utmost pnssible extent, from all 
European quarrels, in the c·onviction th·at·anotherWorldWaris impending .. 
Those who are 30. years of age .or more have .painful memories of a 
previous occasion in which the United States intervened in European. . . 
affairs with· results about equally disastrous for the Old World· and the 
··N. , ,.19 
ew. This indecisiveness and demand for peace was a major fa~t.or in 
. . determining the government's position. Organized resistance to the 
• 
embargo policy came too· late. -~ 
-
-- -----
·.)-.:···1 · High government officials also began ·to object to the embargo ·:t,. 
in the years fol-l_owing 1936 o Ha_rold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, 
Ce, 
• I ' ', =~ • 20 called the. policy a "black pag_e 1n American history o" Claude .Bowers., 
0 the American Ambassador to Spain during the war, became -highly c,;~t}.cal 
··. -,·- ..... -
of the arms'. ban and attempted to get the State Department· to lift ito 21 
'i) 
In· Congress the staunchest isol~tionist of them all, Senator Gerald Po 
-----·------------- ---
--·----------·---------·-----
- . --- ------· ~-----'··,< ·-·---- ---- - - ----- -----· -----~--·-~·-------- ••• -
. ----- Nye;'\vas ·to labe-l'the embargo ari "unneutral" act, and.sought to ·have 
,·-.· _, 
·-··· - -··----·-·· ---·--··--·----·-·--'"-- . --------- -- --·- - - - . - ---· ------ --- --22 . . . . . .... . ·- ............. ·:·-·.·······--··----···-··-·-·· 
- -----~·--·-· ...... ---- .. - ----~- -- . -




····-----·----~- -------,...--------·--·-··--·--·"-···--·-de:c-isi·on ·· 1:-0 pre\te'fit·· .i:ffm.s···-fr-oiii .. reacliing:··1:h,.e -~--o-nnaiiy.,--recbgnized Spanish 
g<?vernment was a "grave mistake and that it con~roverted old American 
, principles and invalidated established international .. law o vv~ 3 In the · 
light of these opinions the obvious question ari·ses, why was the embargo 
I I 
I'' , ,· 1: 
' .. ':.) 
.,-, " .. 
-•·---' =•-• -- -















segments of the government that were responsible for the August 7th 
dir:ect,ive ,and . tl1e January 8th Emergency_, Re~olution? 
' . 
. ·Basically, , the foll<;>wing discussion will center around the 
·, 
moti.ves and motions '.of Congress, the State . Department and Presiden·t, · 
Frankl in Delano Rooseve 1 t. '' ' •• ( ., I ·Each area will be studied to d'eterniine ,tli.'e 
.. 
major factors, that led to their acceptance of the. Spanish Emb~rgo· ., l ' 
. 
. 
. ' .. ' .... ,,, 
-14. 












... ----·- - ,-,·.:~ . 
.. to the Spanish·_,cr·isis. becomes"'- even more inte.resting in light of the later 
- ····-·· ' ..... ,<f 
·antic::,embarg~stand by the-leading.isolationist.of Congress,. Gerald ·-P. 
Nye~ Though"'Congress may have passed the Emergency Resolution by an 
; 
·i...~ ' . • 
overwhelming majority, at_l was not. as united in'"view as the vote . 
indica'ted. 
·· Roosevelt presents a different problem. His views on neutrality~-· 
· and es.pecially the Spanish embargo are known from ·his speeches, · ye.t ,his 
. - - - ----- .. -----;· ··- ·--· ·•··-· ····-<-• ---
private sympathies as reported by those closest~, to him were contra-
dictory to his public position. ;It is in the light of this .contra-
. '''' \ •.•' ,~.,,_ 




. •· l 
I 
--· ---- -----·--- ---·--·- ........ -------------- f -·--·-------· ----·-- - ---------- ····--·--· ---·- -- --- - -------------·· ------. ---· ·-----~-------· ------ - •---- - ----
- ·---- ---- .... --·--------·:diction that his motivation is to be stud'ied. As president, Roosevelt 
- -------- -- ,--·---- ---- ------ - .. ---,------ -·--- --- . -··-·· - - . - -·-- --- --··---- - -- - --- -·-·--- -----· ·----- -
. ·--·----- .. .--···-· --·- .. --- .. -- - .. -·-·-·-- -· - ·---------"-·-·--·--·"-·-_ .... ___ .! 
, 
. 
. . . . I his·influence_because of h·is.posit:i:on is all important .. · Since F~.n.R.. f 
was so .. much concerned with the political success of his New Deal 
program, . some attention will of necessity be given to the presidential 






The State Department, because it played tpe leading role in 
formulating the Spanish policy, is the most important of the government. 
,. 
agencies under study~ As· the agency responsible for foreign policy,. 
. ' 
the Department ls in especially close contact with ·other countries. 
Thus the motivations of Cordell Hull, ··and his· principle assist:ants, 
·--.......l ' 
W.illiam Phillips and· R. Walton Moore extend beyond domestic pressures 
. . 
and considerations. Tlle obviou·s _relationship between the American embargo 
' . 
. ;'.\..' ''~ 
I 
. , 1 
I 
··and the , Europe,,an Non-Inte_rvention Pact implies a ·much less isolationist 
,. r 
· ···-··---------,-::-~--------:--·-~-_:_ _______ ,,-s·tana~-~tnarf-clie . p.iiol-ic~seeniea-~to~·wan'--f· ·-'iin·a--·afr·11.~-re1>rrlt-adds---to~---the·c--eom----· ·-·---~----- ·:·----~---.-, ./; . . 
. . , ) . • I' .· , •. • ,1 •. . 
_.. . " ,1 
.*\ . • J 
• l1i 
pl.exity of'· tinderstand:j.ng the. mo'tivation behind the ·Amer"ican Embargo Ii 
q 
' Policyo _ -Several writers claim that the ~ritish foreign office in-
''' ',. ' 
·.' f luen·ced D~_paitmen.'f policy ··in .regard to Spain arid_ thus the question 
. 
. 
aris~s· as to how much influence the actions of foreign nations had on 
tl1.e ·final decision. This is 9iscussed in Chapter, 4 .. 
Other questions a,.lso must be considered that c~ncern .Rossevelt, 
.. C9ngress ·and the State Department alike. · Of prime imp·ortan.ce· are ·.the · · 
. ~-- ...... ~-... . 
legal questions .-at, issue respecting our right~ and· duties under· inter-
! 
·national law. Why did the government decide · that the· Spanish Government 
and rebels should be treated in ~quivalent fashion. Traditionally, 
as several' international· lawyers and authori'ties pointed out,· 8: legally 





, . ' 
! 





•;-. . . •, . •·-· ------·------- ··---------- --- .... 
______________________ Jne.nt, in regar.ding the. rebels in· the same way as the Loyalists was re-
versing a tradition that this country had helped establish during, the 
American Civil War. At that time thC:1 Federal. Government declared that 
. ·' 
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the same rights as the legally constituted government, and if any -
neutral natio·n did accord them such rights it would be gu,ilty of im-== 
y 
°": . 
proper and unfriendly action. What was so important to th~ various 
elements of ,the American- Gover·nment in 1936 ·that they should <l.eny the 
·rec • 
Spanish Republic these sarne traditional rights? 
•., . 
-16 
In connection with this, there is the question of how much did-





Governme:nt. Was Congress., ·Hull or Roosevel-t concern·ea with- the fate of· 
























• •' t ·., ' -_- -
1.., • ..:, 
' . •/ 
-Spanish d~mocracy? Did they· take sid~s with those groups within the 
c;~ • 
:, 
· public -arguing 'that the Ins_urgents were saving 'Spain from Conununism or 
with others who saw the rebels as a Fascist threat .to world peace? In 
' 
. 
effect then, were the·-- motivations behind· the- embargo .one of isolation, 
r= 
ideology, or .coopera~ion? 
. --.. 
) ' . 
'. ,., 
' 
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tJhen the 75th Congress convened in January, 1937 the first 




.• · .. 
Civil War. · Within three days after the formal resolution was presented, ~· 
/"-Z 
/ 
the Senate and House oye.rwhe lming ly yoted their approval. The moral 
. ' .... -,.•J 
embargo of Hull and Roosevelt now became ·a formal law of· the United· 
. --·----- -------···---·-- ·-·-··----·----- - ----~ ---- .. 
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! ' •' •I 
St~tes Government on January 8, 1937. ~ ·such action in view· of Con-
. ' ~ 
gressional a·ttitudes was of .course not surprising.. From 1936 until 
· late 1939, Congress was under the control of· the isolationists.. In 
',, 
rega:rd to ,._foreign policy Congress had only one main .objective - to keep , 
the United States· out of European ·troubles o The Spanish Civil War was 
~ . ' . 
only. another disconcerting probl:em. from· across the Atlantic and had to 
tfo 
. :,·remairi a European concern alone. 
Mo.re ·than any oth·er branch of the Government the Legislature 
• I 
is, of ·course, closest to the people. The individual representative from 
his local district tries-to know what 'his electorate wishes., and on.the 
. . - -
. ~ 
whole votes accordingly. The Nye PCommi ttee hearings had brought the··· 
question of why we entered Wortd War ·I and· the American.- people -wanted. to. 
. I . 
insure themselve'S· that it would never happen, again. Congress complied 
. ' ' ---, 
./ 
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at,removing the profits from war by placing heavy taxes or quotas on 
munition makers. In· this way, the rationale wen·t, the "blood suckers" 
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and thus the United States.would not be forced into a .war in order to 
defend their '-interests; 26 · Orte such .. bill was introduced by Representative 
• Mcswain 'tvhich proposed a 100% tax on excess war profits. 
. . 
This measure . 
,- . . -.: -- ·----·~----Z" . 
' ' ,. ' .... ,, ~' :, 
pas~ed. the !louse but was shelved in the Senate.. In the· ·1attet chamber, 
• • ··1 
. b ; 
,Senator;_Nye proposed an even more drastic bill. Bes.ides giving the 
President wide discretionary economic powers, as the· McSwain 'bill also 
had done, Nye wanted to limit_ wa·rtime corporate earnings to 3% on,.) 
,, 
· invested capital, ip.crease taxes on personal wartime income, and con-
... ·.. . , . . .. . .. . . . .. .. . . 27 
·_ fis·cate· a.1-1 profits from war exceeding $I00,.00().: . ·· However~ thi"s··b.ill 
. 
met the same fate as Mcswain• s· and· nothing ever came of it. The 
~erican people were not ready for such drastic action. 
____ .--4' 
,. 
, ' ' 
With· the outb·reak of war between Ita_ly and Ethiopia, rrowever, · 
Congre~s stopped talking about neutral*ty ~nd debided upon definite actiono 
, ,~··· ,., r 
,. 
~By August of 193·5, a tempora:t_y neutrality· law was whisked through _ 
~ -· ! 
Co~gres.s, and· passed with an overwhelmingly favorable majority. The 
i~nly real debat~ had been ov~r,. h'.ow inuch'·.dis~retion: the President should 
be given in invoking a~-- ~Ill.'f.?~l:'_g9·0. -Roosevelt's desire to be able. to ··dif~. ····.--·-----------·-----~-.--~- --·-- ·--· - --- -- . ·-·-------·-·-- -····-~-- -·- -
·fe-rentj~a:t~ p~tween the. aggres_sor and the victim in a war in applying the 
· embargo segment of the new law got little support. Any embargo legis-· 
<' 
lation, Congress decided, was _to be mandatory for all belligerents, 
tr: 




























I ,: " , 1 
·war, not assume responsibi~:i:~Y ~~; stoppf!}g __ ~ggressioJ:!. _ -~ey_._~a~1:-~~-- ~-<?--·-·- ·--- ____ -··--···-·----L 
I 
i 
. - .. ;: -- - - . 1-
. -
reduce ''the points· of contact between America ~nd the outside· worl_4"'.- · 
l, 
! 






President ·to help the "good," side over the "bad" could lead to the same . 








·' ' j 
I • 
- -- --- -- -- ~--------=~-----==....._...."'""""""'....,_ ___ !!!!!!!!l!!~--!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!=i!I! 
:_-__ ..:_::_._--· _ _;;_,_·:',ic.•:.: ~-_. 
.. 
• I. 
•· The 1935 bill specifically stated that once the President 
declared that two nations were at 'tvar, any arms sh~pments to these·~ 
_countries would be illegal.o To enforce this, the bill-called for tl1e 
·1 
l 
formation of a Nati~nal'· Munitions Control Board. This group was .to 
supervise.a.11 future arms exports whether it be peace 9r war time. As 
a -result of thi~, Congress believed it had .given the people the 
-19 
. I 
security they -wantE:d.. However, no group_ was particularly happy vJith the 
1935 act. It ~vas drawn up in haste ~nd rushed through- Congress witl1 a 
minimum amount of discus·sion.. It was intended to· be only- a temporary 
measure, but before i_f' expired in .1936 it was quickly rene,;vedo The only 
change in the 1936 neutrality bill was a provision added in deference 
to Senator Nye o Nye had cLaimed that embargoing munitions was not 
suff'icient: 
... since wars are for economic causes basically, it 
is as important to avoid-becoming involved in en-_ 
tangling economic alliances· .... It is useless to pre·-
tend that our isolation· from foreign policy entangle-
ments means anything if we open wide the gates to 
foreign loans· and credits ·for munitions.,, ,,29 
The embargo on war:·mater~ials wasr- also· now· exte·nded to include·· 
loans and credits .. The administr~eion again raised objectio~s to the 
- . 
. 
mandatory clause, .but there wa~ yet little Congressional support for 
. 
. 
. . ..... ' 
•I' 
• ---j. -- ~ - - --·~ ..... - .... "'" ... , .. ..-- ..... -·- ......... ~,-~,, • .. 
- ... - ····-h· 
I 
I 
-------- ·;. - . ~ ··-~executive-·discret~on:i"'"' ___ c~~-g·;~-~s beli~ved that Americ~ns wanted to. be . 
) 
I ( 
. guaranteed they would ·never again find themselves sending American boys 
. ~ 
-to -Eur-ope. - And--the-----le-s-s---disc-ret-ion-,- the-le·ss-chance for war·~-------
•.. I 
-
-- -·- -- - . . .. . \ ... -- - • ·•· •·•'•4- •••,.•·•-•· -•••·•·•-,-,, ... ~- . ._.,.a,--:-,.-~ .. ~-.,··.·.,"._'_.-.~· • - • --···- - ·-····-·,:·•_-__ ··-··· - ·:··.:;-;;;-;· 
• 
' '' '' 1·.' '' 1, Ir,' 
'1 ''·-;·-
\, 
No one in Congress ever said during these debates. that the 




man call for America t'o work together with European democracies f:o stop 
,. 
' - ------- ---------~-------~---·----·---·~ 
----------~~=~--=-ooa---;"""""""'~~...,..._ ...... -=!!!!!!!!!11!!!!---!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!l!!!!!!l!!l!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!l!!!I!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~ - ···-----------------------.------. -------·'----·-··· .. - ·-. ---~-~-~-~-._ ........... p,-,,._._. -· - ~-,_ - - . - - ~ _1 __________ - - ----------·--- -• 
• - • ·----- ---. - - ---: --·· --~---_J- - _-. - _:-·--·- - - = --·:._"':;'" .·· .. , ·. -~--~~ 
\,. 
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aggression. Those who argued for open cooperation ivith Europe were 
I 
successfully muffled.. . Even the supporters of "traditional neutral.ity", 
such .a~· Edwin Borchard anq John Moore found a lack of support in C~ngress .. 
. .. 
Both of these isolationists had appe.a.red before the Foreign Affairs' 
( 
Committees to state their case for a re turn to older· conceptions. of our . 
. ,., 
n·eutral rights. and duties. Instead ·of stopping all trade with warring 
. nations, they wanted America to re.tain her rights as a neutral to trade . 
· 30 with whomever ·she pleased. · But Congress refused to listen. _. The 
/-
·Legislature was more than willing to ·dispense ·with ·our traditional rights 
___ .,' 
of freedom of the sea, ·tr'ade, etc. in order -to keep America out of a 




embargo ·on all export of war materials to troubled &reas. Neither the 
build-up of the Europe_an totalitarian states nor our fopn~r .. sacred 
,, 
rights as a true neut~al were ,of any importance_ to this "peace-passion-
31 
a.te '' Congress • 
This mood was of cou·rse present when·. the Spanish Resolution came 
before Congress. Only now it was even more accentuated. As ·was noted:· 
When tqe ne:wly elected Congress of- the Uifited Sta·tes 
met on January 5, isolationist sentiment was at high 
·tide _.among its members. Events overseas had increased. 
,. their.fear of.war, likewise their:::determination tqt. 
,I 
- - .- . - . . --- - __ _ 




out" the sound of bombardments, invectives·, and ide- · 
ological screechings .32 
----- ---· - -- -···· ,._...._ __ ---··---~- ··-·- .. -----·· ·---· ·-·-· ------- ·---~-· -·-····-- ·-··.,-···,. - • . __ ,.__ ----· .• .!. ..• -=- -····----------~- .. --·-·--·-----------·· ··-·--· ··--·· --· ' . ' 
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A· few ~embers ,,of Congress -had been toying with more extreme 
neutralit-y measures such as nationalizing the munitions industry and, 
. . '·--
· enforcing neut~ality iri public communication, j. .e., newspaper and· raclio~ 
fl Neither bill was broug~t to vote, but even the introduction of such-
drastic bills showed the degree of the isolationist desire for peaceo 
''1 
---· n LI L...J 






American security was the prime aim and any plan-was listened to if it 
gave hope of achieving this goal. 
"' 
Previously Congress liad concerned its~if only 'tvith th_e thre·at I 
. ~ 
to the United States of warring"'vnations·, not civil strife·. The 1935 
and 1936 bills were specifically limited to en1bargoing belligerents 
" 
and legally could not apply to civil war combatants. But Congress was 
not to. be prevente_d from. attempting .to preserve America's peace by 
legislationo Nothing could· be more important than this. As 
Representative Rankin of Mississippi.said: 
. . 
Q 
. I do not care if we are reversing th~- policy of a 
thousand years if it will keep us out of the 
' 
. holocaust of war now going on in Spain. The people 
of the world are not thinking· of technicalities ... 
-Our people ·expect us_ to ·keep them out oi such a 
conflict. Remember .this :ts the way we started 
getting into the World War ... 33 
\ -. 
."c,.":: 
. ,,,_,_ -···,; 
,, 
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- ., . and fellow Congressme~. The final vote was t,o indicate· approval with 
.these ·views for on January 6, 1937, .the Senate ratified the Spanish 
Resolution 80-0. It was quickly accomplished ~in three short days. 
--------~--=---- ·- _:_~~..:...:___· -------~------------·---------- - ----------------- --- --- - __ :. - -_-:_._-- ------- -__ -- - -··· --- . -- -- .... ··-- .-----__ -_ ·._-_- ------ -- . ------~---- -- -- - -·--- • =:...;:...·--·--=:··-: .. --=-----• __ - --- __ ; --_ 
·.. . ' . . 
- . 
. .. --- - - ., 
·······- ·····---·--··---···-
' Not fast enough to prevent·. ·Robert Cuse' ~ - ship, the Mar Cantabrico, from · 
-· ----------
---- -----· ----, 
- ------------- -
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I 
cries ·a day later when Majority Leader McReynolds brought the Resolution 
,.,. 
• • -. 0 
I ' ,. • '~ 
. 34 to the floor of the House. Basically. the argument was limited to a .. 
-,· 
discussion of whether it was right to pass ~n embargo solely against the 
\ 




- ---------------- - -
-----·----··-··-
.,... 
Spanish combatantso Senator Nye led the argument in the .senate., He 
· rea_d.ily agreed that the idea of isola·ting · the Sp~n~sh 1,ia;.r .. as supported . 
by Britain., and France was a ''splend=idly conceived_ idea", but'·he a~ded 
, that we should not restrict the act to Spain alone. If America·was to 
stay out of European troubles the bill would have to be broadened to 
include any future civil wars. Nye also recognize·d the fact that by . 
' 
' . 
embargoing~ the legal Spanish Governine.nt._ .. an,d · Insurgents alike we were i / 
in fact being unneutral as we were singling out a recognized government 





·-- --------- --- --- -- --------- - ---- ·- ~-·--·-· ·---.------ ----· ---- -----·- ---- -------- ·-·------· this point if the embargo resoluf-foii was made :tiit:6 ·a ge-ner'al statement 
of American ·policy in.· regard to all civil wars, no~ just .Spain. The 
international law· aspect of ·the· embargo question was not as important . . 
as standardizing American neutrality.policy. 
o' , 
,i._ If America intended to 
follow an embargo policy in regard to- all civil wars the·n do so in 
' . '! 
· · Spain, but do not single that conflict otit as a ;pecial cas·e. 35 
. ··,;3. 
'' 
,-t, ' ' 
Nye '.s objections,. however, were .. rtt.led out mainly because· of 
' ' 





- -• 1<-~·", - • 
when the 19~_§ .. neutrality bill expired in· March. In the :meantime.,. how .. · · 
·------·- .. :.: .. --£.·-·:·--:. -- --- --·-




'. -~. ',, . ',:. States isolated from the Spanish War. The Senate unanimously concurred"· I 
' . i 
Representative Maverick led the debate against the resolution -:• 
. - -··- ---·- - ~· · ... -~. ,---~..--·~-- ·--·---·· .-·--·---------~ ___ ,·; ___ : ___ ·_. --------- ·-·-····--·•·--- . ·---------- -----·----· -·---- ···--·---------· .. --. -··· 
' . 
I 
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in the House . He too did not like the idea of specifically ·naming · 
' . 
. .... . '•,;··:· 
j .. 
te·rms ~: Maverick also recognized the fact that never b~foi;e had the 
. ' 
United States-considered insurgents and the recognized government on 
., 
~· .... l ' ' ' ' 
\..;.·.:-··· .. 
! ( ..... 
I. 
h, .... 
..... =-=- - -
(_' ,,, 
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,, 'I , 
'I 
the same level. 
As he' stated: 
To do'· so was· ·a seriou:s departure f;rom traditional policy. P· 
, ... , 
\ 
' 
. I think this legislation is hasty and ill advised 4 •• 
·Wll:Y should we not apply it .. equa~ly to all co~nFr.ies? 
., · It has al'tvays been the practice of our government to 
send munitions. to the~ l~gal' government irrespectiye 
. of· its mertts 4 If ·w_e are to send muni~ions at a11·, ·.· 
s.e11d them to every .nation;.·· It has always been the 
pol.icy of this ·;nation to maintain the status quo ;Of:. 
, t~e recogn.ized parliamentary gov~_rnment .... ·Why· then 
. 
., 
should we pick .out Spain and suddenly say we will. __ ._ 
pass this pit of -emergency legislation? ·0ne of the_ 
. 
' criticisms of our Government· ha.s been ,that .it· 
indulges· in hasty .a,nd -ill-·advised--·legislation ... I 





· . MaverJck never doubtld ··the need for the United States to adopt_ 
, . 
.. ·· neu,trality legis~c+.~,!,9P even in terms of Civil Wars, and de<::lared ,; "I 
... favor an· ·embargo against every nation .. n 39 Bitt ·he wanted. the goveriunent 
to recognize the consequences of its action. To embargo arms to the 
" 
Spanish ,government meant that we could. 11-ot ~end arms· to any other_ 
legally recog~ized government including Erigl~nd and France in time of 
' 
. 
_________ : ______ ~-----·--... -.--.------.'...-----Civi0l-str-~-fe-· w_ithou.t_:_betng ___ inc.ons-is te n-t-... ----· .Mav-er-ic-k~-wan-ted-·--t-o---be--a~s-sured · , ---,-------- ---
-·------·-··---·-------------.-.. -that, what was applicable to·. ~.pail} _was applicabl-e· to all otl1er countries 
' 
' ·-----:-:--'"".'""'"~,~-=- .... ;;,.·:·:_ .. "" --·- -· ··" -~ .:. . . 
.. ~ . 
{ 
-··- .~~ 
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_;. 
including England and France, then we would· be guaranteed peace. Only -----~---···-··-··-·· ·--·------··--···------ ·-·-··;:,_-·--·--=--~--- ·-_:_~·-·--- - _, - ~ - - -- -- - . - --
Under these Circumstances Wa.S he Willing. tO IVVi.Olate the. precedent Of 
-~ -_· ___ _:_ _____ ._ ·:· -· 
. - - - . 
·-·. .. . ·_- -- ··----·-- - --,·'-~-~~--~ .·:_~ _·:; ." - .. -- -_ .-
--- -·. 
~- ------~ .. - ··---· ...... ,-·--- ·---- - . 
-~-- .... . ' . ----·-.. ·-x,· .. ,.. .. _ · ... ~.---,-.,~•\.:.ah ... "";r::;t..,---.- .--
neutrality by pointing"· to, the Chaco-Embargo o-f 1-934, which had banned arms ij 
' 
' ' ' 
.-·-,-·"'·,._ .. _J_ ... _, ____ ,_., __ ,,,.~·-----·~-- -
....••. -~"- ·--··-~-·-··-- . ··-··-.:.. .. ~;:.,... ... _. ..... ;-....:_~;.~·-'·"•'·""" ,., •• .,___ -.••c _· ••.. , .. •.-, •.•... •·.oc;..:;·:-~·,:·,._· .. -- '-·--r:--"" :··••···-•-----L--•--- "--'-·---··-
shipments to Chile and Paraguay... However, Maverick was still not· 
satisfied since the Chaco War was not ... a. civil one._ Actually, for all . 
. his doubts Maverick did vote for the Spanish Resolution. He receiv~d 
'1 the same guarantees as Nye did, that· when the 1936 neutrality bill 
/ 
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expired a general statement tnc·luding an embargo clause f9r all ·wars 
' 




• In studying· the contentions of Nye and Maverick· one · can more 
.>~~:·/Ar··, .. : ........... _ .. . 
clearly see the general Congre~sional 01..it·rook against the re~olution • 
I, 
0 / • .,., •,' ' ' It was never. a. question of ·neutrality vs. non-neu:trality or isolation 
vs. internationalism·. These, two men were simply arguing for a broader 
and· thus an even st:t;icter. law. They still maintained the basic belief 
. '• 
_.} 
that the United States could stay out of European troubles by cutting 
those·ecf~nonric bonds whfch-brotight·us·-into World War I. In the end 
they. too did not really care about th-e legal· differences b.etween 
' • • ·"' 
' I international wars and civil ·:wars o., A war was a war and as such was to .. ' ···-, 
.. 
-
be avoided.· The~ diffe?ed with Pittman an¢l McReynolds ont§ ·in limited 
measure o Pittman and McReynolds were primarily concerned with the tas.k 
o~·tpassing a specific resoluti?n, and not with the· formulation of 
general· principles.. As, P_ittman stated: "It is our duty not to think 
of either·of the opposing forces· in Spain, but to think of .our own 
' peace arid out ow11 ·country," · and he· added, "I do not have the ~bility 
-24 
_, 
t'o formulate language which defin·es when ·a state of civil war exists. "~O 
To worry just how "neutralu vJe were being was to Pittman 
stressing · the wrong thing D Co_ngress should have been· more concerned 
'' 
--~ 









- - ~---------------- ~----------------
·with the implications and possible.--.. ~onse.quences of the sailing of tlJ.e /') 
.• __ Mar Carit:~bric.o~ than. 31±tLthe 1egalit;\f• a~plyirtg an arills embargo to the 
.., 
-·-spa.iifsh'. Civil War alonE{~·\ I. rt·' w;Js.::"'t:ffe:::Span:fsh.;,:War that . posed=; p~;~:i.ble 
~ ... 
threat· to America, not the lfother" co~ntrie.s.,, and thus the Emergency 
41 Resolution should be granted quick passageo 
t.-_., 




---- ---- -~-_ ___, . 





~ This America First attitude was. also complimented .by another 
·argument, though·-of lesser importance·., . Sev§?ral·.cong~~S$nt~n believed . 
·that by embargoing arms to Spain the United States ·would be making a 
• ·t" • 
" 
. 
·· contribution, to World Peace·. ·The Spanish ·might, ,by their failure to 
receive arms, be forced to·":13eek· peaceful methods of settlement. 
.; Repres·entative ·Johnson:· 
' ' 
Mr" ·Speaker, if we pass ·this resolu.tion we give notice 
to the world ·that insofar a.s we are concerned 'tve are . .·' . 
for peace and that the United- States will not give 
' 
' countenance, aid or comfort to _the· cruel and, barbarous 
war now being waged in Spain by ·furnishing them.im-
plements of· de'at4 0 • -~ 42 
. ' 
. ' 







Resolutiono If the American. munitions makers were prevented from 








, ·'halt. In 1934, · th~ United Sta:tes had seen the embargo plan work. to this 
~ effect in the ,Chaco war, 'though it-haclcalso seen a failur·e in the ~ 
. V 
-"··. 
Italtjtn-Ethioipian conflict. Nevertheless, many Americans believed, 
naively. or otherwise, that by not c!.ssfsting arty warring country, 
' ·. 
aggressor or victim, ·rebel 
. · · · 43 
or loyalist, peace could -be secured. ·-
-That 
we were g·oing ag~instthe, trafitional policy o.f.helping a recognized ______________________ _ 
~ . -
. -----· 
consiaered. To those· who likec;l to view the embargo goverr1ment was _ little 
acts as a step towards wo~ld peace, .as with tho~e who see the acts as 
· · · · a. protective mechanism, the fate of -~h~----~Pc!!!J:sh __ gover~ment __ wa_s_riLiittl_e ___ _ ----·---------~-----·· ··-----:---------··- ~ . • 
----- -- ---·----·----- -
. 






--- - _ .. _·, ' -- _;._ ·. ·-·------ ., __ , -·- .•. _:_. ___ ... _._ - ··-- -, -----
. 
--• H- ~- -- -•"•• <:---~- -·-·~--·------- --~·•••--•~- -- - - - -signifi canc·e-~-- --~Represerrtative"-Jolirii:fon "-openly'- refe-rr-ecf -to ___ the-· -In-surgents 
and government troops as "those belligerents0 indicating no desire_ t,o· make 
a distinction between civil and international strife. In the end then, 
whether the reason for the embargo was America vs safety or the longer 
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.government would get no assistance from the United States. The orily 
-- ·--~ ·• - c-··-;,, ·• 
· member of Congress to argue this point was llcipresen·tat:ive Bernard, a ~ . 
' ' . 
farm-Laboriter from Minneso·ta .. · . He sincerely believed that the dem<?cracies · 
. ' 
and fascist nations were linked in a fatal struggle, and if Spain fell it 
would -be one more set back for the democracies .. 
. . 
In the name ···-of~ neutrality the United States. I . . y Government off ic-ia1.ly .supports the Fascists. of Spain and the world .. _o .In: actua.lity:·.it,places the· blessing qf our: Government on· the bloody murder '---
of Spanish toilers, peasants_ and-. their loved 
ones .... The Resolutii>n to .embargo - shipJAt;)?.tS to Spain is a partisan, pre-Ftscist, ant~-d~~ocratic 
measure.. It ... is against the inte'i:ests of peace. and 
·_ I oppose ita44 . 
. 
•' ... ~-. 'I 
J'' 
However, as was evident by the final vote, Bernard was a man 
without a following. There were 3,000 miles of co;1~-~" blue ocean:between 
the threat ,of· Fascism and American democracy. I feel that in 1~36, Hull, 
, I 
.. -.·, 
Roosevelt and almost a.11 of Congress_ 'tvere willing for America to initiate 
some form of neutralit·y legislationD ;~. . Because the Spanish War·was a. 
' civil one or because democracy was .struggling against totalitarianism 
was not sufficient reason for the embargo policy to be altered.·· 
., 
....... 
Possibly in calmer times the Spanish embargc;, might not have 
passed with such overwhelming support. I further feel that con$ideration 
might have been given by more Congressmen to the fact that the S{?anish 
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might. have been accorded the right to purchase. arms as a recog1:1,ized 





par l iamen ta ry government. I • • But· times were not calm. Europe was seething 
_ as it had twenty years before, and it was obvious that conditions were $ 
worsening. Congress was certainly not unaware of this. Senator Pittman, 
in his opening statement .,,.,in the upper house noted that World War I had 
,. 
........ ~-~=--- - - -- - ::. -- t - $ ... 
-- -- -- ---- ----------·· ··-·------- ~-.. ~- ~~~--=.,;~::,,;-·---••,- - .. --~·~~.-------- .. L • 
-•.-•-~-·-··--.----.••• • • • • --•' -•-- --~·- • ~ ~ n-•-·~ •_ -·-.--- --•··•--• ~~--- •'•• ·-··•• ·_r p • ·-· ,•-- ... ~· ~ •- --•-·-·-•-'• 
------=.-....:.;:::=:c:·::.----="c'.::CC-::_ ~.~.---'-',.,:.:;.~~ 
' '• '. ·!_''-I • • ,· ... -
I 
started over a much more trivial·,matter. He stated that: 
. . 
There was a far l~~s clangerous position in 1914 ,. 
which ·resulted in a World War into which we were ' . 
. 
"' dragged. An Archduke was killed in one, of the 
· countries of Europe. There was ·._no great distur-
bance th.ere and the great powers sought to 
arl:i.itrate... Today the· situation is more dangerous 
· than was the situation at that time .... 45 
(J 
-27 
, ' ...... , 
.... ; '/1'· I 
.i. ...... ,, J 
There was ·really ~o al_t~rnat.ive for Congress to· choos·e. The·. 
public .was ~:t~~-~-Y. convinced th·at to export a~s meanr· b~-tng dragged. 
,·. 
into a ,var. · The American people felt- secure behind the wall of neutrality 
. . 
' 
and were ove-rwhelmingly .opposed to any involvement in foreign quarrels. 
The prevailing attitude was to· leave the rest of the wor1d~"to its own 
~ - · . · 46 
-problems. Inside. Congress the. same. view preva:tled, and· during the 
embargo ,discussion._men such as Johnson_ and Nye did not let the repre-
seiltatives forget i't", 47 To even think of aiding the Spanish government 
• ,· I 
would be to surrender to the munitions makers and their evil designs . 11 
Representative E o Isac got so carried ,away tha_t he was even against the 
idea of letting Red Cros.s Units go to Spain. · With his c.omment isolation 
seemed 't::6-reach-. 'it:s -peak: .... "Mr.·. Ch~·irma~:' so~~bo.dy.'\vould ~o~~ aio~g· ~nd 
drop a bomb on the tent o:('···t:he··! Red Cross and immediately we would all 
···"·:•: · · · · · ... ·48 ·,,,,.• · 
be up. in arms.'.' The policies of the Administration had also made' 
- ... - ... ~ ' ..... . - . 
. .. - -
Congressional acceptance of the embargo possible. From July un.til-
' January Congress had been out of session and the Administration E:~~--
. ' 
........ ..,, __ ,._ 
. ,' 
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a 
Depa'ttment simply reinforced the· embargo idea by immediately applying 
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The time element also played a major ·t-ole in getting Congress ,. 
. , 
' ' 
- . .,., . ~ 
to pass the resolutiOQ. 0 • • Pittman and McRe.Yllolds barely had time. to 
' ' '; ' JI 11'· . . -
. 
" . ' \ . . ·• •, ' 
,, 
..... ' 
print a copy- of the embargo resolution £or themselves whe.n they . intro-
. I) 
. ; ' . . . 
duced .it to_Congress. Most bills, ·one irate Congressman nQ.te.d_, __ were 
'·kc> " ', '· 
distributed in advance fo ever.y member or·-c·ongress so ·that ·they could 
·49 
be analyzed ·before be-ing voted upono But with the race to beat the 
"' 
_··· ............. _ ._.,,. ___ ._' ___ ,,;·- ____ ,, __ ,,_ ···--·--------------·--·--------------------------·-·-···--·- .. --- ·----------------·-·"''"" .................... , .. ·-· . ·-·-.. -- .. . 
Mar Cantabrico, the Administration didn '.t want to 'tvaste v~luable h·ours. 
· . 50 
Debate w.as intentionally·curtai,.led fot· __ the same reason. It is-in-
. . /,) 
' 
teresting t:o·note·that debate had also been curtailed on the 1935 
·,1 · b · 11 51 neutra ity i . The question of embargoes always seemed to-arise 
.. ,.,. 




the amount of time that could have been devoted to. a careful review of 
the legislation. Representative Maver-i'cI<··summed up his feelings on the 
. s 
subject v1ith this cogent statement: 
I think we should'-''have some time to discuss the---. '-""·.c.:.·c .. ,.c .. ~-=--~ _ 
matter and not just twenty minutes. We t~lk;for · 
hours, days and weeks on matters which are unim-
portant, and _then we rush through matters of such 
·-· gt·ave--imp·ortance ___ a]3·:-·tiris·~-52~---- -- -- --· .. ~) ------ ----------·--·---- --
. ' 
.And ru.shed .. C_ongress was, into passing an"ac:t __ that __ se.vera.l __ of the more 
· ·· ...... :····· 53 
vocal member-s were to regret later.· -
" 
The joint resolution of· January 8, 1937, made it ~'unlawful. to 
· export arms, ammunit:i.on, or implements of war from any place in the 
. 
I 
United States, or possessions of the United States, to Spain or to any 
-- -- !_ --- - ------ - --- - -- ---- - - - -- -·----·----- -------- - . - -- ... -----·- - - - .... - -- - -·------ -·-
o tl1er foreign country ~or transshipment to -Spain or for use of either 
of the opposing forces in Spain .. " It also canceled previous 1 icense·s 





















































D The provision,~ of this neutrality legi'_slat:ion did' not. recognize 
-!> 
the belligerency of the two .parties. The purpose of"~he United States 
..... 
--. 






rather to interpret it as an unfJ>rtunate s,ituation·o Green Hackwqrth-, -
,.-...::-·-
legal adviser to the State Department, stated that: 
' ··········~~1 
) 
.-----·'' ~ .. , 
It is probably not· desirable -to .require the 
President to proclaim that a state of bell·ig-
erency exists wherever civil strife exists 
,bec.ause the President may not want to pass on . 
the question of whether there is· a state of war o 
The question of .be1~igerency is a delicate -
question, because when you recognize that in-
surgents are belligerents~ then they are ·en--_ 
titled. to all the benefits of rules .of warfare o 
.j'. . . . /- .. ' . 
Moredver, to recognize. a state of belligerency 
on the part of insurgents ·might be offensive 
to the recognized ·government.55 
\ 
'. 
w~ recognized this action.as part of the basierpolicy of 
... 
.- . \ 
. -- ···-·----------·----- ---'----Bri-t-ain:-and -France o 
A·· 
Hence, our policy was -compati-b-le with-- thei-rs •. ~6 - - --- -
. ;- _) 
.. 
.', C 
The_ Spanish question was not yet dead ;with the emergency 
r 
resolution. · In ·February 1937, the House Foreign Affairs Co~ittee and 
:.i. .. --- .... . ~ 














of· bill should replace· the· temporary 1936_ ne1.1-~rc1l~ty act. Though most 
. . "' 
. . 
of the hearings were· devoted· to o~her aspects of neutrality, the problem 
of America's policy in re"gard to·civil wars did arise. However, it 
received only a half-hearted survey. The Congressmen tre·ated the in-
. . ~ 
' 
------·---- --·----. - . ·-··· ----,-·-,.·-··-------·-··-- ·-- -····-- -------- -·----·---···-····-· 
clusion of a civil strife clause in the act as a foregone conclusion. 
·--··several "pressure groups, both for and against the· clause came to air 
their views and were listened to with, an almost condescending courtesy. 57 
The arguments of January were simply rehashed with the same results . 
. \. 
' 












McReynolds, leaq.ing· the· House us Commi~tee, almost ended discussion of 
' . 
1: •• , 
' 
' 
· the dist.inc'tion between civil. and. foreign wars at. the:', outset: 
I . 










civil strife~. not every civil strife, but such as 
we have in Spain is one where we would want. tp.e 
same provision as to be.lligerent c;ountries as to the · 
. banning -and" non- shipment to apply O .•• 58 
,, 
' ~ 
·The.mood ofCongre~s·_had not .. ~hanged any .since _Jantiaryo Tli~ugh 
·. McReynolds ,·sin,gled out Spain, the finalo ·resolution.would simply read: 
When the President sltall .find that ·there exists a 
· stater of war __ between or, among two or more foreign · 
states e •• 0 Whenever tbe President finds that . ' 
.(1) ·there exists a state of wa.r between_ two or more 
sections,-parties, or factions, of a foreign country, 
and (2) that as ·a cqnsequence of such a state of 
war, the peace and neutrality of the United States 
or the commitment of lives of its nationals is or 
may be threatened he shall proclaim such facts and 
\;.. there~pon for the. purp,pse of this Act, each such 
..... _·· . , \ . section, party or faction shall be· considered as 
..: 
.£)'. .•. 
. '. ' ' 
[l 
· ---------·-··----- ------· -----,.. ~------------------ --a---separate -be-1-1-igeren·t--country---or··--n-ation. 5-9 -· · · ---- -- --------~----------------··~-·--·-·----·-II 
r: ~ 
• d 
)' .,. i 
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Thus ·the gap left in 'the .1935 neutrality bill had finally been 
rectified. 
• •• ' > - - • -
----·-----~- ,, ___________________ _ 
---"·---------·-------------------~-------- -
In general· Congress had no d~sire to spend time worrying about 
•· ._,. --- ·,._- ·-·' .c__· __ --·- .-: .. ·.··-·- ~ 
• - ·----··-- -
tlie effects.of.the claus~· Oil. Spain _or for that matter any other nationo 
The House spent a day mulling over it all and when the Anti-Fascist 
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1
[-~~-~~----- _____________ : .. ~---------=----------r_ep_l~i.e .. d;_~~!I_~_au.L_"ho_t .. Ihterested in· the Spanish Revolt o" Even the· State 
i 
.P~ ·-· ·--- - - -·- -------·-----· --·· -··-·--···-------- ·----·- -----·---! 
! 
i Department .. got by with a minimum amount. of que-stioning.,-----The---,Hou--se--went----·--- .. ------···-~ .. --- .,-
through the formalities of asking _the Department's Legal 'Advisor, R. 
~. 
•· 
Walton Moore, ·.his opini~n and. then turned to something else. The Senate 
group didn't even botl1er calling in the Department .. As a matter af fact 
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' ~ 
the ·Foteign Relations Committee· accepted the civil. strife clau.se ~with-, 
/. 
, ·r out a~y sort of discussion~ When the House and Senate Committees filed 
·-----·-- - . 
. .... , .... ,-,,, ... ,, ..... , .. ,,. \-;:, 
----- ----- ... - . 
-- ·-· - __ ;_ ly ·--- -··· --- -- - - --
·their final reports, the majority-and minority opinions of both agreed 
' 
· 61· to put· civil strife combatants on the same ·status as belligerents. 
'. 
All that can be said in looking back at th'is phase of the 1937 
•L \ {J -· , ___ , .,,, _,, 
. · 'hearings • that-- there was 18 an extreme lack.of any sort ·of- discussion 
or debate o The. Spanish resolution, had set the prec;.edent. Brnd .as 
.J) 
·-. McReynolds_ and Pittman had promised in January, the neutrality act was . ~- . . h 
~ ~! 
~xtended to include all civil wars.. Such dissident elem~nts as Nye and· 
,• 
Maverick were soothed and the permanent legislation of 1937 reflected 
a firm conviction that America would keep out of all wars of any type 
or kind e 
Throughout all the discussions ot January and February on the 
Spanish Civil War there had been little comment -about Communism or 
---·----------- -
-- - -- -· ---- . ---- ----·---·---------- ···-·-· -Fascismo-- Wb:il-e the New York Times was running banner headlines -about 
tl1e insurgents and the "Red Loyalist Government, 1162 and the ·Catholics 
- 63 
__________________________________________________________ 'tvere denouncing the anti-chur~h activities of the- Communist governmen~, 
- (} 
- - -ancl-the--s·o-c·ialists w~re-·warning of t:he.spread ~f- Fa~~-cism if ____ Fra~~~-~~~~ 64-
Co11gress rerilained '·aloof o Congress _seemed to feel that tqe ,?bnly, consider-
,,''\__,, . 
, . ' 
ation should be American neutrality, not which ideology·would gain a 
foothold on the Iberian ~enihsulao The internal affairs of Europe were 
seemingly of.little or no interest to most members of·Congresso. This 




member who ·regarded tl1e spread of Fascism as a threat .to all the world. 
,, ,..-µ ..... ,,. 
,f 
That the ·Spanisl1 Government was or was not communist had· little to do 
ap - CT ,i 
-·-··,-,· 
---- ·--·· --- .--·--------:,-
'·•·•l.' 
~--~·I 
--.. --.. -----···· _.--------.~~-=--=_,...,...,.,=,-,... __ =-=s_,....,...-------,-.,.-~~--......--==,~~-~~-----·~!!1!!111!'_!!!!!!!.!ll!!!!l!!!!!'!!l!!!!!.,.!l!!!!!l!!l!!!~~-==l!!!-~~----', 





.:with the final votes of "either January or-·February, 1937. The mood of. 1.,, 
\ 
... i I - -- _ C.ongre~s was for neu~trality first and last. If the Spanish war 'tvas an ,r .', i \.J -
' 
' .. ideological struggle, then, as one representative said, "let Ge.rma.ny 
·: · · 65 
· and .Russia fight it out." 
,, 
No matter .wh'at the circumstances, the -
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of the Spanish Embargo · is quite ... ~P:iqu~. Tnrough·out the ·crucial months· · ·· 
.. 
.... --- -·----- -· -
. 
·------· 
of July, 1936 ~o Janua:r:y, :1937, the President attempted to star. _al~of 
of· t:he .Spanish question~ leaving mos·t of the public .. statements in 
regard to ·the United S_tates- policy up to the Secii~tary of State-, -Cordell 
~ 
Hullo ·However, on the rare occasions that the ·President did 'publ·i.cly 
broach the· Spanish :topic he made his position quite clear.. On August 
14, Roosevelt. delivered h:{.s famed Chautauqua, New ~-York ,spe,ech, and 
'while avoiding any direct reference t·o Spa.in .clearly proclaimed America's 
\ 
. 
. intention to remain isolated ·from··war .. On ·December .29, at a··'i1.ews con-·· 
I 
' ! 
i ference, he vehemently condemned Robert Cuse as uI1patriotic-for shipping 
arms· in disregard of the State Department's moral embargo; 
, j 
And on 
January 3, f937·, I1e made plain how he _felt about the Spanish embargo by 
asking Congress to pass .,a formal -embargo resolution to replace the moral 
. 
-
one that had been ineffectiveo Whatever Roosevelt may have believed 
privately or what he thought three years later, he nevertheless orig-
" ·. .! ;, 
... 
. < 
...... inal.ly ..... a.pp.roved ..... of---.. t-he-.... AmeI"iean· .. ·p·ol-icy .. -··a:s--··set-· .. -f·orth·--±n-·-·the .. -Phi-l·l·ip·s-·~---~-----.--~-:~--~--~------~-----.. -....... _._ 
d .. .h 66 ispatc . · 
Roosevelt'.s foreign policy in the years ·prec·eaing the· Sp.arifsh. 
crisis had rarely differed, il).,any large degree, from the wishes of an 
isolationist public and Congress. When the Nye Committee published 
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-34 .. 
,• 67 . . 
exerted· no leadership to counter- set. Nye's views. · . In ~any ·case, 
Rposevelt ·be.lie~ed that American -mu11.ition~ mak~~rs had help~~ le:ad the .. · ·-· 
United States into -World War r·, and he. wa!s determined not to. let it 1- l 
d . L · 
happen again. 68 In 1934 the President Willingly invoked the Chaco 
- . 
. . 
.. , .. _, 
' . 
.. 
· -embargo .measure pa3.sed by Congre~s in· the hope· of ending the confl.ict. ·· 
,r. -... _ ...... ~--
•' I '"'"•·11 
. ·rn_ 1935 ,c1· he ·again· ~eclared that a ·state of war exi..st:ec1 i11 a fQrE?ign ·. _ 
"' 
.· land,· .. this time in· Ethiopia, and he .. placed both be·11,igerents. under the 
. 
. 
new .. neut-rality ~ct ·passed by. Congres-.s· .. 
-'., ... ' 
t • 
·!· ·~·-1 . ' ' ... The 1935 Act ha4 its· fa_ults according to: Rooseve.lct,' .. but he 
' I a 
seemed to agree with its underlying principle o F oD.Re wan.ted- to .shield 
. America from .European trouhies and. at the same time work for- world · ' 
. .. 
. 
I < 69 peace o . He s'incerely believed that the neutrality. acts 'tvere a step 
~-
. . 








tequ_ired _the President to invoke- an embargo on all- bellig·erents if a 
· state of war existed. He preferred to leave the que~tion of who should 
·be embargoed up to the discretion o~ the .President •. ·In that way the 
t? 
i JJnitea··st:a:t,fs cotrtci·-continue to export arms ·to the, vict-ims of agg:i;ession 
I 
. . 
i while barring such supp lie S to the aggressor, if it. so desired. 70 At 
I 
J •• ~;- • ·~--
l 
11:;:, -,; ' ,~- '·,- ', '• .,,·, ,-~ . ,. \ .._ 
t: • ~ \"" •, •,',I•.' C, ' 
1~. -, -·····---------------------·------·-least ···p· ot-en·t·ial-···ag·g·. -re ssors--wouli ll~"f:~-have-to·· bE--totd- ·before;;;han:d:·that "'iiO .: ___ --- -. ----' . 
. .. 
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1
Roo~eVelt. :eillained ngene~a'l~! sa5}sfi=~witµ_ ~~~ ~c1"7:_" 7~ C ~is 1is- -- - - - .. ······· ...... " ! ! --- _·· 
I :.. . 
(1 
---- - --~ ··r==---, - ~~~= 
agreement.with Con~ress was only over one aspect of ·the neutrality lawo 
-in regat·d to the policy as a wI1ole -Roosevelt: expressed ·.the view that 
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( ,l . 
11 
, ,· 
~ ' .,. 
.. ,. · Ironically ."enough Rooseve'lt even .favored .. ·the extei1sion ··of the 
•,' 
. ·-·· -
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L 
act· beyond. Congressional~.limitations,, in certain areas <I All trade to 
. . ' ~ ' . . . . ~ 
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. bellig'ererits," h~ believed, should be controlle-d in order to prevent 
excess war profitso 
.. '·'"''. ''i 
\ ;·· .. -, 
. . ... \ 
I .. '· 
r ~ 
I. do ·not beli.eve that the. American peopl.e :.wi.f~ wi.sh· .:'-
• a .abno1,nally increased·- profits that temporarily ·:might. 
'be~1.secured by gre-atly extending. our tracJe, (in,•war 
· .~ 74 . . · · time)~ · · ,. . 
o.· 
. 
Exports .to warring nat·ions should not ·e~ce·ed t~e normal p~ace time ' -
volume o ·F oDoRo. tried ~o ~ncorporate· these ideas into the "moral embargo" 
.. 
' . ~ ~ . plan directed -by~the State :pep~rtmento 
r' 
·' ... \ . .. . 
At the outset of 1936, F oDoR. defined his ·foreign policy in 
' . \ 
. . ' 
regard to ·neutral·ity:. · 
,.. 
~ 
We .ho.pe we· are not again at the threshold of su·ch 
(a second general European war) .... · But if face·. 
it we·rnust, then the Unit~d St.ates ap.d the rest 
·of tJ1.e Americas can play but one role: through 
... ·a··· we'il ort!ered neutrality to -do n~ught to en-
-courage the contest, · through adequa·te defense to 
save ·ourselves_ from embroilment 'and through 
} ; -
exampleo .. persuade other nations to return to the 
way~ of peace. and .good willo As a cons._istent 
part of a clear policy the United.States is fol~ 
lowing a two-fold neutrality toward any ·and_ .. all 
nations which .engage in wars that are· not of· ' 
immediate concern to the Americas. ~Fi:r;st, we 
decline to.encourage the prosecution of war by 
p~rmit.t3:p.g belligerel}ts to -obtain a~s, · 














. -- · ·- · · · · =by·· b~e11-igeterit.- Nations of any and a 11 Amer ic~ri · 
products cilculated to facilitate the prosecution 
· --<lf · a.···-wi:rr··-in-quant11:·1e·s ···ovet·-aua--above··-our····i10-rmar· ··· -·-······--- -··- ····-········-·-·---· -···-----··- ·· -···-····- ··-
exports of them in time of peace. 75 · , ·· 
In short, then, Roosevelt believed thati America by stopping the export 
' 
of arms could at least k:eep the .United State.s aloof o · Roosevelt had 
accepted, at least publicly, the idea of "strict neutrality" as the very 
I 
basis of his foreign policy. 






In .J9~5, hqwever, it is evident that Rbosevelt' s policies in 
., 
;, ~·-· · _- ____ ..... regar_d· to .... Et!·J;Op~--~~!"e~-~-~ _·a highly confused state. ! He wanted a neutrality 
. V 
,· 
- - -•- --- --;;--· -------- ------·--·----------·-· • .- • --- -·-···---• r .. -·-·---·-·-··-· ···-------·•--~----··•···-·· -------·- ,,. •• 
.·.-- ---· ······· ~--- -------····-- ···- - ':- --
policy but not one that would completely· isolate the United s·tates from 
" Wbfld a.ff airs, for Roosevelt wanted. the United States to remain a force 
in international policies. With these dual aims in mind, Roosevelt 
"cautiously' ·d·isserited to the mandatory a$pects of -th~ neutrality acts 
. . 
and he refused to use his veto power. 76 The explanation for his 
willingness· to cooperate wi_th the staunch isolationists, · becomes more 
·"clear· perhaps f:\vhen one realizes that the President had more politically· 
··, 
at stake than just foreign policy. 
q 




certain facts and conditions of political life.· First Roosevelt· 
' 
. realized the temper of the country and how str~gly it felt about 
neutrality. Secondly, in order for him to get support in Congress for 
. his New Dea,l program Roosevelt had to depend upon. the .votes of various 0 . 
' <''!) 
. ,. . . -
strong . i'solation:r-sts O Tqus he was "faced .with the choice iof. fighting 
f<"; ' 
for freedom· in foreign affai'r's or maintaining the Isolationist-Progres-
-
. 
sive coalition whi~h had served him so y1_ell. 1177 · FaD.R. wa~ in 19~5 
...... ___ and 1936 still mainly concerned ·with dome.stic prob~ems and probably had 
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I 0 
and allowed himself to "flciat ... on the f{~~i-~~de of isolationi~~:;~"7S -- - ---- - -- -) 
' Buy, by floating on the __ ~id~ ___ !ie only in_c_reased its force.· 
Even with.in the Democratic party there was no unity av.er hm'l7 
foreign affairs shou·~4, be handled o Demo1~rats s:uch as Hull and Sumner 
\ . , I 
::· . 79 Welles often found themselves at odds with party isolationists. 
£; . 
·':" .. , .... 
-: 
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Rooseve ft'."''~s -head of· the ,party and leader.of·: the COtlnt:ry, had to make 
• I • ;---;··•'" .•• ,._ • 
the-Se extreme elemen.t°S into some sort of cohesive u·ni.ta .. ; ~Because· the 
" 
1932 election had lit.tle to do with foreign aff~.ir~ F.DoR. had no basis 
'' "'''""' 
t 
from which to.build a solid'policy. As a result he found it necessary 
,;: 
""' 
. ' ·:~ ,, 
·-......... ' . ~' 
. ~~. 
.,, 
-, --to.' c9mproinise with Congress '011r the· question,· and in .. order .to,,. keep· h-ts. 
' ' 1 ' 
. ... • ' • • 
-..• --~i-r-·~--~:·;;~:.c=----, __ .....:._ ------,:,.;-p.- . - '-.---·--< 
Administration united '~ot to ~tcuss. matters of fore~gn pol:f_:y at:· .. 
. .. /~' ·., 
/ 
r• 
cabinet meeti.n..gs. · The isolationist·. forces were too ·numerous, and ·there . 
. were too many local problems, to be resolved ~·fot Roosevelt to exer:cise 
- ·- .... _ 
any strong positive folf ign. policy respe'cti~g the Fascist threat in 
\, 
·Europe. Not until late 1937 did FGDORG venture out on a limb and 
. ·-.-~-....... , .. 
- ; ,~O challenge. certa_in of the assumptions of "strict neu,trality." _, 
.. 
Of.course there were· other and more positive aspects to 
Roosevelt's· foreign policy. As Secretary,of State he ha'd appointed a· 
well-known .~internationalist, Cordell Hull-, and through him attempted 
.. to bring the United. State_s back into· the world picture" Reciprocal 
. ........... , ,,_,., .. ,,, 
,-trad~ agreements and - the -Good Neighbor Policy in La tin· :America reflected· 
•Q 
a sincere effort at international cooperation. When the Chaco embargo 
~ •. 
I 
,;-,a·s invok.ed, it was in cooperation with other ·anns-producing na.tion.s.· 
~1' 
- --- ---·---<. 
• - • ·1 • 
The Italo-Ethiopian War also revealed a desire of the Admini~t·J;a.t.ion 
..... , 
,-.\ . ' . .., ~ ... , .... ' 
. ' . ,~ 
to cooperate with the League of Natj.ons. However,, aside from these I 
. 





-· - - . ---=--~-:~_:_-_. . 
- - . . .. ~-
-·-- ·- - . ·--··-~ ........ -.~~ ... --··---- .. , -
---- -·--_~ .. --------------------............. ---·--·--·- --Rooseve·l~ -·heede·d-·'-the .. ··-,1e-s·irefs·---1rf----·congres s and · the people~ - · 
When· the Spanish crisis erupted in .the sunnner of 1936, · the 
' . attitude of the Administration towards European struggles had already 
,{ 
- , been set .. Little is known of the discussion held.between Hull and FoDGRo 
over the new crisis, but it is not.too rash to speculate that FoD~R. 













- ( di. . 
, accepted the idea of a moral embargo. ·-'At the outset· of the war· · · ·· -· 
\. 
. .. . ' 
..... J.loosevelt, wrote to Bowers to express his grief a:t- '~the unfortunate and, 
0 
.,, 
terribl~· catastrophe .-in Spain, vv but added that United· ·States neutral.fty 
', ~. l 
would be_ complete. 81 Botl1 H;ii a·nd Roosevelt seemed to come to a quick 
• () ' • .._...-/,<-~, .. ,,. '.--.:,:::,i-
,, •.. 
. ,· ,,,.. -· ,n,·:\. 
agreement that the best policy" to be :followed would be i:1.on-int~r:veiltion. 82 ' · .. 
Hull .. himself stated that ·the two men were in full accord over what course 
· 83· 
. of action to take, and_ Roosevelt's subsequent action. confirms this . 
.. , '''"'\ 
., 
.. ·{, ; ' . ' 
.,., ,., . ' 
The President efnphatically .stated~on Janu·ary 4, 1937: 
./ 
- ' . 
The Department ·'of State' with my entire. approval' soon . 
after the beginni_ng of· the Civil War in Spain took a 
def,inite stand. on the'' subject.· of the expor,t of' arms 
to that country--a stand which was in ehtire conformity 
with our well-established'. policy of ·non-in_t~~v.ep.tion. , .... ,,., .... :. 
and with the spirit of the· recent neutrali.ty act o ··- · · 
.-· ~ . 
t' r • t .~ • C: .. 
~- ! ' • •. ., ·, .: 
. ' 
o •• it (is) clear t:h·at th~. civil. conflict in Spain 
. involves so many non-Spanish elements and-has----such 
\-
wide international implications that a_~p,.oli~y of· 
attempting to discriminate between the part:fes wou~d~ 
be- dangerous in the extreme·o· ... Not only would we, by 
' ~ 
. 
permitting t,tnchecked the ··,flo:w Qf ___ at"II1_$. to one party in 
the conflict, ·be involving ours·elves directly in that 
European strife f°rom which our people d-esire so deeply 
to remain aloof, but we would be glad of this pretext 
to continue their- assistance- to one side-- or· the other 
in Spain and aggravating, those -disagreements ·among the 
European nations which are a constant menace to the 
peace of the ·world. 84 
However, once. the policy of .. a moral -embargp was ·initiated 
I.;-,:·_··. •. 
./ 
.. . ·- - - . 
-
. .. - . ·.----- .... __ .. -- - ... -- - - - - ·-- --_------------ -·-------- ----- ------ -- - ·-------:··- -- -·- ·:-:. --------· -·- -------:_--'lC----·----- -:·--:----=-=-'.·_·:·:-- :.~-.:.:: 
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S 1 f 1 bl . 1 ° 1 f h ' . . . . 85 ,· tate was _ e t, at east pu _ic y, in contro o t e s1tuat1on. 
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- - ... ·. --· . - -· 
--·-····· .. \ 
policy spee·rh of August .. 14, ·only seven days after Acting Secretary of 
State Phillips had dispatched his· cable. Though Roosevelt made no direct 
mentipn of United States action towards Spain, the·in~irences were clear 
.I • 
-- ·- -- -- . --- - ----·.-.h~ -- ... -- ., -~~ '·---- - .- .. - -~---~--. ---. --. ----- ---- .• ~-.- ·- ---~-~·---,.- -.-~.~~? -
. . 
' I 




' ,1, ··.,• ' 
•. 
'tvhen he--:declared·: - "I 1can at .1.east,~maktf certain that -no -~ict '·of the-
• ::: •" L 
. United States helps to J?roduce or promqte·war. i can at le~·:\: ln~ke -C1e8.t' ... r 
........ 







. t• insisted, uwe are not isolationists":,except insofar as we seek to isol~te 
ourselves coinpletel~ £~om war.," the whole speech.was, in. effe'ct a plea f~,r· 
.. .. 
' +- -- . ...-,._,-- - -~,, 
· ·. 86 · : strict neutrality o . America could stay a lo.of if her manufacturers. did 
., 
. (I 
If·we,face the cho~ce .of .profits (?r.peace, the 
nati'on will answer - mus't answer· .:: 'we. choose 
_ peac~·r.. It is the duty of!' all of. us to en:... 
· ,courage such a body of public opinion in ·this 
cquntry that the I answ'1F :will be clear and for 
all ,practical, purposes unanimouse87 
, ,.. 
. f . 
Coming on the heels of the State Department• s moral embargo 




~ question ~f siding with democracy or assisting a formally recognized 
government ·against, attack .. Roosevelt had simplified the problem into 
' 
. 
. . . 
' 
-
- . . 
. t, 88 
· '~t}J.ose who want war and 'those who do not." · This generat statement " 
-
couid only -further the cause, of American is·olationo There could he ·no 
' 
--=----.-- .. -.-·--· 
. •- '·-
/·-tni:~dle gro~nd· .. _- .:T'l}ose American§ ____ who- wanted t-o _ship arms '.t-vere the "war 
/ .. prdt t~e rs , ,; a:nd had. t~ be sque lclied . 89 
~ooseyelt .never seemed to concern himself 'tvith the fact that by 
t~~d-~ 
. :--~/•'. 
i .. . . -· -
===~-~---~-=~gDi~~~~~lli~~~~~~~~E~~~;r~~--i;- .·...-c.•.,,--.,.' '°:' ~.: ;.,;:_.·;_;,:i .. "·'''] 
_1/ 
later years he· 'tv~S to arrive a~ var.iou::~ rc3.t,i9p.alizations .£Or- the .. e,mbargo 0,· ,- - _-_, ___ ..,_,,._._ .. _. ----· --·-~--~-"'----···" ___ : .. ~------··- .. :.- --·-·----'-··' .. -• -'-· -. __ ,.: ·- · ....... ,. - ·-·-- -··-····- .--·-····· ··--· .... --------- ··-·s.•,. -•', 
' . 
' - ~ll~ te~se ~~ellled to _be only. after-thou~J:its. In 19 3 § __ t_1.1ra ~-P~J1. .:L ~h --· _ _ .---, ····--··-·-.. --- --·--·---'-- . --·----'-··· ~-- ------ ·-·-···-tv 
.-·Y. , . Revolution was for FoDoRe a 
,, 
conflict that was killing people and l'.in- 0 
t-h d f th t . . t f . . . " 9 O H ,., d .. d k o er wor s · rom a poin o view 1. t lvas war. e 1 not ma e 
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,._ Congress had made the 1'935 .neutra·lity act so definitive that. it could not 
' - - -~ ·- :, ___ t,,- ___ • ------- -- ·-- --· --- --- - ' --
· · ,· _· .-- . . 91 ., · -
· b~ autoJnatically appfied to the· Spap.ish l:!Prising_. Roosevelt never 
' . 
. ' 




mea_sures~" -As· late as 1938,. he proudly noted: that though no· formal 
.. 
. . .. ' . 
• • " I 
' • 
• !) 
- . " 
_ legis·lation -.~xisted to enforce., neutra·lity i11;~~b.e · Spanish conflict, "the. -
( 
governmeJt soon made its policy clea-r arid d~f~nitely- di.scourage4 such - _ . 
exportsl' through a moral em.b~~-goo- ·_The_~Spanish situation was re?lly_ no 
.r 
different from other outbreaks of violence. There were "two, equal 
.. 
sides~ .• ~wi-th_ approxima.tely-navies-~J;:,f- the --1lame'- size and·- therefore -there -
', l ,. ",' '.' 
" ld- b b ' " wou - e an em argo ... It was Congress.' fault _ that it could not be '1, J 
C done legally at the 1 outset of the crisis. 
Roos.eveit 0 s atta'ck on the patriotism, of Robert Cuse also revealed 
',\'--. ' -
the President's favorable·outlook towarc;ls· the.Spanish embargo. "Arid ·then 
. \_ 
one man," declared_ Rgoseyelt at a press conference, "does what amoun-ts 




to a perfectly legal~ but thoroughly unpatriotic act, he represents the 
- ---- - - ·- - -- -
_- 92 ten_percent of business that does·not l.ive up to the best of standards." I' .. - . ,:,, 
. 
One week later, Roosevel·t" went befor~ Congress to a·sk for emergency 
legislation to· stop t~e Cuse ·shipment·and\a11 future ones-.-··-As:one writer. 
-. 
. . . 
aoted, tJ::iis action was "or1ly further proof of Roosevelt '.s faith in the 
·l' 
'• · · 93 
neutrality idea at that time." He seemed- as determined as Congress npt" 
to allow American arrp.s to reach -either .of_. the Sp'anish combatants. 
'• ··--' 
I . 
•• -1 ... 
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Furthermore, the President favored ,· __ wttp.9ut. :res~:rvc.1.t:LQrt., . tli_e -- - •- ·- .. ' . - . .. . . . .. ·-- - - - - -- ·, .. -- - . ----· ·:-···-,- - .......... ___ .. ·--- .... - -- . ··--· --- ... ----- --· ... ·-···-:· ......... -- ·- ...... ---- . . ....... ---- - ... ---· ·- ·- -------· ·-···· ' :-- . --,· -- ---- - . .. - .. "' . 
; -
arms Embargo Act -concerning Spain •. He strongly urged its passage. When 
' . -
' --
he signed it, he did so with~ut any relu~tance. such as he· exhibited when, 
on signing. the Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, he issued the state-
ment that inflexible legislation might have the opposite effect from 
,C 
. -- -· - - - _- ::=c:-::.-= =·- ---
.-.a • .---- --·-·-··----~--'---~--- - -_: - -- - ·=--- - ____:a - ---·'--•-••- --------~--·"·-··cc~~ .. -·:.,--·---·-":·----_-:- __ .,,-.···- __ ---·-
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and the executive' brances of t-he · Government jo.ined, ·in singular . ' , "' 
. •·· 
. 
-~-~ ·. '. 
' 
. harmony, in b·elievirig that to keep,<~.\qof .from· the·'. Spanish c;.onfli~t was 
' ', 
·-- •·: ; 









~ I ' t ' I I 
., 
',, of the emba_rgo, even in its moral stage .. 
' 
. 
Ac~ordlng to'"Mrs ~ Rooseve 1 t 
and Sec~etary,of the Interior Harq_ld_Ickes, FoD.R. ·wa.,s qui_te. symp.~thiit1c·· 
' ·, 
',,_ to the Loyaltst -c'ause\ bu~ ___ could_ cl_"' noi;h~ng to. b.e_lp it _be'c~use of ad-
C . 1 d bl 0 • 
. 




~ '•., there is one v~ry· obvious reason why the President had to· follo'tv their I 
. . . 
' 
' 
dictates and not his own, and that is the imminent pre~$idential elect'ione 
For Roosevelt the _Spanish Wa~ had e_rupted at a most inopportune. time. 
,, . 
,- , . . '. -I 
Roosevelt's immediate· goal in the mon'th·s pr~c¢ding November 1936 
1 d E h . 1 b d · · d · 96 .was to- get re~e ecte . veryt 1.ng e se ecame a secon ary cons1. erat1.ono 
His domestic- policies:. were coming ,under severe criticism fr,om the 
Republicans as well as the radical right of Hue·y Long and Father Coughliria 
- . . -- .·· .. 
- . ·-
Among other things,. he was accused of making. deals with the '~reds" and 
- · 97 shifting the federal governme·nt into· the socialist camp o · In retrospect, 
of course, there was really no.need for FoD~Ro.tO worry since he carr·ied 
the country by an overwhelm.ing majority. ·However, Roosevelt co_uld not 
-----·· ---- -- ~---·--- -----· -------:---~------
-
- __ .... ---··--·-·-·-··- ·----::---
-
- --- ·- --·· -.-···---
-~·~=0'"~_:,_,--,-c-.,:.,~"::'.:-=::::::-:::. __ , __ .· · __ :-,~~:poEfsess~-sucn--~lcnowled.ge~-:in··'·advance·--o·f--this -event-.----.Coughlin-·had formed 
. . ' 
. 
. a third party along wi_t;h Dr. Townsend and Gerald Smith; / the Republicans 
hac;l .. nominated a mid-westerner, Alf Landon, ____ :f:n t:l1e hopes of attracting --- ·-. ___ ' ----- - - -- -- --· . -- - - --- -- ·'··---- .. ' - -- ---·- - -·-- --- ·------ "" -
the drought-stricken farmer; and in general the President appeared· to 
have little reason for over-confidence ... The New Deal itself was giving 
'· I·. 
Roosevelt's opponents enough campaign material without interjecting the 
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.... ,.,, ........... ,,. .. 
•' •,\; ,1,,1,•1.•1.',t,•t,i,t:::j 
The_ ·l:lresident.: realized.· that the. ovenihelm.ing. sentiment. of· this . 
. . 
,country was for peace and he,.had taken great pains "to. impress· Americans_ 
• 
with "his · s-incerity .on the i·ssue. 1198 ·The Spanish cri·sis· coming when it 
. " did, revived the, otd fear .that the United States might again be dragged 
. . . 
' 
. ~ ' into war. Roo~evelt had ··to prove· to the .people· that ·this · f·~ar was. __ ·_. · 
\ 
\ ' ' ., ! 
\, '. 
' g· roufittfle s s ; 
.. 
-- - - . ,"--i He had to mai~tain-. an :",adamantly neutral" position ~n order ' &ll ' ), I ~J , 
I ~ ~ ' . .... . .;,~, - . 
' ... 
- . -- ~ .. 
· \ .. :: .. - . •,• . · 9 9· 
to. k¢ep the issue out of the 1936 c~mpaign. E.~sent-ially the .. Republicans 
., 
t • , , I~• 
. , •.c .,.,,,,1 
... • oil' -? • ' 
and Democrats had the same platform concerning,_ foreign affairs.;-peace. lOO ' ; ·· 
..,. 
. 
--- -~ ··''··-··- ---- ·:·-·· ·- -· ·----·--··-- -- ---· ------- --- ..... - - - - -- -
A:s~ .1:ong as the peace wasn't in j~opa.rdy, · foreign affairs .. would offer no 
.solid point ·of diffe:i;ert~e .. 
"")' 
By embargoing anns to Spain, FoD.R. St).Cceeded in keeping the 
campaign fight .limited to domestic 'problems alone o His· Chautauqua· · 
I 
-i~ 
speech set down hi·s · goals for peace· in August and from then on there 
... was no n.eed to brin·g up the question again. Landon never even -broached . 
, I 
. . the subject. Late - iri October, however, there was a foreign policy. 
., 
. 




-~;Repµ.blic_a,nS-:,--~b:y.:-.-the·.·.son of .. fonner Pr~,sident·T?'ft, and the ·socialists by, 
··---:·' 
.101 a Mrs. R. Lament. . "" The outcome of this forum.showed that all three 
. . 
' : 
parties shared _a similar point of view: The American peopile were deter-
,mined to· keep out of war and the country• s neutrality legislatio~ ,,Jas i 
viewed as an effective means towards this end.- What the whole question 
.. ' -- . ···- - __ ._ 
_ __ -____ ·-·- -------- -~-· _-_;_:_- __ :___ - .• .. : .••. __ .. __ _: ___ -_ •. - _____ : ---- . - •-----,--,--• ·i·-- ------ • - - - __ ,_ -------· ---- ---·-·-- . - -- ... 
' 
would receive!bi-~artisan support~-· 
There was also another major reason why Roosevelt refused toi 
show any part~ality. for ... the Spanish Republic, and that concerned the 
\ 
Catholic Church in America. From the very outset of the civil war, 












. _____ ., -------~------- '--~----· -·. ---- ----
'! I), 
\; :1 ·-~--.:.·.~.;:-_.!i • ' •,_., 
_ ... ' 
,, ·--~lmost. a11· of the tJfficia::l· organs(·· of -the ··American Catholic Church -had. 
' 
. - -· 
- .- ......... . 
"."' u 
---- . '. ~: -~ 
sided with· the , Span~sh _ ·~nsurgents. The Church believed that the 
'' . 
-· "c .,.>' 
·Republican Gov~rnment was· domin~ted .by Communists:wh._o would··destroy 
... .. . ,~- - ' . ,,µ\)J 
' ••' -.'··-·--·- -,. . ·, ' ' { -I:-/ . . ' . 102 
Catholicism in Spa"in and then: set up a Bolshevik state .. · With the 
church so a1:1tagonistic, the best course FeDa·Ro -could have followed was 
.. 
the one· ,he did, complete neu~rality·.--,_ If he had allowed ·arms to reach -~-
-~ ' 'h, 
· ·the Loyalist~f, much of. the Catholi·c vote might have been lost. e-ither to 
.... ,:, .,) 
.,· ~ . 
~ ~ ~~-,_.-) 
Coughlin' s group _or to Landon.· As a politi~ni~ Roosev~lt realized the·. 
·- .·_. --'--- -·,·---.~ - --
I 
' 
need tO~'tvOO this religio:us,' bloc .. Of c'c:,urse it is difficult to discern·· 
.~ .. 
.. 
. : '\ -J . " ... :whether·-.the majority of th~- Catholics felt as s.trongly as their 
~ • •.!-,_ ••• ,., ..... ,., 
' 
religi~us leaders, 103 but in an election year Roosevelt w~uld not ivant -
'f..' __ .-, ~ to take the risk of offending an important ·bloc of vo·ters 0 
.. . ··-·· 
--·---------- -·- -~-·-----
To some observers, especially those who were· agafnst the embargo 
jJ 
from the -outset, the Catholic element,seemed to dictate to Roosevelt 
______ ~~~ica' s Spanish poiicy ... One writer in The Nation, ace.used Roosevelt's 
. ..,i_. . .... -~:- .. 
I 
i follower~ of sidJng with -the Fascists in Spaiq., because a·· Father· Ryan, 
r---
L . b 1 h . . . . . f' ' h p "d' 104 re e smypat 1zer, was campaigning or t e. resi ·ent. who was a known 
-~-~- "•· -- .. -
. 
Harold·Ickes in 
. . ~ ' f 
1938, made no secret·. 9£ the fact ttfat he believed 
Catholic sentiment ruled American.fo~eign policy. When the question of 
. ' ) 
,' 
lifting,._ the embargo arose, F .,DaRo, according to Ickes,· believed that to 
· · · - · 
105 
lift it would mean the loss of every Catholic vote. To Ickes as·· 1-r----- --- - --- .. -- - -- -. - -P --· -··-· --- - --- .. - - --- - . .. . _-:-· - .. - .. -- ·- - <- --.• . . -- - - - . - . . - .- . - -- - - - . - - - -- . 
11.:: ........... ~::;--·'""''"'"•''·--···:: ..... , ........... _ ... ___ ~.--:w.i.th_;_.Ma~cc .... L1~tt'JJ.g}:"._,:-,Jl .. ::n.9J;ed~::·.·:~Qm.mg_p.t.~.tQic:,:.~~='=--h~~t~:C.~thP_-l!i~:~P~~~§;§g~~~=~i~~-§.:~::Q_!!~::=9.t:::·~~~:.-.::::::-:.::~~:-.-~~~:~~~::i:::::=::-:;::.:.-~.=-




'! " s 
-the.:.prime--reasons for F~DaR.'s approval of the-.embargoin 1936, andfor-
his refusal to lift it in 1938. 106 "This was the cat that was actually . 
· ,. · .. 107 
in the _bag," stated Ickes, "and it is the .mangiest, sca·bbiest cat ever." . 
•·<) 
-- -,~~~--_. . ,-. 
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tl 
It· :"~hould ·be noted h·owever, ':that .the p1.1b lie Qpinio.n· tbc1t: 
~- ; 
\!IP·"' 
Roosevelt followed was not solely. that of the Catholics .. 
I • ·• 
fn. ·the ~ar1r-
stages_ of the embargo;· the Cathol:Lcs did not seem· to ~e pressuring the. 
. ,r 
, '•...,1' t I i 
Administration ·one way or the other o · .Not until· the question of _lift:in.g 
the embargo arose did the Cathcri:Lc· Q:rgans openiy pressure the- Pr~sident. 
. . .- • . • I 
~In,. 1936 they.were as quiet about what American poli~y should be -in S.pain 
as the pro-Loya'list elements were. Roosevelt was fearful of public · 
opin,i:on en ,,~~se, -not one religious e leinent. -
. ·\) :. 
.. 
Aside from these domestic poli.tical considerations, the embargo 
seemed ·'also to reflect Roosevelt's de-sire to further the cause of peace., · 
'" 
j ,,.,, •••• ; 
A~ in 1935, F.DoR-o believed that America·, through.its.neutrality measures, 
could make a definite c~htribution to internatio~al stability o · The 
" 
President was aware that Ame-ri~a 9 s .s_tand in regard to the Spanish· crisis 
would assist those European ·powers trying to work out a non-intervention 
agre1~mento -When Roosevelt delivered hi~ Chautauqua address the diplomats .. 
f h ld . d . . . . . . 108 d. . d o t e wor wa1.te ·in anxious anticipation, --. an as it turne out, 
Roosevelt said what Br-i-taln and France wanted to hear. Amer_ica in_ re_--__ _ 
maining c\loof would allow the European powers to solve their own problems.-_, 
in their own way. FoDGRo had also indicated·, as the New York Times 
· . - 109 interpr~ted it, a policy of friendly, unentangling cooperation. 
The embargo actually turned into a double edged sword·o On one side 
I 
I 
___ ··--· -·-. ____ __ _ _ ____ _ _________ .. ____ ---·-- ____________________ . ___ A~~-!:!<:_~ ___ Y.?~~·----P-~Q J;_~_~J;.t~g __ ,,_!.t -~-- .9.~-----·$-~_c;._gtJJ;y_:,.==:.P.~_t __ egg._: _ _t_hg=~- Q_th~h.:~ --iJ:,: ~wa$_:: : .. :.: .::-_: __ .::~: ... :::.:.:=~.::.=~-=.,.; •.. :. _________ .. , : .... --·-----·----· ......... . 
.! 
l 
____ t~ctically attempting to -cooperate-•·with _.Europe~-- -·-Howeve-r·;·····tn~=193-6-::--ttfi_s:'_=-~~~------:---:-:::-~~--~- -:-~~-------
was not one of Roosevelt 9 s major· considerations. He was much more 




necess'lt.Y of cooperating with F~a11ce and Britain .. 
. ' ~,. . 
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The. question of -whether Roos~velt _ was __ personally _in_ f_a.vo:1:_ 9:f~ __ 
:the emb'argo policy in 1936 ~S,· .in ·nie_asure, academic, for a Pres.ident molds 
··~' . 
' ,, 
policy more by his public statements and actions than by his personal 
sympath_ies. Roosevelt had favore·d neu~trality in 1935 and in 1936 · and 
made two main_ speeches that gave -every. indication that he believed 
'·, . 
strongly in· the neutrality system., In 1939 Roosevelt admitted the 
- ' 
·United States ·had made a .. mistake in Spain, but that was three years too : 
,-·'l"'·,.,,.,, 
late o .. In,.J:,he months· when the moral and · the'.!-1- ··· the legal embargo ··we·r't~r·--,A · .? .... , 
,J " 
be.ing molded, Roosevelt seemed·to give his full.support t9 the idea<P 
If .he did not like it h~·did not give the public ·any.knowle·d.ge of the 
fact. Everything that FoD_oRo. Sl\,.id and did in his official capacity a$. 
' ·, 
Chief Executive _only made the· United States commitment to isolation all 
th.e stronger o 
.. 
Roosevelt was at once sympathetic to the Loyalist cause yet · 
in favor of the embargo action" It becomes apparent tha~ in 1936 his 
r~publican sympathies were _'no more than compassion for __ a sister democracy 
" 
in trouble. ·He had no real inclination to assist the Spanish Government 
,1 
' --·,1- --·· 
in its fight for survival. The President was still, . at that time, convinced 
·of the need for America to remain sheltered from European troubles. 
And this conviction was more than just. an acquiescence _to political.._ 
.. ' 
necg$_S 1.1:y. _ 
·-···---: .... ~·-···-. ··-···--., .. - ··-··- ··-·--·'. --·-· -·-· '--·--···---~--
-'·-· -···-· ··-····. --··-·-··--- -····· ,. 
-· -· ~ • .:.. ....... _ •. _, ____ , _______ ..... ,.·-·-···-··--·"•'-·-----~-· -----·-····-·--- ·----· -····-'···-~ ·- ._ -. - . ' . ' ............ -._ .. ,. ....... ~---· --···-'-····· ·-----·- ·-----:-.,--··--·- •• -- ········-··-···-· ···-·--·-···-··-·······' •••••• ,.. ······- ,.t --·--
"--~····-·------· ----··- --
... - --·····---~>---~·-·-··-··-- .............. ·-' --- --~ __ .... ~----·· 
Only after the obvious failure ··of the. Spanish. embargoes to bring 
·~ \ 
- --- ..... \"\.. ·-- - - . --·· 
about peace and the equally obvious fact that the embargoes were of im-
measurable value to Fascist advancement did Roosevelt change his views 
,--..,-(' 
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· Roosevelt fip.~lly i-ndicated that he was now. le_ss. cbnvinced., th-at Ainerica ,; 
~ . J', -" 
should stand aloof. In that s.p,eech he declared: 91There mus.,t b·e 
· positive endeavors to preserve peace o ii 
·-America hates "tvar Q ____ America hope~,_ 
,- ,· :.,\_~. 
- 'JI) I 
' . ' ~ 
f for peace o :·; Therefore, Americ·a actually ~ngages in the· se.arch for 
. 110 . 
peace .. '' · -If the President · had held such a view at the outset of the 
Spanish· crisi~. hi,s reaction .. to '·the war migh·t have been quite different. 
' ~- . - . --·--- - . ·-· . ~-.:;.~ But by 1937, the embargo proved irrevoc·able ... 
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4 . STATE DEPARTMENT ,, 
-... ,.,... . ,-.~ 
i' . . : ... -~ . 
. , 
· Cordell Hull, long after the Spanish embargo policy had become 
,, ., •• ,1 .• ,.-,, 
'v a part of history, commented that even though the Fascists won in ' . 
·• . • 
• 
·, '.t • • • I • • lj-
. Spain, at .lea~t·the Civil War did 11.ot boil over ·i11to a, general.European, ...... :::··::·:·:~·: .. :~.-~,--~······ 
. -
' , . conflict .. · He added that " ... it was difficult·'for me then, as it is 
I 
·, . 





" we pursued. , · It ·is in the light of this statement that one must 
......... , ... , ... ,,. 
~_,..,. .. ,,.,,. ... 
approach the study · of· the State Department in 1936. .. Hull freely ad-
.. 
-mitte'd that .he was in full support of the moral ~nd formal embargo and 
.r ,_ . 
-~ .. ,·,·., 
the actions of the State Department reflected this attitude. The idea '.·:. _ ........... , .•... :-. 
i 
of an embargo was carried out to its fullest in regard to Spain, and ·-
though numerous oppo_rtunities presented themselves to soften the policy 
they were ignored. llull, as well .as his sul>o.rdinates-; Assistant 
Secretary of State R. Walton Moore. and Under Secretary Phillips, favored 
. r America 'a stand ·for several/ reas~ns. The only real dissenter w;s ... ~-·:-· 
, Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles, cl,nd in 1936 his influence was limited . 112 
t..-·····' 
. T11e Departm~nt energetic.ally assumed the comID.and of the ~mbargo policy 
. and :steered a straight course' from ,the outset of the war until its 
conclusion ·in 1939v In effec·t, then, the State Department Wf1.S very· 
--- -· . ---- ---------·- -- _ . ., - ---- .. - --- -.-- -· --
- - ---- -·· ·-- ---- -
- -------'--~~-- ---
·--·--·-- ·---·-···-- -- . ·--------. ----·-·- '·-------·---- ... 
. -
·-, largely responsible for the initiation ~·and execution of the embafgo idE=a:. 
-- ,-1------ --- - -- -- - . - -- -
• , ~ r , 
trJithout State Department support the "moral embargo" would have floundered 
p 
aimlessly~ 
' I \ 
. ' 
r ,r.,_1 ,.,,-.,,,,,. 
-
-- --=-:=--= --- -- ~~-----=- -··----~--- L--..J --
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. 'V'• -·:·--cc- • ,,.. , . . ·: t 
•'. ·._ .... ,:·._~·.··j·' .. ·, · .. ·•· ... '~-,, 
~ 
:, ....... 1·•1 
The whole idea of .embargoing "arms. by moral s;uasion as . a . form 
of American neutrality was no:t a new 011e for th~ Depattinen~_. ~ust a 
ye·a·r earlier. -~l?,e · Italo-Ethiopian----emqargo had !J~_en extended beyond t'he 
' . . 
', >, I 
-48 
:' ,.1 ,,,, i 
' ,i , ,.. I 
limits set by Congress and was," to·-tJ.1at degree,-~ moral one. There· 
·was no _ legal :restriction t.9 .. :keep Anier'icans · from exporting goods. tither 
~ 
= 
I-. ,_ .. , 
. than implements of war to . these warring· countries; but w_i.t1:'t .the assistance 
,"' '.'.' I ; < ••., ,. •- ,, •·•·•·••!><•• '-~ 
of the President, the ,.Department· impressed upon the publ·ic the need to-
. 
. 
. prevent trad·e above_ -peace time levels. In 1935, I feel· that the- De.par~.-
... ,,, .,.,-
ment seemed as convinced as the public,Ptesident,.·~~clCongress that., . 
wa:r coulcl be halted and the .. peace of the··united''States preserved_·by 'the-·1 
s/imple installation of an embargo pollcy. As with Roo·sevelt, Hull· 
" 
, agreed with the· basic i_dea of United State·s neutrality ai:i,_d, impartiality. 
in foreign wars. But both dis like·d. -the ·mandat,5ry_· character of the -1935 
•. a.ii 
. . __ ' ........ ~----~....-..•,. 
Both )11.en ·wanted to· empower the· Pres iden.t .to- -:- --- . -- -- -- --- -neutrality legis~~ti~n. ~ 
. 
. . 
discriminate between a_ggressor and-. victim by embargoing· ~xports ·of arms 
-to only the former as they felt it would deter aggressors. 1 ~~. However,; 
a-side from this, the Del)artment attempted to do all ·in its ·p9wer to 
· ····-----------prevent arms:· from reaching either of the be·llige·rents ·in ·the ·Italo-
E thiqpJ.an War. 
The Department's philoso~hy. in 1935 and 19-36 was basically t'tvo-







· · - - ········ .. ~.. · maintain peace a:nd to restore the World to sanity." 114 ' Hull believed 
_, 
----- --
tha t the best irisiir:ance to keep- the United States out of war was to'-~,make 
sure one didn't occ·ur. Thus, Hull attempted informally tp cooperate 
with, but not directly or publicly recognize, the League of Nation°s 
~ ' 
.. " . M.. 1 · . 115 Du h 1 ° 1 . sanctions against usso ini. ~ e tote neutra ity aws it was, 
'),, 
~ 
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... , .... 
,., ·. . 116 · Hull did-not 11.lce!' .. , . The Secretary never attempted to,.hide his.disdain. 
--
' ' 
•/) •C "• ·~-•;:, 
for an ~mbargo that had to ·be' applied again~t aggre-ssor· and'·victim 
alike. 
-~ ' 
This · uwork for 'pea'c~e··' at:t;itude" seemed to permeate the whole 
' 
117 Department. Assistant SecretarywMoore went so far as to recommend 
. ..118 that the State Department should be renamed the .'9Departme'!lt of Peace. 
Of course, due to isolat.ionist sentiment, Hul 1 and ·the Department were 
' . . 
forced to fulfill this aim in quiet and limited areas o There could be 
t 
. l 
·no .outright cooperation with England, France or the Leagueo The United 
-States had to remain ·aloof from foreign entanglements o · . Hull thought 
that though the ·united States could not actively cooperate, it could 
' . 
· · ··~.--m.ake-,its own private contribution to peace by not supplying arms to. 
1 ,- •• ·1 - - -------·- - ··•" , • 
- ~ 
warring nations. This view· was to .play an ·important role in the 
•J ' •• -•• ;. J ,,, ' ,., 
- ·- --·------··----------· ---· --·-- ----~----· -------- ·-·---·----·-------~---•,,-------·----;·--.-·.0-···-·-·---------'--------
mot i va tions behind the Spanish· Embargo. 
0 The second goal of the State Department was, of course, to 
keep the United States out of war . 
• . • -· - .•. ··-·--···· ··--.,I. 
It inight b~ said that the slogan of ·t·he State '1 
Depar_tment in de~ling with foreign nations has . 
been to mind 'our own business' and primarily' our . 
own business is concerne.d with peace .. for the· 
United States first, peace .for the world after-
ward & 119_ 
There is an obvious ·conflict between this attitude· and the first 
. one, but in 1935 such p~radoxes _were part of- American_ policy. On- the one 
hand Hull advocated an active American foreign-policy in the world arena; 
. on the_ oth~r, h.e. ~ad to, operate· within the rest·rictions of an isolationist 
pub~ic. Hull was limited by public opinion, an(j as one political 
. I 
scientist pointed- o·ut: ·' · 
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·The ·state Department· cannot, in fact d9es not, 
fashion a policy that is too far in advance of · 
.. , what· public opinion will permit. If it does the Administration will be .. thrown· out of office· and . 
ranking officials with it .... So the State 
Department-has to limp along with the ball and 




sighted public ... 120 -
.o 
'"'"•-·--•--{,, L•.' .• /1• .... 
Hqwever, it· would be wrong tor infer that Hull was completely 
forc·ed- against his· ,;v-ill to adopt a strict neutrality policy; for he, > • 
like most -other Americans, did not want to ·risk war under· any circum-
- .. ·, 121 
stance~_. __ -~----- In 1935 and 1936 the "Quarantine policy" was·· still too 
""' 
•. ', 
radical for both Hull and his chief, President Roosevelt to adopt6 
It should be noted that the State Department~~never objected 
.,.,.,' 
to the right _of Congress to- legislate neutrality. It seemed as senseless 
to Hull- as it did to··most of the count~y to risk war over ·''traditional 
··-• .. 
n~utrality· rights." The Department's only complaint was with the lack -· ~ 
of discretionary powers granted to the President to discriminate between 
aggressor and victimo This vie"tv prevailed in 1935 and 1937 when the 
1 0 1 d' . - d 122 -- ---- neutra ity aws were iscusse o Indeed, the Department never rejected 
the general principles of embargo legislation. 
,, 
-When the. Spanish Civil War erupfed in late July the State 
Department was still followfng the t"tvo-pronged .Policy initia-ted at the 
time of the ltalo-Ethiopian War. It was_ at once_ '~promoting peace" 
d " h . • d .. ·- .. ·1 . . " 123 B -\f . -an at t e same time avoi ing 1.nvo vement. 1.n war. . ut,~_9 course 
.. /,.. 
_;-·',/ . 
, / (_.,.. -----
. . - ·-in regard to Spain the path ·was not ·so clearly 'marked. (The_ e~isting -,,;, 
~-- --- " ' ' 
neutrality legislation, as noted, did not apply to civil conflicts .. 
\fuatever policy Hull and his colleagues decided up-on, it was to be· the 
sole responsibility of the Department i,tself o Within twenty days after· ', ,,_f 
1, 
the first notification of trouble on the Iberian peninsula the 
\.. ·.:v, 
1,\,\ •• ' • 
(I 
·=··-·-- -- -- i 
0 
'-'\ · . .; 
.d 
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(! . 
Department .decided to once again adopt a moral, embargo; this time against ' ~ 
. ' . 
· th~ legal government of the Spanish Republic and the Insurgents. 12A This 
latter fact repres~nts the crux of the problem, and problems· surrounding 
the embargo O s· adoption went a lot deeper than mere thoughts of world 
,;1 -:, 
peace ... The motivations that prompted the embargo-neut,rality approach· 
towards '.Spain· initially appeared to be a carryover of the Ethiopian ·· . 
. . 
/ 
· policy o·<: · Howeyer, the circumstances surrounding_ this new crisis were of 
• I • 
an entirely different nature ... · 
. V' 
, ___ In __ the days _p_rior to the August 7t~f declarc1tion of po_li_cy, little 
., 
is known about the ·inner workings of the.State Dep~rtniento Hull is 
·. known to have had s·taff meetings ·every Sunday, but none of the dis-
, . 125 cussions were record~d, pr.-at least the records hav~ not been releasedo 
·· It is,_ however, logic?l to assume ·th-at-·"'Hull d·id, discuss. the Spanish 
situation with his staff and reached the conclusion to embargo arms .. 
through moral suasion. ~26 . Th~ attitude of· the government was based on 
the policy of promoting peace and avoiding involvement in foreign prob~ 
. . lems. · From his later·statements, it is obvious that from the iutset . . . 
Hull ivas· in favor of .,the embargo o Even in later years when ·the 
., 
~ ~ ~ 
. . . President waivered over the· advisability "Of th~ Embargo, Hull remained 
· steadfast in his beliefso 127 
' It was the contention of some. observers, however_, that it was· 
. {~ 
not Hull. and Roosevelt who devised ·the embarg~ policy, but rather the 
. 
-· -----------·· - -- .... -,- --··•-•--· -·--·· ·-
- -- -· - -·-· ·_.".). - .. --~-----
Secretary" s associates while their chief was planning to go on 9ne of 
. •. . ( . . . ' 
. 
-· 
his ·many trips to South ~rica. Harold Ickes-; Secretary of· the . 
. 
Interior, stated that: 
I . 
' 'It· is widely believed th.at the embargo .on ,,, 
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128 .. · .. · 
. ···~, ~ 12 9 absence o • ~ .• .,:. _ Correspondent Max Lerner echoed these sentiments. . 
. ,.;' .. ,, ,,.,, ,·. 
However, such a thing seems u11likely. Hull, though he may not •.•.. ';" ,. ,- •. -~ ~-,.---,i,-'' ~ ·•!) 
V have been the .best of administratoliS·,· "lvas considered to have had com-
plete · con.trol over I1is underlings in matters of poti·cy o l 30 It is true' 
. •.·,· ,_-, 
,. !~ : 1_·' ,\ ' 
''J . 
that· the official dec,laration of· the American attitude in the Spanish 
affair was re-leased\ -by-Act~ng Secretary Phillips on August 7, but Hull 
'-' •· 
_ ... 
did have sufficient -opportunity to discuss the general outline of this 
. - ) 
stat'emevt before he left on August 5 o Besides, I feel that no .man . 
' 
. 
would have vigorously defended,a policy if h~ did not believe in ito 
. ' Even ~ore·, ·the Secretary of State. was considered one of th·e major 
f b h .. d n 1 1 · _.; "' f .h b d · · · . A lJl orces e 1.n .1.'-ooseve t s acceptanee1a-- o , t e em argo ecision 1.n ugu~_t . 
. '\\ 
./',_ \\ 
The moral,_ embargo itself was instituted without fanfa.re. · 
Pnillips cabled-our ·diplomats that though·t~e Neutrality Act didn't 
apply, the United States "in conformi"Q"with-its well-established.policy 
of ·non~intex-ference with internal affairs in other ·countries, either 
in time of peace or in the event of civil. strife, ·this g.overnment will; 
. 
. 
of course,. scrupulously refrain from any interference whatsoever .iri the . 
. 
. . 
unfortunate Spanish ~ituation. 11132 A few days later an Anierican airplane 
manufacturer aske·d·- the Department whether he could se·ll to Spai~, and a 
. simitar·ly-worded-stateraent was released for' the public to the effect· that 
. . 
'the United States Government had art.: established policy of non-_inter-
ference in the af-f;i~;-~f- ~ther nations. 133 · though there was no legal 
- -- -- -- - -----· --- . --· ... ---··-·········-···-······---··-- ---· -- -···. -- ......... . 
- ---- -- -- ... -- .. --··· ···-·~- ... --------. --~ --• ··-···. ... . -- . -
way to stop such ·shipments the Department had hoped -that "moral pressure. 
would be sufficient to keep our citizens frOJll involving ·tQe nation a 11 
'. 
-And it. was able to do ~o, until late December, when Robert Cuse blatantlr 











The· reasons · for this poli'cy of the State Department are a·S 
.. 
numerous as they are diverse. At times Hull emphasized the· desire for 
. ~ 
'"-.. .. , 
f1,._ 
"r .. , , the Unite~ States to -keep o~t of war .. 
. I . At bther~-,,times, as in the August ,- 1, -· ·' 
7th note, the rati~nale was that we ·did .nqt want to interfere ±rt the 













follow a more internationally oriented foreign policy_o -As in 1935 the· 
· State :Qepartment was at once building a wa.11 around our shores while at 
I 
~ ? 
,,. the same time trying to extend indirect hel.p to European democracies .. 
. ,
Public opin.i(!n also played a role .tri.: helping to influence the 
Department embargo policy, · though it was far less influential with this 
~ . ,--- , ______ --··-----····]' 
.. 
or_gan of the Government than with the Pr.esident .. FoDeR .. was very 
conscious of public opinion and always kept._ in mind the domestic 
reactions to-"interna~ional problems. Nevertheless, ·the State Department 
.. 
-- .... 
could ·not operate in a vacuum. by favoring policies· not supported by the 
public. In 1936,. __ sentiment was, as has been noted,· in favor ·of strict 
neutrality .. 
On August 6, the Depa~tment replied to the ·spariish-·re·quest -for 
. the sale of machine gun cartridges by saying .''while· we could not embargo 
'' .. 
the export of war materials to Spain, (the Department) emphasized the . 
-- ------- ··-. - '---·----···;- --- ·----· __ ,_, ___ --· --~---·- --------·~·-··-·· ·-----· -·.·_-. -:-······-- .- --· -· __ ,._ ··-- -----·· .... - --·----· --- ---
____ : ·-· . -- .tr --- ····- - . . ----·-··--· ··----· - -----·- - - . -· - ,· :~ 
... widespread f.ee.iin.g in_ the Un:ited Stat~s against such exports o" . :The same, . . - ,._ '" 
- ' 
argument was used in 1937 and again later as an excuse to'the Spanish 
'\ 
A. b d . f . 1 ... f . . . h. b . ·.. . 134 A- • d f h·"· • h h . m assa or or not -. 1. · ting -.t- e· em argo. ···· ·· - si e .~ rom t is; t oug , 
.. I·• 
I 
the · State Department rarely resorted to using pub_l.ic sentiment as a 
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") 
·. I 
-that the· public exercised a great restraining ·influen.ce and promptedr 
., 
-the Department and the President to follow a cautious and aloof. 
1 . ·. 135 po 1.cy .. · 
\, 
In line with public opinion the Department at,t:empt:ed to· keep 
.. the United States wer1· insulated from the sp·anish conflagration. A . ( 
. 
-54. 
·prime example of. thi_s may be .. seen in _the rea_c-tion of the. Department to 
•. 
the bombing of the 19UGSGS$ Kane" in· Spanish waters by some unidentified 
planes .. Huli '. s -first move was to inform both the Republican forces, as 
I 
; 
well as. the ~Nat.ionalists, ·of~ the at.tac~. and t<:> .ask that proper pre-
caution· be taken to ·prevent a reoccurrence.o .. But their assurances were 
. 
· · not sufficient. Htill;···the·n ordered all American ships in the area to 
I 
• 0 hd . ~- . . f . . 0 d . . 13 6 wit raw .. -s·o as to prevent any uture inci ents_. ..- The old World War 
· -I lessons were revived. Americans now believed that as long .as there 
,.-·,:•:• 
(.~ were no ships to· bomb, th.ere could be no reason for war .. Hull seemed 
more than ·W~lling to concur with.the public. Th~re would be no more 




··--·------ - - ----·-·--- --- ~--""• ··- --
The action of tl;ie Stat-~ Department in withdrawing. 
·our warships from Spanish ~aters will merit the 
/ 
strong approvhl of every--American-~.. Thi~s--moVIf-1s·-----·----~------ ·.·· · · · -.. -
another indication that. as a· nation we ,·are through· 
sticking our- noses· into ---the-wars---of·--Eur-op-e·~-13-'7-·-- ·--- ~-------- · 
--····--~-
Ainericaris were in no mood. for heroics. 
This idec;1 of· American ships entering belligerent areas was also 
very.basic to the embargo i~self. If the·re was .no tradin.g_ w:i.1::j:i_ ~:i.J;l:1._er - . - --- ·- ...... -- - _____ -~·----- ______ -, __ -- . ---·· ···-·· -----·· -----------------·---·-
' \ 
~.:ide, then the Government would not be responsible for the safety of 
the ships. The 1935 Neutrality Act ma.de it quite clear that. onc.e:.:_--the 
"· '1 •..• 
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' 
bill was invok~d by the President, American ships entering belligerent 
· . . ··1.· · · . 138 
p·orts traveled at· their .own riske Thus the State Department was 
simply applying the spirit of the act to the Spanis~ crisis. In 1938 this. 
issue 't-1as to become even more importan~ when there was ·a movement afoot 
' 
" . 
to lift ·the ell!bargo/ . It was one of H':111' s prime arguments against. any _ 
such action. However, the. threa~ of backing into war because of our 
r 
~. . . f ~ -, , -
•
1 





. ~ . C 
So far I have inves~igated the .''moral .. embargon from the side 
of fear; the fear: that we would be dragged -into waro But Hull also had 
... 
· other reasons for·~' adopting, the_ embargo o Probably the most important 
one was cooperation' with the non-interventi~p power~. in the latter. s 
attempts to localize 'the war. Publicly,. the.re was actually no differ-
· ence .. whether we simply wa~t~d to st~y out of war or wished to work with 
the ·British· and French, f~r the e.nd. result in either ca·s_e ·was the :embargo.-
' . 
However, the motives were of a complet"e~y different nature. 
-- --- ··--· .. --·-- --· ·.::. ------ -- -
··~-
The State Depar'tment was, of cours~, fully aware of the plans 
·for non-intervention circuiating'·.through.out Europe~- While the_ British ·· 
were t:t;ying to convince. the Fren_.ch not to sell ·arms to th~ ··spanish 
\ 
• I • • , 139 
government the United States was kept informe<;l.. .On A\lgu~t 4,- France 
. ·"-~ . ; 
I 
... ,,.·; 
. C, ; 
C 
--- -- finally·notffied·Hull th·at-·she wou .. ~d follow "the-tradit-iona1--po~-i-cy:---o-f·-.. , · ·-- · ----- ---- --------
: ________ ~-------------------~--~----------------non·--interventi-on·--·rn··-·int~rna-l·-·aff-a-irs--o-:f-.-ariy----natienu--·-a~a--wou-ld---a-tte,mpt--·--··-----~-... ~-----·---------------·-------: 
' . 
to form a Non"'."Interv~ntioil pact. 140 No overtures were cj'ffici_ally :r11a<i~---- ____ · _ 
. . 
.. 
to the United States, though, of course, the Frenc.11 envoy was· trying 
to discover America-'s likely -posit.ion. : Hull did indicate tha-t,,., __ ,ithe·''·'--~-·,.~,~-<, ______ ,_. _____ ,,~~· 
cha~ge was aware of th1e· general attitude of this government towards 
:·,. -· 















,.· · 141 the _doctrine of non-intervention," but made no firm commitments . 
• 
, • t":::. Ho~ever, on.August 5, the same day London agreed to go along~wit~ the 
French ; 142 IIulLcl;t(i hold~~a 1Ile¢ting with l).iS advisors and two· days lat'er . 
.., 
op August,.~7., tl1e Governmep.; .made its stand quite clear. 
. ''('.:"\., 
0n·August 11, 
·, • r,, I ·' 1',c 
Act;ing Secretary Phillips took· pains to clari.fy our relationships 'tvith 
·the-European pact and .indicated that though we. could not sign, the 
.... , \ , , n • \ • . . ' • I 





. .-~ . 
. On.. August 11, - in explaining the ·American· position, Acting. 
r- .... ' 
Q. 
Secretary-of State Phillips replied that·. the United States was in 
,. . 
.. sympathy with' French efforts to keep the Spanish War from ·spreading, 
. but, that this country preferred to inaugurate its own non-intervention 
. · . 144 
systeriiwithoug collaboration- with--,·the· countries of Europe .. 
· Re_g~rding the relatipns'hip between. the ·action of the Uniteµ 
. . -States government and ·of the British, Norman J. Padelfor<J. wrote: 
--·---.~-----,--~-------·-·: ___ .. --.--.. ---:·--·-·--··-·---,-.--··--~ _, ____ ... _ -------·,--·---:-··--·---- '?······:--·~·--,.--•···----·-- ·~-----·-~ -- . ----: ---··--.'· · .. --------------.--· ------. ----------·-··----·-,--------·---·-~·.·--··-------·-. -·-----.-·----·--- .----·- ·--·-· ·-··---·- ---·---.. -~·----,--=-·---..-.--..!.:.!.-~ .. __ ...,__. 
... \ 
-·:. . 
Admitting the.- -t:raditional policy toward the internal· 
· politics of ~tiropean states, the· issuance of the an-
_nouncement. {by' th~ Department of State on August 11, 
·' 1.936). at ·~he mome.nt'. negotiation_s were. in progress- -
• 1 
· b~,tween the French and Br·itish Governments for the·· 
Non-:Intervention Accord, and four days be,fore that 
. --.· ·-·- i:!'c-c·ord,-:-to·ok· -the···-·-form·:of····t-he··--exe-I-1ange---of--not·es·-upon··----·-·-·'-··---- .··· --·---~- -·-----···'._: ____ ·---~··· ---- ,:::" 
' . ,. . . . . '\ . 
. " - ; 
. , which ·the· entire structure of non-intervention 'tvas · . ·. - . 
' . ba.sed, . :Ls· an 'int~resting coincidence. ,combined with ' 
.. __ ----:-·- _: __ ·_,_~~------:--- ---- --- 0 ~----~---. the __ faCt, __ "that-:measure-S . simt-lal:' to those . ~dopted first 
-·· ·-·· by-Br.itait1· and France,. and .. then ·by, all·_the ·-non-inter~ 
vention parties, to stop. the.:··passage of voluntee·:t:s 
. 
. '-. to Spc1:in, were taken at.:,tha~t--time when 'these two . ·-
Powers were negotia.ting with the. other states in 
•,,J-J, .'•,r\ ••' . ' • ' • • ~ 
'• 
---···---- -- · ---- -· ----.---- - ---"-:-- ------------Eur-op-e,---sulistance--wou~ld ____ seetrr to· be---1ent to, the _____ · . ---- -
argument that the policy of the Uni,ted StaJ:es, was 
one of. support of Britain and France and of their 
~ pol!~-i~i, J;:QWarc'!- _Sp_a.in,._s1_lbeit_by ii~arate and, parallel. .. ·~. .. .. .............. .. . --
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The six major powers involved seemed to fall into three groups: 
the troublemaking "ha_.i.,e_-nots," Germany and Italy; the ·peace-desiring 
? , / . - . 
, "haves,". eager to maintain the s·tatus· quo,' which suite_d _them,_ England 
. 
pnd France; and in a class by itself, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
;Republics. The "have7not·s," with their undemocra:tic,. totalitarian ./ 
. . - . . . 
. . 
• I. - -.. - ·• . 
gove,:rnments, ._ seemed re~dy to disturb the peace i·f that would make 
possible the realization of- their agiressive ambition-so 
/ 
The deci·sion of the French gove.rnment {July 25,. 1936) not to ~~ 
~ . . . ' . 
permi.t. war mate.rial:s ·t:o go to Spain was, perhaps, the most important 
,· . 
single act in the his.tory of the dip.lomac.y of the Spanish Civil War. 
... v . 
~ Perhaps.of paramount· importance in the. fateful decision of the 
French government was Paris·• .desire to maintain the friends~ip "and good-
.. 146 will of London which it saw as the "sine qua non" of French security. 
I-"'! 
In· seeking not to ~l~_l?_!!ci:_!=~ _ ~.~~-t.i:.~4 .. ~op_;i.11_i_op. _. the F_r§_nch ___ gov:e_rn_ .. ___ _ 
---------·-----------------------------~ --- -----------·--- . --- ----
....... ,147 
ment abandoned ~he thought of an independent p_olicy toward, .. Spa1.no 
-
· ·British· influence in the .determination ·Of French policy toward 
. 
. . 
Spain was decisive o - There cari be no doubt- that the chief :arch,itect of· 
0 • 
appeasement in Spain was. Gre·at ·Britain. . The motivations whi,ch underlay 
British policy toward Spain. were ··many o: .Most significant,· in Engl~nd, 
-... ----. - ,••·,•··•- -
-,· ··',·j""C"'- ,- ---· ·•• ..... , ·••- -~,-- -
----·- -··· --- --- --~--- · -- - -·:--as w~:11-~-as ·in--Fran~e;-was ··the·-:wfdespread- r,a·~-if:ts·J: sentiment~ In giving 
. • . . l . . 
its. ·support to the .. non-intervention plan the -British government announced 
. that it-_ thus hoped to 1.ocalize -the Spanish. conflict• an~ pre.vent it from 
.,., ... , ... , ...................... .. 
{ . 
• <!} 
. __ .. de:vel.011ing.c __ into ___ a.c.general war.,,,.all---aimc~th~,t-c,.received. t-he,,capppova0 1°;~Qf:a:---·-··-'"··-····--'··' 
' 148 ' , ..... . large number of people on both· sid·e·s of the Channel • 
• ... ,I 
~---·~~-·. 
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' - ' 
, German · intervention in the Spanish c·ivil _ War was_ prompted,· 
... , ..... 
' I ' I ~ 
primarily,·., by strategic consid~rations. Another important factor was. 
the desire of Ge.rma~y to· win a po_sit:fon of economic preeminence in the· 




Getman intervention was also motivated by ide9logical and 
----------~- --- · - ·' . · ., 1 l.L 9 




With ,Italy· stra'tegic considerations constituted the principal 
motivation for int.ervention in the Spanish struggle.· Howev~r-, while 
, ' -- , . - ,. • • • .; r , , . ,!!J. 
• ' '• I 
economic factors were less significant in Italian than-in German inter-
-vention, · ideological .. and political motives were probably: stronger with 
-~ - , - · 150 . --- -




· The· Spanish Civil War· marked the real beginning of Italo-







German amity" and collaboration. which :r-e~:u}ted f i;st . in -·an_ ~n.~t=:~t~---~-tyJ_~_c:1 _____ ·_ ---~·: ___________ ,- __ ·
\ 
~.the "Rome-Berlin Axis". and. ,·ultimately in ·a·, formal militc3:ry alliance 
- · 15-1 , , · 
between the ·two powers. The ''Rome-Berli..11}1Axis" functioned_ to keep 
"communist poison" from spread,ing beyond the CO{lfines O_f its parent 
,'/ 
' , . 
.152 · 
state.-- ·. --- . -·-- ···------------ -· ·-. ----·------·· ·-·- -·---· ·- - - -----------~···------~-- --------·-----·- -~---- ··--- ---··--·--···--·-- - ---·-- --·-·-··--·- ---
. . 
f.- ' or-- /J 
•, 
. -·-- -·------- -·--·. .. -· ---·· -·-----·----·-· . 
Moscow, without a formal denunciation of the µon-intervention 
- ' 
.----------- ,- -· 
____ plan_, beg'::n act~vely to support the Spanish ~epublicans. 




__ Sovi~t_ i_11t~:rv~p.t.Jo11 _t1.1 __ §p~i.p. J!9-~ __ P.r.Q;m.pte_¢1 py_ th~ ___ 4~_§_!~_<;_J::9. ___ prj.11g __________ -" _ 
~ ' 
an end to the policy of appeasement and to refurbish the_ system of. 
collective sec~rity. Mo·scow was hot conc~rned with the maint;:enance of. 
·· •-- · . -- - •--·-··· .. · - '"·-•· .... ------»• •·· .- · ·•. · · ... ··· -- -· -- ..•.•. ,•-, •--~ -- .• ,_: ••• ,.--, • ... ; ·-- ·-···---. .: •. · - •• -.:.· ... :o., ·. --- ..... , - •· ... -.. --- --- . : .• c,,._, ___ ,._ .. ~·-~ - ...... -,.,. __ •• c,_ •• -.• .• · ·•- - --- - -- .··· - ---- -- - - .• · C _-,. --~~·- " ..•••.• ." ·.,.:. - - ------• .,. , -···--·-•'· '··-••·• -•••. _ .; : •• • -. - •.. " _- •• ·,_ ,-.-, _ --·. ,_ •• 
u 























fascist powers in Spairi ... Mosco'67 sought to bolster the Spanish Re·pub.lic; 
aga~nst the fascist onslaught until Great Britain and France, alert to 
the threat to. their security, would jettison. the policy of appeasement 
and would themselves aid the Madrid gove~nment. The conflict in Spain 
C ,, 
•I i..l ,, \I 
u 
provided the St!-preme test of the new S.oviet diplomacy aimed at rap-
~ 
prochement with the Western democracies and collective security against 
£ ,, ( · . " .. 153 ascist aggression.· · 
Hull, in his Memoir~ made it explicitly clea:r, that he believed 
l) 
that since. t4e; war was in Europe• s baclcyard, it was for those po'tvers 
• \ 
I 
directly concerned to take the leado And since twenty-seven nations 
· were eventually to sign the N~ri-Intervention pact,"" it would havenbeen 
· · .·. . 154 
"unthinkabl_e for the United States· to talce the contrary course o" . If 
Brit'ain and France were convinced that the pact would insure peace; 
I ' 
•.! . 
I' t_. ------ --
... , . 





friends." The Secretaryadded that: 
f If · general war were to come, ,these nations would [ } have .. to bear the burden of fighting, without any 
,.-.:.1 
• . ,r 
a assurance, in view of isolationist sentiment. here, p ~ _________ ____________ ________ ________ __ _____ of assistance from us who,· by. tJJ.t~~yen.tion __ (if 'tve.:~=~::~==-=.,.--- ______ ----------------------------------- ... ···--·----· l --




: -1 -- . .. 
: 1·· 
u 
Hull firmly. believed ,that a~y · othe;r course ·taken by the United 
f - -· - -·· . --·-· - -- -- '. - . -- - . . . . State·~ would have endang-ered the __p_~ace of. tlie _ American people o Otir 
-- ------- ----------------------- ii V ~ 
-policy of non-inte~vention in regard to -_~pain had to be- in full accord 
. 
. 
.. . __________ .. ___ .:v,_~_!;lt __ _t:haJ~ · e1t.pres.sed by· the_ Eu·ropean. nations.,·- Whatever, else- the' ·United---·-___ ----------·~--------
•. ""' • 
- - ,· --





.States did it could. not upset. the: Non-Interve_1:1:;_ion ~-~ti:eemen_~-°---, ~~- ~- ~q_:t~---- _ -~ 
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American policy and :its relationship ~ith Europe: 
0 
I again emphasized that in view of the attitude 
of the· Europ·ean Governments and the danger of an 
internation~l clash in connection with· the Spanish 
· situation and the non- intervention polic·y being 
phrsued -by_. France. and. other. known friends of. the 
Spanish Government, there were no other recour~es 
for· the United .States except to remain aloof .156 .. 
· Europe,. however,. was not convinced that they could rely on the 
Un_ite·d States to maintain 
thought that the Phillips 
th/s/COoperative course. France and England· 
statement wa·s ·"vague" and were worried that 
Ameri-cans might pay no regard- to ·the "moral embargo." Roosevelt.'s 
. . ~ Chautauqua· speech.· offered~ the foreign diplomat$ a little more encour-
c·· ~ . , 15 7 · 
. . 
'>., ·''· 
- agement·. -- --- ·However, the:ir-- :fears were realized ·in December with the······· 
· · 158. 
Cuse affair. The State.Department took.quick act~on to reaffirm its 
' 
" 





···-- ......... --- ·------·- ... - ............. ---------·----·'?· 
-- ------- - -~- • --- ---------- ----- -----.--. - --·- ----
" . to every one ·of· the Non-Intervent.ion pact signers. The note stated 
• I . .",. ~ .._ •·• ~' .•• '.., C· • • 
·that:-.· 
~revio~sly inquirers have patr.iotically refrained · 
·from requesting ·such shipments upon re.ceiving··aii-
. ' 
' 
e·xplanation ~of this Governmegt·~-~--~-ttitu_de_~a..nd:p_olicy _______ _ ~- - -- -- "' : '· 
. - . ·tr· ---- ------ ---. ·. ··. c ..• -~--~Qf_-~s~-1:µpµJous.~.iion-~-interv-ention ~ 0 6 . TQ.e Departme.nt . . _·, ' 
. .. --- --· -· -- ----------·---~----~---•sinc.,erely ·:regrets the unfortunate' non-compliance 
.· of an American citizen withtt:he Government's strict 



























. -For a goy.ernni~iit. that was. s:imply, ·:1:0.llowing. its· ·own :0a1oofU po"licy--. -·--···-· --- ____ ,_ -
/. --- - ---- -- . ·-----·· -·. -·· ' . ______ . __ ;:.'...: ____ : -
·; 
such an apology was indeed unusual. However, in"· ·light ,of Hull's views·,· 
. the Depar.tme~t felt quite obl-igated to- recti·fy- the--~tter.~- One of the· 
major reasons· that the Emergency __ ~-~~-~~tJ.~_!011._ ~~s_· ~~~_1:1~-~ thrc,t.igg_ (!ongre~~ -·· ,,.,'. ~-._-__-___ ,.....:.;;_-.,•-- :·.·;.·-.:.....;...c~:....: ... ·-c:.';._.;..c. ___ ;,;'.:_,__ - ---·•-
-' ----- - ----- 'C.. - • -·---- --· --- -- -- --- • -
.· : 160' was in order to prevent Cuse .from ca·rry·ing· out 'his shipmentso .. , The 
./ 


















,o 161 British and French.. -. The idea -that this one shipment would risl-c wa;r 
,., 
-t, 
'tvas secondary .. 
,. 
-To. several observers this "'seemed proof of our collaboration with . ~ ·"\. 
-
· ,the European powers, ·· especially Britain. .-America was embargoing arms 




auth9r put it: "The British made- the point.plain ·and ·the American Stat~ 
162 Department caught. on at once." 
And Max ·Lerner went -so far as to declare: 
: 
"The State Department 
h b f h B . . h f . " ff · " 163 S h as ecome an annex o t e r1t1s oreign.o ice. · uc statements 
: ',. . 
. 
have a degree of validity to them, since. the United States· was obviously 
.-. influenced by opinion abroad. However,· they over-exaggerate the ties·,· 
th.at bound Britai'n, .France and the United States o The- ,.embargo was not 
simply the work of Eur,ope for the support 'for ·such a policy had domestic 
motivations as well. I 
· Nor ·were- Hull a·nd the Department continually .echoing the senti-
• 
' ' ' . I • 
' 
\., .• 
· ments of the Allies. _ In,~ugust of __ 1936, the Brttish wanted t_o __ g_eJ:_ the._ .. 
.. - .. .. ·· ; ·· ; ····-· ····· · ·_ . ' ~--'.c_ ' · 164 ___ ··-- - . : - :_ -·· ······· ··-···· ········· Unite4 States to mediate a ~panish peace confe~ence·o _ .- Such. requests - - : 
'-
" 
. · Wet"e not new." 
. 
.,., : .. 
In August,- - the Argentine embassy has als.o .urged a 
meeting of a·ll diplomats· fu--Madrid to end the w_ar.. Am_ong those __ r_ec_eiving 
,,.,_ .~ ....... '. '. "·' ''. 
. 1 
. . ' ' ... · --· ----~_:_ ________ ~_.thJ~_§L_J:e_qu_e_s_t __ was ____ the_:_Am@.r-ican-Ambi:1'S-Sa'dor-,-- (}laude· _::Bower;-.- ~, Then Urugllky •.------··-:--·- --·· •---·---· - ' ' • 
. <: 
• • • •• I' .•... .., 
------- ... - .... 
. - - -- . ·- ___ .. _ - . ·-
had put forward an idea that all Latin American· countries ·plus 'the • . . 
• 
- I 
. - I 
0 
-~ 
. '. 165 · . · - ·/ -United Stater~ ge;1: ___ toge_ther .and stop .the w~-r- .. - -- --However,-Jon each ~ ,.h 
.::.- -·-- .·.- --- --- •• --· ••• ;' ' -- " - __ ' ' -· _, -c • ------··--'" ----. 
...... ·r·, 
-
- .. LI_-,...- -- - .. 
... ·-· .. ·,,-···-
--
, ·I 
· . - 166 \. · . - . occasion the State Department respectfully declined. · · Itl· e.ach instanc~ __ · __ , __ .,_, __ 
: .... ,~------··----:.·:_·_- ___ ::..1..-·.c:.· ___ ··-·- .,_ ----' _ •. , ..••.•. c- . -~- -· •.. :c.-'----··--- - c._· •• -- '.:.: ·-·_; . .-,-.--_· ,.:· .-
·--
,the Government made it- clear. that. we would follotv our policy of non-
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try to mediate the 
guide the exchange 
-- .LL,. 2 
-62 ,.. 
. ~ .... .. . 
'· 
. 
Span ts~ Civil· War. 1 Ev~n wh~n Bowers was ·asked to 
J ' 
I 
· • 167 of ·-pritsoners of eithe·r side, Hu'll ·advised against 1.t. · . 
' • I The Government did not want to become implica~ed in· tl1e: larger European 
).:1 
,, 
• .. • " ' l • ~ 
.1 
'issues inherent-in the situation. Severa:-1 times,, the British and· French ' r 1 I ,'f I 
attempted to . ge·t:·· the United States to join them in i_~suing a d:marc~e to 
' ' . .. 
) Germany and Italy for· not adhering to the, Non-Intervention.1Pact, but l' 
. . . . - .:. . 
.: • . . ~ 




and even the British ··could not change· thi's. well e~tablished pol.icy -of '· 
Strict netltrality~ 
'. 
The American position was in effect a rathe·r contradictory one . 
. . 
We were willing to go along with tr,e. European .·powers but only to ·'~1 degree:· 
·, 
~. • . . .1.. ·•..;· . 
. , 
We wanted to. se~ the Wal'"~ -shortened and lo~al ized' ·but -again did-. i it-·Ele • • °' • • 
..,. 
-·---- ourselves to insure such art ·outcome.· Hull ·firmly believed that 
. . 
uEuropean 'nations have -the. first .responsibility for the maintenance of . 
~ 168 ,. .. peace in Eur<;1pe," and that the Unite·d. States should do nothing to. 
µpset this, as it. might le'ad·· to an. international: crisiso. However, 
- .,. .... --. . ... :· ...... - '" ; 
. 
. America must be allowed to··adhere·to its:own i~depend~,11.t policy. ~A§ ... _____ ·-·----__________ ....,..... __ -: __ ·~.;.-:::_;~7--~-'.------ ~-~~- "·• • •- ~-•• _:~'. L-- •. - _._:·--·L + •• 
__ .__ 
-,, .. 
.• • • .:--: ,•, o+ •• ,•- .... 
-, 
- • ... --- •-•' • 
- • • 
-
' . ·-. ,· ... , ... , .... -1-tul r'- ·s ta tecf: , ... ,c . •., ... '" "'" ·,, • . . • ', " I ,·--~ -.,---,---,--,---·.-····· c.-~--- .. -.«-· ·-··.,··-- -., .•. , 
• 
. , 
.... this Government ·from. the·. :beginni~g of the Spanish 
internal strife has pursued its own separate,. inde-
p~ndent. C()t,l;~e With respect··to all deyelopments '= 
r~lating to;·tthe · Spanish situation a11d is continuing.-_ . 
to do so.; tha,t this Government is primarily interested 
in keeping out of war an~ incidental tb this: is, in-
terested in peace everywhere; that in accordance with 
this attitude I have_ made· it a pr~.cti~e -of .preaching 




. . . . \ . . 
_government involved in any way -in the Spanish situation 
may_ fi_f1:~?:J4?JlY {oI"·:~P~ac.ecful __ .ad.j.ustment .. of .-every ··---··. 
· ~- di.f ficulty arising .169 
-'- · 
,:.~:.,.,.:...·- . . 












Once the~ initial.policy of the embargo was formed and adhered to, Hull 
., 
wanted little else to do with the Spanish situation. So long as America·n 
~rms and muniti9ns wer~· kept' out of the war', just so long would America 
., 
" -
herself sta,y ,aloof. Thus Hull was cqoperating, listening to p~blic 
. .,,. 
II- ff···.{ 1, t 
sentiment, and staying aloof all at one <,,,Yim_e .. ,-
~" 
Ironically Hull seemed to ·have considered the .embargo· pol.icy 
from every ·viewpoint ~x_cept that of the beleagured Spanlsh government .. 
" ,-. 
t,' 
United States policy had not even· co~sidered the·· outcome. in terms of -
the succe.ss of _Spanish democracy or· th_e formally. recognized- government. 
As Hull stated: "Our policy had no.thing to ·do with' our views. 9n the ~ 
.. 
ri$ht -or the wrong in th~ Spanish Civil War. . We were ,,not 'judging be-
,..-~--, ... ·- --...,__ 
. 170 
tween the two sides." The Phillips -note indicated that the State 
b 
. . 




· along with "long established policy .. " I.t is questionable, however,-. 
t 
'-
whether this was sincere belief, or simply furnished an easy rationale 
. • :·' " . ' / . ., 'J ,.j ~:ft: .;,.i; 
for_ a pre-determined ·,embargo policy. 
' 
----- ------··-· · th-e-·recentlys·igned· Montevideo· Pledge 
In any event,. the Department used 






. ,. "· 
~\ 
JI!-----· _____ --:_c __ ,_..::.;;:. _________ .;_c;;:._----'---------·-- _-c:-_:-_____ :c:;:_ ---~---- - ___ ,_,-:--. __ ~- ,· _;:. - -_ -'. --- - : •• - • ~ - -· 171 
11.---- · --- ---~---- ·· ------- ----------- ----to-----the_--formal---g·ove·rnment -of- S·pa1n-~, -- ·. ·This·--pledge---wa-s ,: or,ig,inall-y ·-meant--·· -_-- · _.:_ ··· 
, . . 
I' , ' ~ • ' 






policy and was _.another attempt to undo the interventionist polifies. 
----- -- -- -- ----- - .. - -· -- --- '··-----· -- --- - - - - . 
... --· 
,. f . 
r of Theodore Roosevelt and WJ.l~.iam Taft. _ T_hi::; ·~-,:~ai::y_ was_:_:~.P-~C!~_f!~§liJy _ . 
in.tended· to ·reassure the Latin American countries that the United .States· ... 
···:would. never again seek to expand or encroach upon the internal ,or . 





'---·-----------·---.------·-·· ' -·---·-·------ --- ---···-~-----·---- ---·------··------~----- -·--·----- --- ·-· -·---· -- ----···-- ----- -- ·- ··-·---··- -- ----····---·· --- --- --- ·----·-·--···--··-----------····" --------------- ---- -·-----··· --· 
- . -----···---·-· ··-- - ---··•··-··--·· ·-- •· ·- . - ·--- ... -- - ·---• -·-·----· ·- -·-·---- -- ..... -- ---·-··---- -----··--·----·· ·-··------- ... -- -.-,_-.· - . - _. , .. - -----·-- --- -·- .. ----·· --- ·--··· ... ·---·-- - -----·- -·-·. 
J · external affairs of another American state·o However, Hull quickly-_ 
I 
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~ Spanish Republic. However, such a rat·ionale was obviously quite thin ~ 
. ' 
lvhen applied in thif?, situation' since the" ·spanish governme~t from the ,< 
,, 
'l 
o.utset had requested that· she ·be able to buy United States ,arms .. · In 
actual_ity the :.Unite.d States was· interfering more with the internal · 
affairs of Spain by. putting: the .·rebels and the government on the same 
'. J' c >. :' I' :t) . 
footing, than if it· simply had accorded the loyalists the traditional .. ' . 
. . •,• 
Hull,-him~elf, so~~ realized the weakness· of applying the 
I" 
Montevideo Agreement to Spain., when in 1937·. the Spanish government lodged , 
a formal protest ·with the Department over the issue of the_ ·embarg<J'.1.7.Z 
Among other· things the docurµent did point out pa.st examples of American 
adherence to a policy of aidl11g recognized goverI.1ment$ o Hull_ put. an end ., -
' 
( "' 
to the. issue ·by stating· .that·~ debaite· over legal questions was purely 
"academic o" · He adde.d that the problem of export~ing arms was solely 
·.1 , a domestic one and even more; "Whatever·.inight be developed by legal ·. 
dis_cipline would be unimportant compar:ed with the determination of . the l 
- American pttblic ... •• 173 In effect then the international law aspect of 
---- ---· --·- ·--·- --- -------·-· -----~-------------, ----
- - - -·-- .. _ .. ________ -- --
----------- ,----------------·------··---- • ··---·-·-- • 
----------------··· 
- 1- ,. 
-- · · ·· t_he--question was brushed aside by the ne·partment right fr,om the outset 
. of the war. . The· impor~ant. thing to Hull· was, (1) · t·o follow the lead ., l'' 
. set .by· ~pain's .. neighbors, an~ (2) to·_keep ourse\yesv from being dra:wn into· 
' ' war. Both' these desires took precedent over mere legalities· ... · Hull was 















localized and did not involveUnited States interests. ___ l -- -----·--··. - --- - ---- --···-··------ ---· - ..• --.. 1'.--·----·--·-·----·-- --· ·---·--·--- -··--·· -- ------- --· 
~, .. -- ---.-----•.:.-... ~·.:.·.·.:, 
---·-···----·--· .. --------- -
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- ------
- - - - - --- -------·-- -
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.. c.,In.~.discu~s-ing-the--st~tus--".Of· .'the- non-·interve11tion C-agreeme'ri't··_in 
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,, i ' 
It must be emphasized- ·that -the accord· was not a fo
1
rmal 
internati_Qp.§11_ agreen:ient or t~~aty 'in the .sense" tl1at .. · 
the participattng · s,tates subscribed·. by s:t,gri~ture and. 
rati.fication to one ·written instrument.. It was an · ~ .. , . 
"accord18 onJ.,:y. in a ve·ry loose form, a series ·of · . 
· unilate·ral declarations of intention of the n.atiflinal. 
policy wh-ich,·wouldz b.e· ·pQr$ued. D~partures from .the 
- ·, ' ... . ' . 
accord cannot '·be condemned. as violations of inter-
. 'i 
national law or of treaties.. They constituted 011:ly ~ 
deviations from a.· line of pol~cy which each state 
suggested its.·.readiness:to follow for the ti1J1e.being .. 
• ~ • J 
. The fulfiilment ·of tµe acco'Fd, or its ·enforcement in · 
any ·particular state· depended entire:ly· upqn the ·goodwill 
and cooperation of tl1e authorities of that; sta_te·, and upop. 
the enact.ion and/or enforcerµ.ent ·of·such legislative, 
executive or adwinistrative measures as were deemed to 
be · desirable.17 ~ . . , -.... · 
For all t);le differing. ju.st if ications for t~e. e\nbargo,. the 
Departmentr'.was definite ._in that the eJ?.lbargo should e~ist,. and <:>~hat it 




. ....... • 
should be enforced as- strictly as po$sible·. ·: A· .. close check· was kept on 
•, 
· 175 
every single war implement. that was des~gnated for export. Even· . 
< ' . 
-· ----~----~------·-----·-----·----- -- ---------·-· -----~----- ·-- -·- - ·-. - -------· ---· -·- . -- --· 
." more,. a .close watch was kept on. the_se goods to make sure that ·they 
weren 9 t tt}Ansshipped-·by the importing ,natfon to Sp~in. _ When it was 
' ' ' ' " ·~ ' .. 
h 
,reported that Mexico. was buyi_ng arms -from America to ·sell to Spain,· 
. . . ' ~ ~ 
. 
-- -···--· .. -- .- -- - . ··- - - .. 
- 176 




the Department sent a 11ote asking .that. the, pra.ct_i~re· be l . ...,, ' stopped. J' J-· ·-----··-,-··-- ·--······--····------------ -~·--· ... , _, . --,-... ---.. ·---~"--·---·-··-·-·--·-·--·-.... _ .. ,.---·-·,:_·-·--·-·-·-·--·-"""--·-·-·---.~--.. -·-· .. ···--- ------ ·----·~ . ·-·--\ -'!~----~--------··· -- ·--·-·····----·- - ···-· -·------··-------·-- -·· - ------- ·-------·--·-------.------'- .. -------~·· ----------····-·•·- . --------~- --·- ----··---·----
Jr 
. '--Under.-.no circumstances should American war --mate.rials reach. the shores 
. . .. .. - . _ ...• c.· . • ' " . - ... __ .... : .. . c.·: . . '·.· . . . ·.-. ... . .. (). •. _, :... _.'. ,· ,, . - • - ... :. . .' : 
.t · 
of Spai~, even if another ·country w~uld. take the· responsibility for the 
. ' ' ' 
action. Eve_n in the later years of tq.e war. when F ~D.R .. talked. of letting 
arms slip to the government· through. 1france, th~ State Dep_artment never . -
..... _,, ................ ,· ... ···-. - .. . . .. ··- .. ,._ .. , .. --- .... -, .... ··~;.-· -- .. -···· ....... , -~., ... ~.: ,._ '. ___ ,.,_,. ______ '···- ' ··-· ---····· .......... --···----··-·····-·---·-··- ....... - •.. - -· ···----·-······"--·-· .......... ·-;;-;···-·······-·--, ·-·· . . ..... ' " .. ----
\;i',)',,. . ' 
relented in its enforcement policies ,,(? .. Throughout ·the· whole tvar, from 
, . .I 
. ·- . ' .. ' . ·- ·------'-·-······· -----·- ··----·· .. ··--·-···- -· --·-.. ·-·-·- -··· ·--·-" .· ------·--' ... ,. __ , ...... ··--··---........ ' ..... · ........ ·......... .. ,,, . ·. ,.-~ ... ... ·: .. ' _____ ----....... :.:-... \~.· ......... -..... -... , ......... ,. •..... : ____ ;:. __ , ........... _ ... ::. _________ , .... --.. --




that if an embargo existed it s;hould be implell!e~ted as completely as_ 
' . .. . ~ . . 
- - ' ... •·-- • - -- ·-. • .. -- • . ' -- ;_ -- - •· •.. , • - ~ - •.•. '·· .• ··-. •. ' - • .:--: .;. ' ' ·-••• ·;._ -'·' ' - ;,_- "'· .. ,~ ·; ,- ' •• ·;. ~- . - ••.• ..'..-,---= •• :.; -· ·.;.:·. '; .• -i. ;: ., ~-;:.· ... '~'- ~ ,,., •·· : . ..... ·.;:.,·._. _·;.:_., .•. : .-:~~--; ;.;;..;·..: ·:.,;. -.l.. ;, ;,.· •. __ ;.; .... ,;" ,.:.. •· ••• ~ -- -·-· ·:.- "- - _-.. _ _;:-.:. .·c; .. c •.•• ·--~; , : • • _. ' •. - - • '·' •••••• -__ • __ :..:_- ·- - - - ----·-·-·_:.. _. '. -· ·- • ~ -··- -- ••• ' .-. -. ··--· ;..... • •·- ': • . -,[).. -~- ., ' ,_ • - - •• --- --- >.., . ·-··" . - -· ....... 
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'· 
" 
It is somewhat b!:ffling_ to try tq understand why· the go~~rnment . 
... .._,,,, 
"' 
.. was so stringent in~ its exec·ution of. the embargo .policy. As long as tl1e 
.,.,, .... , ~ 
armaments did no~. leave directly from. th·e United .. ·States, we were safe., 
.. 
.from .. being "dragged into war»" 
l., . 
Possibly the explanation ·may· be ·found 
. . \, .. 
.. \;µ, the. fact:· that ·we ~anted t·o do nothin.g to disrupt: the Non-Intervention 




· the embargo was the desire to u,,cooperate." Moore. e~,pecially, came· u.nder 





' . attack as a . "l·ackeyn of British foreign poli¢y and his hcandling .of the 
. 
-
embargo might indicate- Such a vi'ew. 178 When :the Cuse matter seriously 
\v 
· if,.· 
~\ disrupted enforcement o·f the· moral embargo, it was Moore who pre.ssed .. 
for innnediate passage of. the Emergenc)r Embargo Resolution. However, 




- ,, -- .. ·-------------- --- -----·-·-·~-......_~---------------
. 
- ~ . 
.. __ ... ____ ··-------·-··--·-- --·-----~-------------- --
---- ----- . 
-
---·--------- --- ---------- ------..~:-----·--- - . 
convinced that. the embargo should 'be as tight· as· possible·. 
i . 
. Lrn the summer and fall. of .,i 1936, there really ceased to be, a 
, ... 
. I • _$, few people, if any, _in the Department again·st· the embargo_, · Claude 
Bowers,· the Am.eri~an· Ambassador to Spain, and later .one of the lea~ing 
- -------·· ··---·-. --·-- ----·- '"--~---· .1-----· 
• 
·-----·--··-~·-·-·-··-·-·• .. ·-··-- ·••-• P,.---• 
- .'--·•··•• •• I t advocates-for. removing i:he arms ban was ... af::·--t:hat<:, time .very much -in favo+ '• . . 
. 
-- ·-· -----------------On several occasions between. July, 19_3·6 and---February:,: 1937·, . . __ __,_, _ _,. __ - _____ ___,,.._. ·---- -· -----·---- ..•. of the act. -· _ ... '..~---·-··· ..... ~--·-·······,·,·-, ~-~-----· 
---- -~·----~-.:. -·.-
- •.r- .. , 
.< 
----~· B_ovrer-~ praised the· Depart~en~f:-.:for the st·~~d~:i~-,took: 
• 
,"I:':. ' --· ~:._,. -. ,, • 
' 
The wisdom of th'e Department in taking a pos·ition ·of 




.. "tvretched war was~·-·ne'ver clearer. we·were .wise in not 
·---··---··pa·r·t'tcip;ft1ng·-~'-iii--the"·:v\irI-oiis-iion-::neutra_i ___ scI1.e111e s ·-------·------ ---·--------····-·-·-----· -- . 
. . 
. 
--~--·-,.-·····---· ·-·----·- -- . -~·-·--·-----·--"----------------·-------· 
· ' . sponsored by the Diplomatic Corp. ~ .. We have con- .,. . . 
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respon~ible quart'ers on·· both sides in the Spanish con~lict there i,s 





Mtiiii.illl!• i i 
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. . ·1 
. Bowers did not hide the fact- that he favored the _moral embargo as well 
. , . ·D 
·as the later formal one~ As late ··as July,· 1937, Boi:vers proudly wrote 
\ 
, · . . . 181' 
that "our position has been all that could be desired." 
\ 
--.. -... l . : - . 
, ..... __ 
. . 
. Thus tl1e embargo· policy at its birth had the support ·of one of 
its loudes.t critics as the:._waLprogressed .. · Bowe~~ 9 willing1:1ess to see 
.,.- .... -: ·--.-; ... ·:·,,• 
the policy as. a ·good thing is indicative· of. just how little trouble 
' . l'i:1u1; :;, · 
· there· was arriving ·;t,·the de.cision to ban a~s to Spaino The President, 
' ~ ' • I • 
' ·' 
·the public, Congress .and most of the· leading members. of. the State 
) \ r,.~ 
.. /·., Department envisioned the embargo.· as America I s b~s t path o It was· only 
'-a . \ • ,, 
. I, ' 
· in ·the latter part of 1937, when it became obvious that the Non-Inter-
'i:iJ 
vention pact was a "shameless mockery," and that the ideological issue 
, I 
,I,, 
llj', .\ ;t,: " • ·(· . 
:.. " 
'I ~ ' • . . . ' ' • . . I 
.1.:i··· · · ·' ············•·· . , ---~-became inflamed , . that opp o,s.i t ion-mate"J:",ialized ... in.c.the highe.Lc.J.e:y:elJt,co.L"c.,.~. '"'" ""'~'""···~~, ., . 












the· Adminis·t:ration. At the outbreak of the Spanish strife, Bowers, 
Ph:i.llips, Moore, Hul.l, and ·Roosevelt were essentially in accordo They 
· wanted to see th·e embargo enacted, and they wanted. to see the. Emergency_, 
Resolution pas_sed when'.·,:·the moral· ban failed.. It was not a question of 
' 
isolationist versus international.ist, because each side had their· own· .. , -. ·-
-· ···-
reasons fo_r wanting the expo:.rt of arms stopped. ,, 
. ,.. 
,, The isolationists initia_lly _ favored -the· embargo for the obvious 
'.I 
'· reason that it would guarantee the-United States securi,ty :l;rom involve-
ment. · It seemed a perfectly logical extension of the. is·olationist 
.. -···----- --~ ··-·-- ... ·-·---------- ---'--·-----·-- ----·-·-··---. -------




philosophy to a new problem. _ Just as the, 1935 Net1:trality Act was i-g.tended 
~:-,"' .,. ~-
\ 




Moral Embargo,c:-and· __ the Emergency."Reso_lu~ion:we_:t:~ ;mec1n.t.,_to_ .. kf?~P .. tht~ ....... , ...  ~ .. :: ~ -·. -- . ... . '"-; .,-.c-~ ••. : ' ... - ••• ·., ....• 
,. 
' . 
country aloof from ·the Spanish conflicto ·Yet the:· Internationalists also ~ 
... " ' 
,, 
~ '~ . 






seemed to accept the idea of an embargo as ~n inte·lligent poli'cy. To 
-•- -· •'H•' ,; 
"\• .. ,,' .... ·.r-,•···'""' 
I · I 













·I , \l ;I 
I 
'i ,, ;·i 
.. this group, w1.th its d~sires _to" see America take a- more· acti.ve role in.' . 
; world· affairs, the Embargo was ah obvious· attempt at coopera·tion .. Since __ · 
' ,.· 
-
Eng,land and France had organized the NIC, ·the United States was at last 
talting its place besides these two powers in a united __ c,1.ttempt to pre-, 




antithical viewpoints should agree on th.e- policy, but' -ft was rieverthe~· 
less true.. And Cordell Hull \\1as astute enough to recognize_ this factor 
QaJ?,d ·use .. it to _his own advantage. However, within a few months this 
-unnatural partnership began to disinteg~ate and the. Secretary of State 
. 
. ' Ii, I 
~ 
. ~ . ' 





' l } . 
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~'There can be little· doubt that the State Departdent was a major'-· 
~ 
force·behind the moral embargo. Hull never doubted its correctness 
-aruj when the questio1+ came before -Con~res~ he push~d haJ?d for the legal 
. . .. ' \_'~·, 
\ . 
\ . , . . 
· -~m1J.~1;g9_~ s __ pJ=t~_§.ctg~·-. __ Ye_t as soon as· tJi~e embargo forma1;y~becc1:me .. 1a. law -· 
\ )' . 
and was no longer. the sole responsibility of_ the State Departme:r;it, there 
-----~as -a ---tendency--on-- tfye·· P.ar_t· ~of_-·that· ··organizati-on ·to·-·shif t resports:fbility·:·--
. . 
.~. . ' 
r 
It was no_ long~r .the State Department. that had -instituted the embargo but ~ 
,. . 
rather· ·Congre·ss. The members· of the Department_ conveniently fo,rgot tha.t 
I • 
' . 
they w~~e _the ones who started the "hysteria,"· as one observer has 
·, .. 
. 182 
called it, _ that led to the 1937 Resolution. Assistant Secretary 
·-·· 
... ·-· .. 'i .. ·-- .... --- .. -·-· .... . . - ----- ..... -· - ---- ------ ------------ --- - ---- --~ ----- -- -~ ----~-·---~ ·-·- - --·-- .. ----·-- --------··-·- -·-------- -- ··- .. ······-·-· . - -- -·· - --- ------···- -----··-··--····-------·------------·-----·- - -· . 
... --- . -~--.. - - ---~----·:.· ... -. ·: _. -
Phillips in one speech said: 
. . . ~;; ,_- .. :. .. , .. ;.: .. -•• . .;, .. ~ .. , .. , . ..... ::.,.. ' . - ;- . . -.. . - - . 
- ' .... 
... Since the entire subject of neutrality is not before 
'the' ~xecutive, btit is a matter of active debate in ' 
Congress, I shall not at tlJis time dwell furtl1er upon 
it •. 
'·-
















































· ·' .He '·also added that·· the State Department was uassisting Congres.s"./in 
~ <,.' '· . . ' 
" promotiqg_ the ·objects,: of the people" .to avoid the possiblity of being 
I " , . ~. 
·· invol.;,ed in·war ... :183 'Even Sumner Welles in a note to the Spanish 
,, . 
' ... ' .. ·~ 
I ~ Ambassador in )1937 ·stated that "the Congress of the United States had 
J, 
I 
• • • ' I . ·-.... '•. ,/ 
made it. clear that .. it desired. o othe United States to adopt an ·attitude 
._: ... n.-,b 
' ~ ~ . / . ~ . . 1 OF.~ . . , . 
. / '.. ' Vii- ' . . ' ' ' . : . ' ' 
· .of strict neutrc:!lity.'_! -- · This"·:modest attempt to ·shift the spotlight 
q . . ' 
to Congress, however, was utterly false. · The S_tate Department .hali. had .. 
. o-·· . _., 
the op{>ortun:i.ty
1 
to adopt a course entirely different than i:hat 0£ • 
.,. ·-r{<, 
• i 
. -- -· ·-·---·- -·---- -,- ----·--· .... 
'::-· '. ~ 
Congress it;). the months from J:yly until _January o Instead_ they did what 
- .. 
s l 
. • • .. ,J.' '.. ·.- ' ~ ... , 
~, 
,Congres·s· ·might have wanted, .. though for some obviously di.ffererit reasons o 
. . ",'.~ , . 
Its in~istence ·on .a· stri.ct moral_, embargo, and its desire to cooperate 
with the British and French· leaves little doubt as to the- Department's 
-.. ,·. 
, .. - ... , ,.,-- ,,_.,,,_,.-_·,.- .... ---;:··-.-,,, ............... -- -·------~------·, ... - .. ~ ... -
. ) ".,,~./ 
'\ . 
' \ . 
.. /' / As with Congress, it ,is interesting. to note that the State 
'"'"·:\.._., 
, J ~ ' ~ ··~i . ... • . .' . ' ( . . . . 
P~partment during _this period· never, looked·· at -the Spanish Civil War as 
• ~ 
• • J ~ 
: ·. -- ~ 
... 
' . ~r.., l 




- • I 4,.. • 
.and-the_-·-newspapers, t;hereis li~tle t9 i~catelthat·the 'sup~o.~ed H~-ep."" --· -· 
. . ~ 
1 \ 
tinge of the Spanish Republican Government ever influenced the State\ 
. ·-···----. _______ ..,_ ·------~----··· 
. . ,Departinen t. .The Department did receive reports from ·its enyoys .. over· . 
· · . 185 . . · · · 
the threat of Communism, _but· they were only_ incidental-- to various 
other reports coming 'from Spain. .Hull, du~ing this period, ~~ver gave 
. I . , •• t • 
any indication· that- ·he paid mu<:!h_~_J:1eed- to--··the--Cornnnini-st--th-re·at··there~ ... -----
. ' 
. 
- ' ' 
-r ' 
~. •· . '., 
" 
. . ----- ----~-- - ·····-·---·---------------------· --
He ,had long before· decided upon the embargo without thinking in terms /l 
. -- f. L . . - .. ---- - . ·- .. .. -- - -- .~ ' - - . _,, ___ . - ·---·---·-··---···---- ... -. ···---·-· -- ___ __, ..... ______ , __ ... ---- - --·- ---- ---- - ____ ]__ ·-- . 
of Fascism, C onunun ism or democracyo Possibly this is where Americ:' s 
' -1~ .:.;. - . - . - .. 
In 193.6 we refused to take into account the 
· factor r; of increasing G~rman and Italian aggression and its threat to 
I 
, I 







I •• • ,-• .-,·· i,. 
~· •, 




Department appeared to do, it also h·ad overlooke.d the· ~mpending ,powe'.r · 
s:truggle in Europe between the weakened ·democracies and ·the increasingly 
powerful Fa~c·ist states .. · A victory for Franco coul'1 only serve i' the 
advantages of' the latter. 
. ' . . , . 
In .. ,refusing to choose· between the Insurgent 
Fas'cists and the Republican Loyalists ~he ·St~te Departmeri.t Was -ftli-therJUg · 
. ---. " . . . 
European chaos .. i It was thus following a · course that was the very anti-
\ ~ 
. . ""' /...,j' . 
( ,, 
. ,, 
. thesis of its true motives and aim·s. 
.. 
... { ··: 
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... ~ ,. 
. , 
' .r . 
. ! 
-71 ' ( . .:-· ..... -1 
J. ·, 
L·..._ ' ' !"· 
. ~-
1····--1 
I I' ,'d 1''0 ('f \.,fJI 
I , 
. ------- ·- ·-··- --,..-~--- ------- ...... -._. - . 
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. . ;;, . 
. 1937·, · and passed the '~p~rmanent" neutraltty act,. the_ Spanish -embargo . ' • 1 
question had become mor.e ·prominent o It had becom~ obviou~ to many 
. _, 




, Franco because of the· 1·a.-ck of supplies.. While Franco was receiving 
1 .. ,1 'i .-.... 
large quantities of anns an4 men from Italy a~d Germany, the.Spanish-· 
-. 
.,. 
Government could only_look to Russia and France for limited assistance .. 
., England and ~ranee were -still attempting to ·make the Non-Intervention· 
• I \\ ,t; ', 
----------· -- ··- --- --·- - - -·-----··-----~---•. ..,_.,..t,·.cc-.·- .• ,- _,-- - _····-- ----,_·c,-,"--."'C" - - --- ~--.- ,_,- -
pact work, but the Fascist co~t:r:ies seemed un·interest:ed .. _ With· i\mer,~ca· 
ii 
....... , 
, taking -a strong stand against shipping arms to_ --Spain, Spanish democracy 
) 
seemed foredoomed to defeat. Madrid was again.; und~r siege and those -
elemen_ts of the American public that favored the Loyalist.$.,,,,_became · more 
··---·--·-------- ----- - -- -- --- ------------ ------ ----------------. --- ~---------. ------
.. . 
vocal in·· their_ denunciation of __ the embargo policies:. - -- - - ··--· ,-- --·· ------- ------- ·- -·····-·----·- -----•--· . .i.. 
,• 
------------ --. .----- ··-·---, 
' I ' 
. __ : __ ':r'h~-- S9.cialist:s, wfio had favored pacifism and neutrality,. now 
·~ 
.. y 
· argu.ed for aid to the Loyalists i_n order to stop Fascismo iiThe American 
League Against ,war and Fascism," and the "No'rth American Committee to 
Aid Spanish Democraty" also argued that Fascism must be stopped in_Spain. 186 
~ 
, . / 
() However, besides asking that the·Spanish Embargo be lifted, they also -
·n 
asked that the neutrality provision be invo~ed again.sJ: __ Ge.rmany ___ and ... Ita~y- _ 
.:, . - - 18 - -~ 




United States should not allow _implements of war to be exported to these 
- - 188 two totalitarian states because of their activitiep in ass~st,ing Franco. 










--- .... __ ·-- ~---------~-









-on the relations of Germany and Italy witl1 the· Q'nited ·states. · _Hu_ll; ·· 
' ' 
----,-·,--i\-- -- - .. --- - ·:.:.;:-- -- -
' y,{ 




The Sec_reta.ry of State 'inquired of his amb,p.ssador ~hat -th~_ effect>~£· 1t 1,PI\\I l'.1 1 l',1' 1·,, 
. 
. ·'· 
' ' ' 
. such a move would .be. I • • I ~ I The ambassa:dor tq England, Bingham, replied._ that 
. . · 




"interference in continer(tal ·affairs." It would also complicate 
r· 
~j 
- .. ; 189 Br.itish at-tempt~ to k~ep all foreign intervention out of Spain·. 
' ' 
.- Ambassad·or Phillips in Italy repli~d, _ that·_ to take such action ·singularly 
, 





. the idea itself was not bad, but believed that this was. not_ the time 
- .190 to consider such an embargo. Hull claimed ·that tq impose such an 
,, • 




embargo would accomplish nothing, and as Bingham said,, it would endang'er· 
.r.;-
·-
- . ,_ 
-
- - - 191 the success of ·the NIC. uf It became evident to the Presid.ent that the - :. - . 
,, 
. - - -
4 
extension of the embargo would do little good, and possibly irrepairable· 
harm. 
_, 




•\ ., '''-i 
,·IJ 'I ,. _I'-, 
,· 
'Ill ... 
. _ . . ·--: ___ , .~ 
· -·-'!"-------- - -




: - •• , •. ~,---·· .• -. . :a·;._:_.•··-·-,.-.• - •• ., ........ -.-~ , - •' . 
-
----- -------------
- -- . ----~. ----
-- -- - -- Congress on the whole played a very --trtin~r---r-b-1~--iJ-th-is question, 
. except for Senator Nye and several of his followers. Nye had begun ·to . 
-believe. that our e~li~rgo on Spain 'tvas an unneutral act .a~i-·'it stood. 
' 
·. Nye .felt that either we should e-xtend it to all courrtries involved_, or 
lift it and allow the Spanish Government· to purchase anns. ·In the 
~-'t 
summer of' 1937 he tried the first and met with· little. success; in the· 
spring of 1938 he _s~-~-~~"hed _ t?_ -~-~'~·-·~~~-~~:. -·~~a,3:~.~- ~~~- l:!.1~; ·~i-b~:~. s..t~;i.Jc!_r.,_ ... -,- _ .. -.. , . __ ... ., '-,. •• ~ •. , J ~-·. ~. • . ·-·--
fat·eo It is, of course,.unusual to see.the staunchest isolationist of 
them all taJting sides wi~h the anti-embargo elements of .tl1e country in 
wanting the embargo revisedo - However, it was obvious that Nye wanted 





:.: ·_; --·····- -- --- -
I , 





~ 1' i 
• t ' • 
• l 
.. 
to make_ s.ure·'" that ._the Uriited State~ remained neutral in world affairs . • • • d . 
.: ,',, , I 
.- and he sincerely heli'eved that in. putting the Spanish Govern~ent and -
Insurgents on t'he· .. sarp.e p.Lane we were be·ing unne:utral. I.n many respects-
.. ' . 
I feel that his in~S;!rp:ret.at:io~ was correct., but he had ~iscover~fL it 
• ·:fl - .. 
. : .. ' ,, - ~.... .. :-
... 




- ~ .\, 
... 
_,••··' ~ I' 
• .._ ___ /• in Januar~ ()f 1937 ~ wh~n he;·_._should hav~ sought to gain support and_ stop 
















. United States wante~ the emb~rgo raised completely. In this effort they 





' j • ;1..t1, , • 












· . 192 . •; awaited· the-opin~ons of the State Departmento· .. Hull, via.Senator 
----- - - .... --Pittman-,-~· informed ·them·. ·s·c,on- enough~,:· ·ae stated: 
·, 
Our first solicitude should 1J.e the peace and welfare 
of this country, and the real test of the ·adv,isa-
• (J l 
• • 
· bility o'f making any changes in the status (the 
embargo) ·s_hould be whether such· changes·,would further 
tend to keep us from becoming involved direct;:ly or 





Hull·firmly believed .,that to alter the embargo.policy would 
• 
subject -the Uriit=.~g_ ~_:1.:_at:<:.1$ ___ J:_o __ un_necessary .. risks and .prove exceptionally - ,----·--.-------~·-····• .... -.---. --- -----,--..-~.-.~·~--···· - ., 
embarrassing in our relations witI1 England ~nd France o . l-Iull before 
. ' 
replying to the Senate Committee had requested the opinions of his 





















































\ ' ·-\·• 
' ,.i'" 
_, fa· ' 
. i-,;', ,- ' 
~ I Joseph Kennedy; treplied that _non-intervention in regard to S_pain had 




_ facto~ into this already over'changed and delicat;:e situa_tion -~ight have· --
"' 
\1 ,-- . _ ~ -. 
_ - ·- · -' • - -194 -far -reaching consequences.':', _- Rober~ Thur.stoD:, a consular officer in 
I , 
< , •• '. • ,-"-1 ;,-i,' Spain, echoed .. ·these sentiments and ·added that~Ger~ny, Italy and · ·. 
Nationalist Spain, might construe a revision i11 our policy as "tant~ment 
. . ii-~ 
r 
' '. 
- .. :,·· - . ... - -~--.----:--- -195 -·---·-----------·· - - --------
to 1ntervent1.on. fl - _ Suc·h ar, effect might endange.r our -future· relations 




.:._.1--·-· _._,, .••. , 
and his letter to Pittman was definitely agains~ review of any kind~ ~ o; .... 
•. . . 
-- Roosevelt. was, of course, also consulted about the matter, and , 1 
though i~ was reported he had_ ·agree_d ·to re~ision, he ultimately· fo~lowed · 
- "-: · - __ , '196 
Hull's lineo--. , However, his reasoning was n~t- based on fe,ar_ of up-
setting the Non-Intervention Pac~' as ;as _pl;_~_sumably true of Hull .. 
__ .---
/' 




---- - --·- -
.. Rath~r-... -F1~De_R •. belie.v~d th·at to change' -the" embargo in 1939 would only - . . .- . ~ 
· 
· . 
. - 197 "aid and"' abet'~ Franco sin·ce he had "complete control of the sea~ n 
_.,,. - .. 
Rooseye,lt:._{lls~ · felt-- that by not revising_our .. policy we were "maintaining 
... 
' . . :i 
--------- -·----------·----- ·-·-··-····------· ---~·d-::-:'.~::~-·-·· ----
-- - - -· -- -- --- - . ..-.. ----·· -neutrality in the ~h-ighest ;.$fense. He claimed arms were lea-king to tI1e 
' . I ' 
Loyalist~ _;~rough France an~ay, and that to start to openly ship. arms 
"\ 
r1 --- - . --· . ·- ·- --- -
I 
. · ,-· 
_ _ · 198 . -would·only put more of them into Franco's-hands. · It i$ obvious, 
however, that by 1938 Rct''loe'velt had come a full circle since 1936. He .,,, 
' '\ ' ' 
- -no longer favored the embargo Jhor did·he 
' 
,·""'·~ ' . /)~) 
\{ .. 
really agree with Hull:,on the 
. -- --- - . 4-·--------------..... -~- ---~-·----~---· -·---- ------~J--=..---~--------·---- --+-
I 
· -- --------- ----· -----------------------fs·sue-.-__ _:_-Jle-·puo1_i_c_ly--favor-ecl-the--·1oya'list -cause .an~ was quite happy that 
~ - !' .... -- ---- - -. - .. 
arms were being · sent to them, ':~~-~-~-~-~-:-~~" ~-~~-~~~- qu~nt~tie~. __ HQ~taver, __ . -•r-'•~··· •-•···-~ "•···•--• •. ,,--,·-·•:•• • - ... - . •' . --.-.-,.- - ~ - ·-----·-- - ---
F .DeR. was wise enough to:_see that revision of the embargo was just 
< ' 
· : - 199 
not fea_s ible. 
.. 
',. 
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-~ ····· ~------~ 
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- <" ,, 
Congress, witli neither the President nor .the· Secretary ofJ 
. • . Al 
' . 
.. ·'· 
Sta!te suppor,ti(g Nye• s motio~, voted'-t"o- tab:'le'the 'idis~'S:'.'"~ncfr~a-~e-.it: in. 
.,,;,,,,• 
committee lD .The tepresent$tives. were. still . largely ·is.olationist~· and 1 ,. v 
/ \_ ____ - · __________ · -~.~.·· -~--'-
ha~ no des~re to risk U.nited States.0 . ·security· in· or~er to .. ,fulfill true 
----·-·-· ' . -·----------·----------....,..-~-----· -:--· ------· • ~-- .. ---·-·e < --·" 
' - - . ---·. ~--- ---
- I. ___ .• _. --
,4-,,. 
. - -- •--- ---
- ' . 
. . -- ·-- .. ··- ·---
---·-· ---···- ---
-- -- - - -- - - -- - -·_ -·- -· - --·- ... ··--- ··" - -------· . ' -- -- .... - . ___ -· - - - .... -···-- ---- ---------i~------·-~·· ' -- ' - ...... <)---------- -- -·-·- -- - ·------·--····· ---- -----·-· -· - ·-- -
neutra·lity o The_y probably agre:.~d in general with_- Hull .th~-t if the 




- ·- ----·-· . - ·- .. -- ---- -· ····--····· --- ----.-- -----····· -------------·-· ---·-- ·-··---··- --- . ---- - ---- --·-··· 
. --- ... ·-··--·-- ··-· -· ··-- ---··- ... 
merchant marine,- and the similarity t;o th'? event:s of -.1914-1916, quickly - ... ·7·~-··· ··- . ' 
• 
', 
. came . to mind. · ~ye' s motion wa$ neve:t;" ,heard· of __ again:·o-- By-'1939 _ the W?r --









-- In any event, revisiori of the embargo policy in a38 would have 
, been ·foolish. It was simply too late to do any~hing about it. As one 
, ' ~~ writer said: •• 'I> 
-- - --- .. -- - . - ;,,,"" 
,, It may "have been unwise and .i~;i:~gulc:tr_ ·to· have applied_ 
--- ~tlie -emoargo in the- first place o But .having done so . 
. .'it would have been polit~cally unwise to--chang·e -_i:h:Cs 
policy in the m'idst of the war for i:he.obvious purpose 




-picture in· 1938 througl1 the eyes of British appeasement,· he was never-
,r, 
theless quite correct when he said a change ·in policy would have had 
j 
. .. .. ------ ----· - -··-· - . ---·- -
. ' 
' 
"far reaching consettuerices." Italy,· Ge:rl}!any, Natiomili~t $pain; .England---------· -- __i 
and F_rance would all have been antagonizedo The time to have-- revised our 
..... --· 
. . .. --- -- -- ---- ,--------····. - .. -- . . ,----- - - - --- -
-
-- -policy was in 1936, before it had become an, accepted facto To lift the 
embargo belatedly in 1938, would not "compensate for the· earlier departure 
.p. 
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····1 - . ··~-· ' 
·Thus the embargo.poli~y of 1936 proved to be a millstone around 
. ;-~ 
. :, f. • 
the necks of .those who- wished revisio~. · The August Dec1a,ration· and the('. • . J 
. " 
---- - -------· --- -- - - --- -- - - --
- ----· ·-- ·-. - -· .. - .. - -·· .. 
. ~- ·r.'-;,. 
_subsequent Emergency Embargo Resolution proved irrevocable. There is -
. 
..:-/ . 
. ' . . \. ~ ' ;. ~-
. . little doubt that the· State Department was primarily responsible· for ~ · 
. \ '. 
. . 
.the i,µitiation of the embargo legislation at 'the time it was enacted ________ .,.~ 
. ·-
• • I 
. 
. 
_- and the ·efforts to make sure i·t remained. It was the. Department that . 
. - . 
. ... - --- ·-··- ··- .... ··--·· ·- ... ··-·· .• -.''. ---· - -- '. -- - . ·----- --- .... ·---' ----· .. _____ · ___ ·_· __ -__ j __ -- --·- - ·-- --· : ____ ----· . ----· ·--· ----·· -·-·- --- -- - - --- -· . ·--· ------·· -·- -·-- ·- . 
. ·:formulated .the ':emba.rg·o· ~is: a resu~t of "moral pressure" _and ~t ··was the 
.. 
Depa_rtment· that pressed Congress for quick passage of th~ formal embargo. - N • 
- /, . 
·- ·---- ..... ------ - .. ·:-v,-·-
The .main motives behind the State Department's actions were 
more tl:ian jus·t public opinion and fear of involvement ·in a war. Hull --------.. 1.-
.,. y' 
. . ~-'·r ~ ,, ,, 
-, was exce,ptionally -eager to work together with England and' Ftance . in-. 
order to, localize the war. He ha,4 "'declared ·our neutr:ality in the con_- _ 
.. ' . ·' 
fl'1ict at the p~ecise time that .France ~as dr~wir1g up plans :i:'~-r .the. 
__ , 




·than coincidental .. B'oth· Britain and France had kept the .United States 
inf~rmed as to their plans~ _as· well as· _hope as to what United. States 
. . . 
. 
pol.icy woulrl: be;,. Hull evidently agreep with European non-intervention, • I 
. 




plans and was more than willing to pursue a parallel policy. The 
' ... - .. 
Secretary admitted·as mu~h in his letter to Key Pittman on May 12, 
• 
· 1938 ·---·---------- --"--------·--·-·--·-·---------··--------· ·--· ·--·- -·--······--····-· /: _____________ -------- . ·:---,--------.. - --· ____ ... __ ·---=-----------_-------
/ 
~ In August, 1936 ·shortly ~J~-~'!7 ___ _th~'. ___ j)-~g_i_nn.ing_~--6_f·_:theL . (;i:v.i·l: .. :_~-------~-~--~~~-----------·-~----------~---~~-------
~. - . . .. ""''''"" . ----·······-- . strife ih ·spa.in· it became evident that seve_ral· of the . . . 















-_a real danger of a spread of the conflict irito a 
• • --•·····- •.• - I 
-, Europe?n war, with the possibile involvement -of the. 
United States. That _the+e ,vas such ,-a real danger was 
realized., by every thoughtful observer ti.the world over 0 
Twenty-s~ven goyerµments of Europe took special 
cognizance of that fact in setting up a committee 
desigged to carry out a concerted polici of non~ 







l"--'=' ~=---=·---=~·-a=...· ...,_. ---· -~: -~--:-·-:---------~ -.-.- ·.--·--«-9~- -;.._· --~::--·- ·---~, · - _' 












. ,' ·•. . ... 







speeial _and.unusual circumstances this government 
· -~ ·declared,. its policy of· strict non .... interference 
in,, the s·truggle. and :at' the·_ s,a,e. ,time ·announ~ed. 
th~t export of arms from the United States to 
Spain would be contrary·to such p,olicy.~02 
- . . 
/._,.. 
·-11. 
.. ,._,. '\ 
\ -~ .. 
, 
··--·---.· Hull never re11-tly--fotl-owed-the- -.isolatio_n:fs·t·--p~lint---·of ~"View-;·--------~·----------··---------- , __ 
, .. He favored the-embargo because it was ati attempt to cooperate v1ith the l) 
,,.;c,,,;; '·,,,,,;.' 
' . ' 
major European· pe·ac~ ef.forts ·-.. As a:n .internationalist this w-as a policy --- _ ... 
he had wanted the United States to pursue .in general. The Spanish Civil 
- -- ----------····-------------~·-·------·----·-----·-- ---- - ___ _! _____________ ,. -----------·- ··--·--- ····-·· ------· 
War Embargo,, because· it also satisfied the isolationist desires of the 
country -·gave the S~cr~tary the opportunity to do· so.. -This in itself 
was· -of course- an admirable attempt to bring Americ·a ·back into the world 
" politic-al arena an:d· away from isolationismo However, Hull tvas as 
shor~-sighted as the·British ;nd rren~h in refusing to understand:the 
-
threat ·of further Fascist expanston. - Working for wo~_ld peace was one 
thing,. following the -Allied appeas·e-ment· policy· w;as another .. 
:l . 
f ~-,., 




-in regard to_Spain, I don't think Hull would have been so quick to invoke 
r . ~ 
- ':':' \ ... 
a_ n embargo-. -- He ~vou1c;l, of coutse, still had had- .to. contend with isola-
. . ' {,:q 
. \ ' 
tionist sent-iment in the public and Congress-, but he might have been · 
f' . 
. ' .... ': '~" ; ~ 
--less incline·d- t6 ·enfo.rce t~e· e-mbargo as strictly as he did. The Sino- . 
. - ·-···. - .. ' . ·.-~:~:. _ .. : .. •<' > ::.~_ -----. - -
Japanese War of 1937 comes into mind as an example when Hull (as well as 
·- .. -_· 
:Eto D., R@)-~ did-:~not-::go-:out.- of-·h-is ... :way ... to::::.place: . an .... embargo on-arms.~=:expor_t.s--:_'~-:=:-=-----:=:~::_-_-.--:~ _ _:___ ___ :~ .:=~: .. ~ ... ~::~:. 
. ' . . . 
-·-·----·- . ·- .. --- ,-----, ·-- --- ·--- -- --- - -----~--.. ----- ,, _____________________ ----------- - ----·-·--·- - ----· --- - . •' ·--•. --· ···---------
-· --· --·---- ~--·-- -- ·-- -·· --·- -- ---·--· ·: ---- ~\.,l ---- ---- - --· -· ., _____ ·-·- --·- -- ---~--- ----\- --------·-- ····-- ····- ----· -- . --- -------·--·----·----·· ·- ------ --- - -
to belligerent parties. Hull cont.anded that the United State·s had no,. · -·" 
·->.~ 
right to embargo arms in tha't conflict ·becau~e . .,µeith:er s·ide' had _declared · 
,. 
.. h' h: · 2·03 war on eac ot er. Yet .the Secretary was reverting back: to "lega-1 · 
{. 
' technicalities," something he had called If academic" :when the· Spanish ' ' 
. 204 


















· In any event it is obvious that ·:the embargo was not .forced upon· Hull by 
• 
• publi~. isolationism. He had a very .positive reason for the embargo in .. I. 
- --•) 
· his belief that it would help Europe to attain. peaceo 
., , 
However, I feel that ·is both unfair and incorrect to label Hull 








As. was pointed.out earlier, 
·,· 
tion.. He wanted· to make sure that. the United States did nothing to 
upset· the- NIC, but mediation or joint stat·ements were tabooo But· Hull, . l .. '· 
I • 
neve:C"theless, always !=oo·k pai'ns to make sure that we never antagonize.cl 
the NIC or for tµat matter arty European sJ;:ate:. Wb,en the Cuse matter ( . . 
' - .. 
. 
came up he sent explanatory notes to all nations concerned about Spain, 
. 
•.; 
·and in 1937 when the Department was_ for~e.d._to study the feasibi'lity of -
. 
extenQing .the e~bargo to Italy he sent a note of apology to Mussolini9 
-~ ( I • 
. " 
Hull··was· less concerned about ·Sp·anish democracy and even public.· senti-
, 0 
• • • 
-
• 
" ' • 
• • 
-~--~ , 
ment in this .. country than he was about our relations with the reading •.• 1--·, 
, •.•.• 
J •• 
European nation·s. However, as he note·d himself, he was quite for·tunate 
~;, 
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· · 205 powerful segment of the countryo -
. ' ··:···' 
. ,) - - . - -- --···. ·~~-~ --- - -- - - - ·..._ ___ -- - --------------··-·------------------····· ........ - - -------····· - - ---
····- ---·-- ........ -----··-
-·--···-~-----····-.. ·---------:-... .'.---·-·-···~·---····---·-·- ........... 
-----------------.--. --- ---······--·- ------ -,·-·· •""' ----··--··· ----·----------··---·-·-. ---- -·-· P,:reside~l!t]loo·sevelt:'s position and motiVE?S, on the other .. hand, 
we:re v~ry .di~~~tly,,.af'fec ted-by .... popu-la~---pp-ini-on-o~-----'The·c_19J~~-N:~JJ_t~~r:Li~ty:~:-:~-:.·_--~:.:.~~-----:_;:·~::~-~:'~~--- ,- • 0' ,,..._ .. , ·, ,·, •''"" ",F~--- . • •••···• • -~- ·- --·--· -• .- -·-· • __ .. ·:.. --~ .••. ,.,. •, ••··."•••• •-• ••••• • >. ·.,.'. .:~-• ,, • - • •• '-•••· , •. - c·•. ' - • ,' T.,a··,•• ,_., ___ ,_ ____ :.~"'- - ••••·• '.,. • .. ·• • .... - •. -. ··· ......•• · ..... ·-•:---: ·-~. •~ -H·.o. -•--•• .,·•• ·--- • ••• - •• .,_.,,-,-.•, .·., ... • •.. -·•·•-" ;.>•-" •• --~·. •, '" - •:•• ...... 
0 
. - -- ------··------·· ---- .. ----··-·· --···. - ---- -- -··-· ---- -
••,a.••••-•-••·-••••• -- . •---· 
. 
--- ·------ --- ·- ---·------ ---···-·--·- -·-· -- --·-···· - - - . -·- --·--·--·-·- . ·--· -----·---·- ··------···-----------·- . -------·---.------·····------·---·-·--.----·--·--.. --.-. . .-.--~~.I;"-- ·-~---
.. ' 
-·Act had shown ~him that neither the people· ·nor Congress were convinced 
• 
·- -.. ··--·--· 
-- --·- - ·-·-····· ··-····---------·-· . --· .... - -· ... , .... - - . --· . - -- ---- -··· --- ·-----···- •-- ·-··; -· ···--·· .. ·····- ---····-·- - .... --- -· - -···· ... - .. -
-- ................ ________ --------·- --·------------·----
·tJiat: ·he cOuld-· keep the country out of war. He had not liked ~µe -_I11:ctndc1tqry .· 
---:-·- .. , .. :·.-: ... 
"'\ -· - .. 
aspect of that measure but nevertheless quietly accepted it. The 
innninent election of 1936 made it_ all the more nece~sary, for the 
' 
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, .. -.,, 
,.--,_ 
what an isolationist public would want. Roosevelt could not afford to 
-
risk losing potential voters by taking an un_popular position in his 
foreign policy. If the ·President wg1s a.galnst· the embargo, which is .. .. 
. . 
. highly dou.bt.ful, he could),not----have cou-n-ted on his Se~retary of Stat~ for 




United States to adopt· an arms ban to _Spain. G~nerally ·fp~q, Roosevelt . 
_,,, ' . . 
. . . . . - . . -
- - - - - ' \. ' 
end~rse the embargo policy whether ·he liked it·., or. not. ·was forced to 
•' 
.. 
Even the dissident liberal groups that were- later to argue· for revision· 
were not yet organize·d .. .in the·· suunner and fall 'of ·1936 ·to give Ro·osevelt ' ~~ 
any support, if he h'~tt:'enipte~ to 'ste.er .another course·. 
- .:.,~}-
. ' 
- . Roosevelt's Spanish policy- was, on. the· whole,. characterized by_ 
,. 
k 1 d h 206 wea ea ers ip .. He bov1~4 __ both to Congress·, .whi~h reflected public 
sentiment, and to Hull. · Ile exerted no force of his own o The- President 
















..... --- •-------· -· --~----- ---~--.. .....:__ __ -· -------~----jJ favored the Loyal~sts, he also favored neutrality,. and'. the s·tand he n 
eventually took only increased the strength of the1 isolationists p.ositiono 
The idea that a strict neutrality policy would k:eep th~_. United States 
h 
-----------·--·"•···--·-·-~ •. J,. _____ . ----·· ---·- -----·-·· -----·-. . . .. --· ... . - - . 
safe became· all· the more imbedded in the minds of ·the public. · As one. 
contemporary commentator said:· 
:ii 
-r:i-





. . -- . ·- . --· --- -- -- - L 
. ---- -·--·-···-··- ---·-·-- . ·-···-·····-··-·· 
... - - -~~~-~--·---·--·----··-------····- . . ... --·. --- --·--1-_________ • ....... --'- -····-·········· . ···--·-·····-------··--·----···---,. .•. 0;. ·- -----·-····--·-··--·-·-.. -~, ------·------ ---•.-··- ··- - ·---- - -- ··- - . .. 
- -·- -~~~---·:-____ ---- ---------- History may·: fecor·d that-as -a ·re-stilt ·of the Italo- -- -- - - ; . I' 
• 
, .. Ethiopian, War and. the Spanish C!i vir Wal.7 _ on~ __ 9f t!J.~ · _ ----,------------."- _______ · ___ .:. ______ . _ _. ___ ------------i .· 
•. . . . . 'most significant contributions of the administration ,.. .. . .· .. : 
definition of American. neutrality (in the form,. of 
· 
___ .. .... .. . .... . embargoes): Z()7 · ··· ·········· ···· · · --- - ····· ··-· " - ························· ·········· - ·· ·· ···· - . - \ - , 
-- .. ,- ·~ .-- -- . -, .. ,_ . . ,. 7c:, ... , - ;c· . , . -
,_J;'/ . -:. 
f)P 
The President was to regret this as he triJd to shift opinion away from 
(J • 
isolation and:,.neutrality after 193·7. · If he ·had not given th';. Spanish 
. ~ 
embargo his support, F oDoR .. might·"have had an easier time educating the . 
' b 
I 
people to a more internatioµal viewpoint· as world tensions increased. 
\ ... 
. a 


















. ..... -·----~-----------'-'-··· 
He also could~have.helped the cause. of democracy, even if the English 
and F~ench refused ~g), by allowing the Spani~h., Republic .... the right to 
purchase American arms. 
In tw.o later _war,.s··, the. Sinq-Japanese conflict·· of 1937 -and the 
Soviet-Finnish 'tvar of 19~9, ·Roosevelt refu·sed ·to invoke .the neutrality 
-80 
. · 208 
acts. The same course was available. in 1936, and even more so since 
.• 
.•·"tr 
there was no neutrality act to co~er· civil wars. and th~ President thus 
. 
. . 
had. full dis~retionary powers t~o -do ·a~ he: s~w--fit .. ~u~ F .-D'o··R •. d:!Jl ~ot 
' ' 
want to igriore the Spanish-conflagration. He personally pressed for 
', 
';" .. 
. , . 
Congressional passage. ·01:· ·the formal -embargo and {intil .. 1938 · gave no· · 
. 
' 




• • ~ 
{' pelicy.. As President, Roosevelt. was a little too ~earful of ·~$ending 
> 
. , 
. · • •,. , : • - , 
. : ·· · • · · 
· ',( • ' . ~~- -public -?pi~toJ.1·.- - H~ did not yet feel se1.~ure enough in 1936 al}~_:~··ear.ly 
,. ' ' .... 
·-.~; _..- .. ·-.. 
,I 
_·_>,:~_ ----·--.. -.~J. 
. lt;. 1 
' .J 
~ \ 







------------------------- ---~--1-937----to---buck it; and as a result the embargo was ado1>ted witJ1otltany 
, I 
·( . reservations. · · 
. ' 
.' 
.. Probably the mos·t ironic fact about the embargo policy of 19-36· -
;J 
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l·J 
' ··~ IJ 
,, 
' . 
. Hull who a~~---1.ooked ·at ·today a.s the vict.ims of a powerful -isol·a·t-ion .bloc . .- . - . . ;; 
' . 
in their failure .to bring America 'into ·the world arena in 1936, ·we_i;,~ ___ ..... 
~ • ~ ' . ''. ·• ;;'·,.,;, • •:1'.r): '\" :!.1 
,, 
• .. J • •• • ' ' • (~ 
. . j! 
. ' 
. J 
. . ., ? 
. ' ! 
... ,·- ··· -r ... , __ .-:-·_: ___ ·_ :., .. -;-.-.. --.--.--.-..... ,-·~ -·- -·.::.. .... :·:·---·-·_·.·· --~ 
·,;. 
I . ~ ,. 
• I . publicly in favor of the arms b_~_!-'!.~---··-Qp. ____ !;h~.-'Q_t;:het_.h_and, ... ,the ___ s~taunche.st-------.-··-·----- ---- - ·---·~: ...... ~----~f-··· -····------ .. ··-·· ····-·······-,,.-, --- - --··-----···---···-···-··-·--··-•-'•·· -··- ·-·. . ' -
• i, 
...... ············· 
) ··· .. 
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...... _ _..__., ... r,~., .... __ ,, __ .. ,·~ ··--·- .' ··- _____ ..., ..... _,_,~ ---~-- ~ ~~ . . . . . ., .· 
·---,·-·--··· ... ~ ... -.,·~-~-------
/ 
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r • ~ 





resoluti_on. pa~sed, but i~ 1938 it was Nye who tried to get the embargo 
lifted. However, it must again be e;nphasized that his objection to the 
embargo was on·technical- grounds. Nye was.worried that an arms ban 
f • 
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. . ·~-~- ' .·_, 
. . 
- . . . 
·Cerned about ··the fate of the Spanis'.ft~:overnment. Nevertheless, .it ~,as 
. ' t( ' ('1 
in Congress' that the embargo policy· met its stiffest opposition, -in the . . . 
I 
· e~rly in0nth$ of war, and not from the President or the Secretary of State. 
!,,, 
. " 
, I Ho'tvever,, Congres·s .tvas still ve+y mu~h _re~ponsible for the in-
"''\\ 4" 
b u ... 
vq~tng of the_ arms ~an e - •. · In the ye·ars before July, 193.6 it had· set th·e 
mood. of isolation and neutra~ity D Its members. h·a.c.! att~mpted to shield 
·America from a!lything to do with ~he _rest of the -world, and as a result 
,. 
_ play~d an influ.ential part in ¢letermlning the ·p9licy of .the President 
., 
, ' . 
. 
........ -
and. State Department in August, 1936 o , Though Congress was not then in • 
.• ·.' 
• + 
se~siori, the spirit of their earlier actions permeateq th~ Washington· 




. ~ .. ··.~ ;.~ . 
. : atmosphere .. ·And -for those who _were afraid to offe)1d public opinion·, it 
·~ 
\ 
. / .,. 
· ·"was best· to ·follow -this· ·spirit,· despice the peculiar nature of· the 
t . 
;,ff.· . 
. Spanish .. 'waro 
,, ' .. ,.,, :....; ---.-; .... 
Embargo RE?$Olution had run into some ·re,sis~ance from ·the is.olationists 0 
-·· ---· -·· 
' . 
-· - -= ---
•( . 
I' 
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- - - - ~ -- -- -- - --•- - -· - - - -,- -- - - -
- -
----·--···---- - --------·. ······-·-;-
-- -·· .--·--··· --··-. ---- - -· -·-----
if Roose:velt had decided to. let arms. g·o to ·spain, as he did in. the Sino-








. .,., . . . 
. . . . 
.. . .•. 
.. .. _,, ____ .. _ "·: ···-.----· -- .. 
. 1 
-· -__:_--of one --of -our merchan t···sh·ips ---·congress ·wou·ld--·have··-·been··· the ·first -t·o: --,----~--- -----------·--·---~==~~~-:·:::_-~:~-.-r . . 
. ' 
---· - --- --- ____ ,, ___ ,, _____ --- .... , ......... ,------···· - .... -···-·-- __ · .. -----·-·--··•"-•·-·:--:---" ,.,,,, _____ ._~.----·-·-··--- .. --- .. --------· -·- l ===-==-~-..::__-:··· -_-·~·:-.:::.:-,,.~--=--.:--·=---.:=:.~-=:-..:·=·~·:-_-:-:.--::..:~~--~-·~-~-=-:~-.-- ~--:---: -~ =· __ ... _ 
. . - ·' . ~ ·- - - -·~· 
! .. 
~- . 
.· .. : c~t~~ th~ Presi.~~nt .f~r d:aggi~g ~s . ~~to .lll~r· ... · I~o~~~~o~ w~s s~~;1....... . . ··········· .............. . 
----·-------,----the.,.byword o,f .. ,Cohgress .. Ls .. ,-O\l;tlook--towards,.-Americtiin-foreign .policy o ·· Had · • 
• I 
., ' 
• I ( 
the isolatiori.ist.memlJers ever realtzed··why-Hull·wanted the._embargo from 
" 
..... 
the outset. of t;:he war, the obJec.tions £tom :the Capitol woul<l: no doubt 
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·Congressional discussion on the Emergency Embargo. Re~olution, · Senator 
Borah emph_atically said that h~ woul·d not support the embargo if it was 
in· .any ·way an attempt to coopei;ate with .Europea11 non-intervention. Key f 
. Pittman was quick to allay 13orah_' s fear by flatly denying that. the. 
" 
. 





·~ I ' 
/ 
It is -obvious now, hcnqever, that Pittman's statement was far from true, 
but it at least sati'sfied Congre·~s . 
... 
·' 
. . . ~. 
In general· the United States had :·adopted a very naive policj 
• .
··, in-1936 .. It had believed on one· hand _th.at an. embargo oh arms exports 
-~ 
could k~ep·us safe. from the :folly of Europe, and on the other that an 
embargo would help to b-rin.g th·e ·war to an end or -limit it and bring • 9 
. • 
- • 
peaee to E~rope .. · · To say· the least, th.e p-~;i.cy was quite· short-=sighted. 
. -- ---·--, 
. 
Hu_ll regarded it. mainly ·i·n terms of.what Great Britain and France· 
· wanted. Roosevelt did not look beyond ·the 1936 election, and Congress 
"• 
never-.~ got over it~ psychosis of .t'ryirtg 0 to turn back history and stop 
~ 
• 
~ ......... :....,,.:·· 
. America's entrance in-th Wor.ld War I. Few seeme{d to realize' the dangers ' ' ~ 
of Fascis~ expansion _until Spain was lost .. At_. other times,. Hull's 
,, 
• • ... e<' 
' 
. • ,,, 
" cooperation .. :with._the .. Englis11 and French might have "been· quit_e de sir.able, 
• ' ' • ' 
' C. • ' : • • ' ·" 
- • / • . - . . . ·- . 
--
but in. ·regard t_o the Spanis~·,Civil _War we we.re ·only· abe~ting~-th~-t:·--excuse· :· 
- - ·'1 
. ' 
.·.... ,.:for-.a .. 1i0Jicy c-a:lled .. appeaseµient .• 
' ,. '·~· .. ,,., 
..... -
"' 
The Span~sh Civil War. policy was.· only another indication of 
... ,. ... 
·-,.;: ,., . -· 
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• • ·., •• , ,1 -.·•.; 
· the confusion·. of Amer_i_c_ai __ s __ ~attitu.de :in .1936-... CWhile t:he-~-:.r--e-s-t---ot-----the------------·---~--------- -· ·····-·-"·-----:··--·-·.;::·, . ·-·--·-•- --· .••··-·-· _ r ---·---• ."--··-·:.~ .. :.:.-:.: .. .'.·· .... :., .. :... .. · .. ~..:...c .. - ;-:- :: . ."."-·--····--··-·· · !'l ~ ··-•·• .• •· · ·----·· ··-;·. ·c'."'···;-·:-:-·-:-----·-· -,. . . . . , . • .. 
, '. • ' •l··•.,\;i '"• ~ ' 
. 
. 
••·,.•- ··->• ···,.--·-.-,,•,•• r, 'c-' ·-·-·••·-·-·••.c" 
.,, ' '') 
' 
' ' ' 
. ,.. ' 
' . ' ' 
' ' . ' 
····.·--,----,--·_ .. _ ..... ,_ ....... ·-·••.,,--~.2E.!~ .. -~~-~--c-~~gi!l.1:1:.i!!g.tQ._~ft~c\Y .. a..:t: .. t~~-.-s.eams ... we_, ... ~tayed .. ·.aloof ..... ~s .... much-a;S--··-...... -
. V 
. 
possible. And when ·we .. did- cooperate with other world powers it only 
' , 
served to worsen the world picture. -Germany and Italy .. ,-1ere ·again per-
,.· ' 
·, mitted to sneer ·at in:ternational lai:v and· order with the masked ~le.s,sing 
" 
., ' 
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of the democracips., lI~ll,~ even after World War "Ii had shown just where 
' i,_\ . •,. (/ . . 
the.policies.of.1936-1937 had led to, and still donterided thJt the 
• . r, 
I} 
., 
' United States embargo wa,s the ··right s_tep. According to the Secretary, 




Peace was preserved. -But this "peace" was short lived. Even more it 
... ,, .-· 
•i,l'' 




back on disord~r. ' -The .. f ati of Spanish democracy,· further wealcened the 
/4 -
position of the democracies~ Fascism now completely surro~!lde.d France 
':I_ •• 
· · and made. the internat~onal 'picture all the-_ (larker. · .'Roosevelt at· least 





fact, but_ Hull· never did'.~ ~Ui>po~ediy_ assisting .. ·came. to realize this 
the cause o,f. p~ace' America. had.,actually helped_. in further strengthe11it1:g . 
• 
: Fascism. J. ,--,,., -
·.:._ . 
. The confus_i_on_ in~·American poli~y wa~ also s~1own· by her d·ismissal 
~· , 
. of the traditions of international t>la~r~ 
. '. • ~I . •4' ", 
. . 
In ordeJ:' to _est;ablish.~ and 
. . 
'· 
. . . 
· ·maintain ·tp.e Spanisl) embarg~ .we had to··.flaun~· fc,:rnle~ -preced,ents ,,of· .. 
" 
........ ·- ·-·- ·-· .. ·-- ·- -·----- ···-·- ,.,. ~--- ... -- . ·--· ··- -··--· ... :• .... ·--,·· .'._ ---- ____ ,_": ______ ,_, __ ' -·-··-··- -··:··' ---------·""'· - - --- . _..___ "--'--~-----·----·-------- ----------- --·--··--·------·· ----·-----·-----·--------· --·- . ----·-- -----------·--·-··- - ---··--·"' . -· ----· ---·---·-·-·- ---- - ·-·---·---
'• law o · We had _-almos:t gone. to· the -extent of viewing. th·e Sp?-n-is~Ins-µ1:-gents __ 
. ' . ,. ,.:; 
, , . '. V . C -. 
, . • • , • r~ . . . . 
as true belligerents,· thus upse,t:ting-, the theory of ··non-recognition to 
' . ~ 
. . \ . . . - . . 
= 
.1. . . 
J: ··-------.--·--· ·. ..r.ehe_l.li.ous __ ~_o_die.s_.~i11-:.legal.ly--recognized-c-ou-n-t-F--ies--. ---Ro~seve 1 t ·, 1 i-ke i ~ ' ., . . (·' ; ., . . \ - . • . - ' 
- - - ·-·--··--·--------· . ··-------·------·--·-------------·- -, ------ . -- --------------------------- - -- ------------·-------"------ ----· , __ 
I- .• , ' 
. 
I l 
I '- • . . " I ) -
.. ' . ., ,. . 
_Wilson~ usually did his.u·tmost·to .uphold inter·national law.and. United 
. 
. - ' 
f C ..·.· : ·-, ·. · ; Sfa&~\i;--~:?=~~;~-?~i-~enbi, .. ~~~-~i~.t~=s i=~~:ance he did not. · .. In the .. ...... ..... . . . .. . . - . -· .. . . ~'-· --·-----, . 
. words of . Raymond-Bue~l-l-~cc~-7-----... ~-----------~----_. ___ :,._·. ~ ---, -_ --------------------------
' 
;j ~ •·:·•·•=·:::-:.:::.:.::~:•::•:~•-•·:'.-:'.:"::-:-'~'.:':":-:""-'--"·•··-~--"-•:::---••--·-•~'-";_, ____ ._,'.;::.-' . .,.,_-.,,-., --•••·-·-·---:-·-~·-- ,---· --· .. ---.. ---·~-• .. -·--·-----,- ·-- I ··--·--·--· .. --·····. ---· , .• : •• ·;, \. ·-----~-- ··- '··-":"·-·-----.. ----·-·. •'• ' • "- ~ .. --·-·- •" - "'·-•-·•·- ,· ·-"•••••••--·-·- • -·- .... - ... - •·.- ---.... -·"•" -•-----
- · ·It had been the traditiona1·_policy of the United ' ·-
1·--r···--- .. -"----'.-. :- ___ -·--.. - -_ --~'-c~ -~--------- _-_-_ .. :· -~--·sta-Ees··i:~o-···setl·-·arms····-·;Eo··~ ··re~ognized government -: -- ,. - =' 
··,.-_· .... -- ,· -·. - -------,::·------~------·_:--:;···------------ - ·----s-trU:gg~~~!-!s_=-=-~:~ .. ···;_e-_p:r~~s:-·J:_11~ei.;n~J~-;e.vo·l~~- - _l\I~verth<a~: .. __ --·- __ _ 
~ ,:_: ·~ - -~, •.. -.•.. ·; . _, . ~:·: :, ... " w·-,: .... ,.'. .... "_:. ... -.-. ,:. :: .. .- -~---~le'ifs·~~the-··,-pr-,fsidefiE .. ~--quickl_y_ .. -- ·rec_·oimiieriaed_,_,tliat:·~-this ___ . -"·------------ --- ·--.-- --·. -- --·- ·--,---.. ---·-·" -·-··· ._ -
.. 1'• • 
· · · · · · policy be. adandoned, no~ithsta,nding our. trea~y-
·- e---- .,. · (trade) with Spain in 1902 ,· ~hich seemed to pre- , 
vent such" actiono 211 
,., .. (" 
.. , . 








. ' \ ,.' 
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In sununation, the basic problem racing the American Government 
during this period of time was that of .determing ,-1hetl1er or not arms, 
"· ammunition and implements of war should be allowed to go to Spaj_n· for 
h f h 'f h ·1· . 212 t e ·urt erance o osti 1t1es. 
' 
Well-known legisla:tion dating from 1912 and 1922 c;lllowed the 
President to em~argo war mater·ials _at times of domestic violence in any 
country in_ the Ame:ricas or in which the United States exerc·ises extra~ 
. . 
territorial jurisdiction, v1henever. he finds "conditions of domestic 
violence e~ist, which are or may be promoted by- the use of arms or 
' 
"2r3 ~3.i '. 
... , .. ,., 
munitions of war procured from the United s·tates • 0 0 No statute, 
' 
however,:authorized-the imposition of an·emba:rgo upon. mun.itions t6·Spain, 




' ...__ As I have previously stated in the pape·r, international law 
.J 
- ' allows states singly or cuoperatively to embargo the, exporta'lion and 
- ____ .'! -- -·-. 
. . ,, 
' 
. 'shipment of a:r-m~_ to the contE;Sting _ part_ies Without ·thereby_ vio,la-ting: --
. 
· - - . 215- --;;- ---- - -- ---




. ' . 
'; ~ 
- · _________ . ___ - ·Tn:ec__United States held, and quite properly -under i~ternational ) 
'r: . 
·..:,· I'" , 
) .. 
- -------···---------------·---·-----··--· '-----~----- -----
--------- - '---------- -- • -· --·----- -----------·-- -- -··,--,." -·-c·· - - ------- ------·- ----------------------- --· .·-
• ·raw; 'tll-a'f~ in the absence o.f r·ecognition o.t, belligerency nei.ther---party 
r, 
' 
t · had any leg:al right to interfere. in any manner~ wheth~r by su~face, 
~-. 
... 
· · ~ -~ --------~ 2 -16- -------------.-··-- --------------··-----· - --~--·-- - • --~ .... -p ... _____ ..:.:,.......-..-- .,.,, ....... ~.,~.....-, -- -~~- --~--··-- ---"\"" ~-N_...._,.... _____ ,.....,."~---··<'• - ... ---~·---~- -----·-·~--~------•• - ·--- ---·~·---~~-----· ..----.---.. -.. ,... .. ---~--~~~- _.-_--------.. L~-·--· -- • 
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.!I 





I ..-~· ' 
hciv?~vet, which delimlts the right of a state t"o/ shut- off the export·ation · 
of any commodities within-its jurisdiction or the departure of its subjects 






. -_.,:._-. ..,..__-. -- ··-~···--· ----"~-----~-
-.-,.-_- ·-:c. . 
... 
As I have previously point~d ·out, it was contended by partisan 
I ' I 
' 
groups within? the United·. States and abroad that the Ame·r.ic~n emba.rgo laws 
. -
. ~ 
and th~ N6n-Intervention Accord amounted to violations of international - ~ --- • I • 
. . 




· 218 to purcha$e and export arms. · It is doubtless true .that ·principles ~: 
---
of a family of nations and·of ·the.solidarity of states bring in. their 
train ·an ethical. obl'i'gation of mutual supp~rt, ·one. government, _to anothero --- -. - -- -· -· -- - - --- .. -· - ~ ·----- -· .- --- . . 
. ., 




fore.ign government is. an unfriendly act to~ard the es&tabl.islied ·gpvern-
menb~ ·-:}U,.8-tifying · -severence· · of diplomatic· relations, 
. }.~ 
.1'''~-.:...._ . . . 
.l'~ . 
On the other hari<I, there is no universally ?'ccep~ed 
and even reprisals .. · 
rule requiring 
s ~ates to t>.lace- · a~s and~munt,-tions -a-t -the-.d-t-sp.o:sa·l -of- a .·-friendly govern~ · · ··. · 
··· -~ --. ment· ·d-istraught by· d·omestic rebellion. Inherent in the fundamental prin~_. · .. , . ,, . . . . 
·_'?-, -.~ 
,,,. . 
----~·- - ,----- - ------- '-----·----. ---~-·-----------. •------- ----- -- --·-·--·--·-···· --
.. 
. --- -- --- -ci.ple- 6-£--tlie. sovereignty of st~tes, which forms the °Qasis .of international 
< 
· law and relations, is th~ right of each state to decide for itself what 
articf~s shall b~ imported into arid exported from the national domain 
i . I . . . 219 
to foreign countries. ~ 
.1, 
·., 
• h The right of a government to:. make connnerce in any ~ommodity 




-·------··- - --------·---·----------------------.·-------- ---.------:- -- -- ~ - ------ -- - . -- ··---·-·--·-·· ----- ··----·----------------· -- . -· / ., "' 
,_,. . 
. . 
' . ' 
-... )) 
. 
-was .unfortunate if the effect of the imposi1ti6n of_ the embargo resul_t~d __ 




--------- ~--- --------,----in. i:?eakening . the., hand · of the es tab li:shecl'~·-gover11.mefrft ___ in S-palii--: --If · ad-
·--·-.-~----~--~._,~,-·......-,-· ··-· 1 · .. -.... ~ .. _____ ·J·---.-------·~·~-,-.,,---~------, ...... -~---· .. ··--···-··---··~-~~--·- ~-~----··· .... -- ...... ~-.,_. .. ..,_ ... _.,,-........ ·----~ ~----- ·-- __... --
·---···--. ·-·---·-· · - - Jni~_iit~:ted --~trictly, wi.thout ex~eption -in favor ~£ shipn1ents\ to -rebels · 
---··-·-· 
. . ' .. '" ~t' . 
. - ... ' -- . -----. -
........ , .... --~-.---- ,. -···---·--·--·· - -·-»·-·-·--,~ -,-, ,-,.-·---·.,.. ___ .....,.--~-·' --.~ -
,. 
" 
to in connection with the Spanish strife could not-be treated as an 
... l -·. \ "unfriendly_ act against Spain," or as "weakening the authority of () 
-international. law .. " It is unfortunate, but riot the concern of a foreign 
•'\·. 
. ,•,,!,.,.: . • ~'"----U'- •• -· *··=·-·--·-,F-3. ·-
i 
'':1 1!;1 ' 
.. ! 
. .. .,....._ 
t,r '"'-..., 
,._ ·--· 




$tate, if an established .government·cannot preserve dome$tic peace, 
cannot retain the·· loyal support and co~trol of its troops a~d munitions 
factories. While insurection may·--6e a crime and . treason under municipal 
a 
law, it is not an unlawful action under interna·tional law. International 
; ' 
.- --- . 
. lav1 embraces the subject·of insurgency, 'gives it .legal standi11g, and 
..•. 
· authorizes fo~eign states· to ·have "defacto" relations with insurgent 
•h, • • 220 
aut or1.t1.es .. Hence, it cannot be said that international la"ti · 
. ' 
. ' 
·necessitates stipport of an established government in s1:1ppres·sing 
insurrection o Because· of the· isolationist control of the Congres_~ the 
. \ / . 
embargo action of the United States government was more rigid than 
traditional. irtf::~rnational law .required.·----
·.~\ 
Iri--order to gain peace the United States hag ,bee_~ willing to· 
·~--· 
go· to any;'.extreIJ?,e D The fate of Spanish demo~racy, the ·danger_s of 
. . ' . Fascism,· and the implicatio_~s of banrii-ng .arm.s··'to the .. legal Span.ish 
Government were· all d~sregarded.o -~ 
.">· 
. 
·Washingtorf; how<:y~r, at least neve·r fell prey to the misguided 
notion ·that·- Spain was the battleground of .. Fascism and Communismo 
. . 
. \ While --,:~ 
I 
much\.of the Am~r:tcan .publi~ became,;c::.Q..~y~nced ~£ the supposedly " .. r.ed" . --------------------
·-- . . ~, 
. 
.... - . '- I 
. 
·~-
. . ::,.,.:• 
·character -of the· Popular Front Government 9f Spai~ pl1e Administration 
p ,i 
and most·of·congress-were able to.remain aloof.from such propaganda .. 
• ----•••••- 0,,..,••H• • - -••-·•'' • •· • • 
"'} . 
,:;: .... u,•..:,·:,•·•"·'·'·'"''"~'·'··\1lC1••••·,u~HU•• •,;i.••"''·••'-•'"••-·~·a.·•••• "''•'''''''"'"'·'""''"~-'"'..,';'"• 
. ---------
-· · -v-•~······~-----·--·-····-~---·---· ----·--- -·. , · .. --·--·----------- ,. ........ - . - .. •- .. The .. embarg·o-·-po'ri-cy .rwas. enactefd for several aforel!l~µJ:_i_Qg~g_maj_or. __ re_as_ons_,.-... 7,----- .. ~---'·-----~-·c--·- .. -----i _,_..., ___ ., ____________ - -- --· ------·-·-·-··--·---------.-·-···----------- ---- -;_, ____ -· ·--...-----------·-~··---. ··-·---------·------·····.;.----~--.. ··--:----~-:--... -~---------------------·---- - ····---·-·--------· -·-----,-------- ·---;-·--· ---:----~--- ,· ____ ... 
. . - . : 
- ---
-. -- ...:.----~--:.---:· -. _._,. '-. ,. 
none of which -inclu4ed ... a .fe~:~:~~of~..-..-the..-.:s:p.r.ead--.::of--.:-Connnunismo· Even when 
. Ameri.._~-~ris joined the Loyalist cause in ·the famous Abraham Lincoln 
-~ 
" O_ • ' 1' t~ /' '' I , • ' .• > • ••• ' ... Brigade, the Government,.s.did not try to stop theni because "of the.ir 
,, } i '> I > , '. ' . . 
', supposed-- Communist affiliations o Rather the .state Department felt that 
'• "••.,..,,,.,., 





~--!. .. . 
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- - -- - ----·--- 1 
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,..._ !"! ) ,. 
• 
.• such volunteer groups, whether they were Franco suppo:r:ter~ or Govern-· 
.Jt r1-J-''·'., 
.9. mer1t supporters, endangered non .... ·in·i:ervention and proved embarrassing · . - ' . . . . - . 














_., ____ _ 
. . . ..._ ,n ~ \~ ·. Roosevelt, and the rest ... of. the .Government leader,s w~re much more - -. . 
- ' 
con:cerned with '"peace'' _than. with .Fascism, Communism or democracy. in a 
country'" 3,000 miles away~---. 
.A •. (}: 
. ..... ,Q 
e • 






and the ·American eiµ.bargo policy and Emergency .Resolution little attention. . ' .... } ' ' ., 
: The latter is ·often viewed as the little brother. to the fitst ·major . 
.~ ~ ,· -· 
.neutrality act of 1935. The war 'is. a~s:o · :overshadowed by· the l_ater events 
) 
. 
. ·, . I 
. ;._ of Munich and World War II~· · Our .Spanis1{ policy· is important, however, .. 
. 
as a barometer· of ge11,eral American fore.ign policy in 1936-1937. It 
was a high water mark: of isolationism and a.t the same time the ·start 
of a more accelerated cooperation wtth EQgland and· France.. It finally 
. ,.. 
...... _,.. 
enlightened Roosevelt to the fallae:i:es· of ___ aq_i_ embargo policyo ~--~The, . 
- -"- -· -.---·· 
----·------
United States could no longer· ignore its respon_sibi~ity · to the world nor ' ' - ·~ 
• I 
"' ,. •. 
• 
could it just acquiesce to the confused policies of England and 















assistance tp Italy- and Germapy in their efforts ·to make Spain a· _Fascist 




. . ,l_~~'·· 
-- • 





.. : mination to ·carry through with, t,l;l.,e non-interve~tion idea, even . =!-_~ 6 _J;p.e 
-·--





face of obvious violations ·by- It~-ly an~ Ge:pnany. While Franco r~ceived 
d ·1• 
'' . . 
,. 
. 
' a.voluminous amount of aid, America along with the othe;·major democ-
·. racies · allowed the Spanish Republic to· ·go .down to -an· inglorious. defeat. 
. . . 
-- -·- --·-....- - ----- -~-- --· -~·-·--- ------ - -
.------··-· " ------------------~ ---·----- ------------- -------------
. - ,, 
- ---- ---

























The 1936 policies had shown the ,;ve8;J<-ness of trying to ~ooperate 
' . 
and yet stay aloof at one and the same time. If ·we had wanted1 • to stop 
. ~ ' . 
tl}t! .carnage _in Spain and prevent its spread to other nati·ons we should, 
/ 1 .. 
~ Ji. .•. _, have put our full weight behind Non-Interve1:1-tion and· prevented this 
I 
· policy from serving as a cloak for appeasem~~t. Instead we tried to 
- --- . - - - -~--- -· --- - --·--- -~--- - -- ~- ·-
--------- - - - --- - ------
/ 
' f 
,·,,· .. ., .... , 
steer a middle course' refusing to mediate .or se11-d arms' c>'r" for rthat 
matter do anyth·ing really constructive.. Congress was de.ad set in its 
' 
· . ways .of isolati.on in t936, Roosevelt was fearful of the election,. 
. . . 
·,1 
. ' ' . ' .1 . ' 
and Hti_ll and ~~s Department were\willing· to l~'t Europe take. t:he lead .. 
- ,. t . 
. in dealing-with "her own problern," ll 
\ .. 
~ r 
.-t··-:-:: ·'_.,/' -----· . ', 
h · r } 0 . 
. The major irony of our Spanisth E~bargo Policy is that though . 
-,,'init:Lally ·approved by is9lationists .and· cooperatiortists ·alike for · 
., 
, .. ---·- dif.ferent reasons C, it has. since been subjected to wide' denunciation 
on all sides. ·A s·t;i.l~l greater irony is that even thg~gh the policy 
. . . . - . 
, ' 
' . 
... ~· - ·- . - ...... --· ... - --• •r '··•• -• •• •-+ ••-•-••·--•-- • •·-·••- •••• 
' 
proved to be il,1-conceived and hastily implemented, i~ could not have I'\.._,,__:_~ 
been reversed without multiplying .th/d~ngers and a:i:agonisnis it 
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